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PETITION FOR WRIT OF ERROR.
To the Honorable Judges of the Supreme Court of Appeals
of Virginia:
Your Petitioner, Silas Rogers, respectfully represents that
on the 2nd day of August, 1943, an indictment was found in
the Hustings Court of the City of Petersburg, charging your
petitioner with having, on the 18th day of July, 1943, mur-
dered Robert B. Hatchell; that whereupon the said charge
was tried before a jury of the said City and your petitioner
was convicted of the said offense, and was sentenced to death,
and final judgment entered upon the said verdict by the said
Court on the 16th day of November, 1943.
A transcript of the record in this cause, and of the judg-
ment therein, is herewith filed as a part of this petition.
Your petitioner is advised and represents to your Honors
that the said judgment is erroneous, and that he is aggrieved
thereby in the following particulars, namely:
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia
ERRORS ASSIGNED.
First: The action of the Court in instructing and communi-
cating with the jury, during the trial of the case and in the
absence of the defendant, and in overruling the defendant's
motion for a mistrial based thereupon.
Bill of Exceptions No. 2, Record, p. 239.
2* "Second: The action of the Court in commenting, in
the presence, hearing and view of the jury, during the
trial of the case, upon the testimony and demeanor of the de-
fendant as a witness in his own behalf; and in overruling the
defendant's motion for a mistrial based thereupon.
Bill of Exceptions No. 4, Record, p. 261.
Third: The refusal of the Court, on the defendant's motion
at the conclusion of the Commonwealth's case-in-chief, to
strike the evidence of the Commonwealth on the ground that
it could not support a verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt; said motion being renewed and again denied at the
conclusion of the entire case after both the Commonwealth and
the defense had rested.
Bill of Exceptions No. 5, Record, p. 264; Bill of Exceptions
No. 8, Record, p. 268.
Fourth: The refusal of the Court, on the defendant's mo-
tion, to set aside the verdict of the jury in the case because
the same was contrary to the law and the evidence, and be-
cause the evidence was insufficient to support the same.
Bill of Exceptions No. 6, Record, p. 265.
Fifth: The refusal of the Court, on the defendant's mo-
tion, to grant him a new trial, because of the commission of
errors of law during the trial of the case and because the evi-
dence was insufficient to support the verdict.
Bill of Exceptions No. 7, Record, p. 266.
QUESTIONS INVOLVED IN THE APPEAL.
First: Did the Court err in instructing and communicatino"
with the jury during the trial of the case in the absence of
the defendant?
Silas Rogers v. Commonwealth of Virginia.
Second: Did the Court err in commenting upon the testi-
mony and demeanor of the defendant as a witness in his own
behalf within the presence, hearing and view of the jury?
Third: Was the verdict contrary to the law and the evi-
dence, and lacking evidence sufficient to support it?
3*  "STATEMENT OF THE FACTS.
On the night of July 17, 1943, or early on the morning of the
day following, a Studebaker automobile, owned by one Leslie
Cook, was stolen from in front of his residence in Raleigh,
North Carolina. This automobile was driven from Raleigh to
Petersburg. The driver, en route, picked up two soldiers,
James Jordan and Charles Stephens, just outside Raleigh and
transported them in said car into Petersburg.
On the morning of July 18, 1943, at approximately 7:00
o'clock, two Petersburg officers, W. M. Jolly and the de-
ceased, Robert B. Hatchell, while driving a patrol car, were
attracted by the Studebaker. They drove their car beside
the Studebaker and ordered the driver of the latter to pull
to the curb. Instead, the driver rapidly pulled away and was
pursued by the police officers at a speed of 60 or 70 miles per
hour through the streets of Petersburg until the Studebaker
was wrecked at the dead-end of a street by the Petersburg
Hospital. The driver jumped from the Studebaker and ran
into the area adjacent to the hospital. Upon the arrival of
the officers, Jolly took the soldiers into custody while Hatchell
pursued the escaping driver.
Between 7:40 and 7:45 on that morning, two shots were
heard (R., pp. 36-38, 79, 110-111, 118). Hatchell had been shot
and was, a minute or so later, found lying between the hos-
pital building and a line of hedges growing south thereof.
Two wounds, caused by one bullet, were inflicted upon him, as
a consequence of which he died shortly thereafter on the same
day. The bullet had entered the left hip and penetrated his
body, making its exit from the abdomen below the navel (R.,
pp. 41-42) ; the deceased's pistol was missing from his holster
(R., pp. 41, 43, 44) and neither the bullet nor the pistol was
produced in evidence at the trial.
The defendant, Silas Rogers, was arrested about 9:40 A. M.
on the same day at the north end of the Appomattox Bridge
on the edge of the City of Petersburg. It is the theory of the
Commonwealth that he was the driver of the stolen Stude-
baker and the slayer of Officer Hatchell.
4* *The two soldiers. Jordan and Stephens, testified that
the defendant was the driver of the Studebaker. They
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia
admitted, however, that they were away without leave from
the Army at the time they rode in the car (R., pp. 86, 99), that
it was dark when they got into the car (R., pp. 83, 93), that
one of them went to sleep in the car (R., p. 101) and that
while they were in fact stationed at Jackson Barracks, in New
Orleans, they told the police, when taken into custody, that
they were stationed at Camp Pickett, and that the police, hav-
ing released them on the belief that their statement was true,
were forced to send to Providence, Rhode Island, to bring
them back and to keep them locked in jail until the trial (R.,
pp. 87-88, 98, 101-103).
Charles Leonard Bain, a patient in the Petersburg Hos-
pital, testified that about 7:10 A. M. he saw a man run past
his window, that this man was the defendant; that shortly
thereafter, a police officer, not the deceased, passed his win-
dow, that about fifteen minutes after this officer passed, the de-
ceased passed the window and talked with the witness at the
window, and that about 5 minutes later he saw the deceased's
hat fly through the air, heard two shots, and saw the deceased
reel and fall. He was not a witness to the actual shooting,
and saw neither the deceased when shot nor his assailant.
Further, the witness admitted that he observed the person
running by his window while casually looking out of it (R.,
p. 113), that lie could see no more of his body than from a
little below the shoulders upward (R., pp. 107, 112), that the
man he saw was hatless (R., pp. 108, 113), and that he was
not certain of the color of the shirt the man wore (R., p. 112).
The record also shows beyond contradiction that at least 30
minutes intervened between the time the witness saw this
man running past his window and the time at which the de-
ceased was shot.
Mrs. Marie Davis testified that while standing in her house
she saw the driver of the car, as the car turned into the
street by the hospital, and that he wore a white sailor hat,
and a tan shirt which was torn on the shoulder. She stated
further that she could not identify the defendant as the
driver (R., p. 80), that she did not make a close examina-
5* tion of the driver (R.., p. 80,), 'and that the driver looked
like an orderly at the hospital and that she at first thought
that he was one (R., pp. 77, 80).
Mrs. 0. E. Prince, a private nurse on duty in the hospital,
testified that at 7 :15 A. M., she saw the deceased run around
the hospital, that 20 minutes later she saw him again running
with his gun in his hand and at the same time saw a dark-
-kinned man with a white hat on on the opposite side of the
line of hedges, that the deceased with his gun was then fol-
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lowing the movements of the man, that the deceased and the
man moved out of her sight, and that a few minutes later she
heard the shots. She testi.:ed further that she could not
identify the colored man (R., p. 120), that he was on the op-
posite side of the hedge fiom her and that she could see him
only through the stems of the hedge (R., p. 117), and that
she could see no more of his body than from 8 to 10 inches
below his chin upward (R., p. 117).
Officer Jolly testified that the defendant was the driver
of the Studebaker. However, he admitted that he did not
get a front view of the driver's face, but only a side view (R.,
p. 71), that lie did not know whether both soldiers were seated
in the back seat, or in the front seat, or one in front and
the other in the back (R., pp. 70-71) and that the only oppor-
tunity which lie had to observe the driver was during the
brief moment when his patrol car pulled up to the Stude-
baker, he, the witness, being about 10 feet away from and
somewhat behind the driver. He further testified that when
he and the deceased arrived at the hospital, the deceased
pursued the driver behind the hospital and later returned to
their car, that thereupon he and the deceased drove several
blocks from the point at which the Studebaker was wrecked
where they saw a man in the branch that meanders past the
rear of the hospital; that the deceased got out of the car and
went into the swamp: that he, the witness, stopped a man on
the railroad tracks and did not apprehend him because he
was a local mn, Via'hat some time later he was advised that the
deceased had been shot.
6.- "There is no evidence in the record as to how the de-
ceased was shot, and there were no witnesses to the actual
shootin!2. No witness eould identify the defendant as a per-
son in the viciity of the hospital within a period of at least
20 minutes prior to the time of the shooting, and there is
no testimony whatsoever that either the defendant or any
person remotely resemblinog him was in that vicinity at any
time ofter the sbot. were fired.
On the other hand. testimony by and on behalf of the de-
fendant throuzoh Qther witnesses shows that the defendant. a
Negro man 91 veers of ag2e, was returning to his home in New
York from Florida. t- renort to his Local Selective Service
Board for inrlctiop into th- Armed Forces. He was boboing.
He reached Tinilet. Nortli Carolina. about 6 P. M. on Jniv 17.
There the defendant, aftor conversing with attendents re-
fuelino, the Silver MeItoor. a Seaboard Air Line Railway
streamliner. wa- told that there was a snace on said train
located between the diesel engine and the baggage car, n
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which he might ride without being detected. The defendant
thereupon boarded this train and secreted himself in the space
which nad been pointed out to him.
The train left 1iamlet about 11 :GO P. M. on that night and
passed through Raleigh. The defendant remained on the
train in the same place. After leaving Raleigh the train was
forced to stop for about a half-hour because of a rail defect,
the stop being made at TMcKinney, Virginia (R., pp. 130, 164).
The defendant remained in his hiding place. After the train
left McKinney, and before it arrived at Petersburg, the de-
fendant was discovered (R., p. 130) by the diesel attendant
and the conductor of the train (R., p. 164). The conductor
told the defendant that there were numerous policemen and
railroad detectives in Richmond, and that he should get off
the train in Petersburg, which was the next stop. Accord-
ingly, when the train arrived in Petersburg the defendant
left the train from the side opposite the station, entered the
station (the Seaboard Air Line Dunlop Street Station) and
remained there until about 8:30 that morning, July 18.
The defendant, having changed his clothes in the col-
7' ored man's lavatory, "and, with his extra clothes in a
bundle under his arm, walked from the station to a Gulf
Service Station at the corner of South and Washington Streets
(R., pp. 150, 1 5). There, at about 8:45, an attendant gave
him directions as to getting out of Petersburg and across the
Appomattox Bridge to Richmond. At the north end of the
bridge he was arrested.
Each of the above facts was testified to by the defendmt
as a witness in his own behalf.
Lester Evans, a Seaboard employee, who worked at the
roundhouse in Hamlet and who was engaged in his duties
there at the time the defendant boarded the train, testified
that he saw another employee talking to the defendant, that
he saw the defendant get on the train into the door-space bo-
tween the engine and the baggage car, and that the other em-
ployee told him (the witness) that he (the employee) had told
the defendant to get up into the space. The witness further
testified that he was at the time working at the car next to
the engine and that the defendant was the man whom he saw
g-etting on the train.
Captain W. E. Bright, the conductor on the train on tbat
night, testified the train left Hamlet on that night and stopped
in Raleigh for 5 minutes; that the next stop, after leaving
Raleigh, was made at McKinney, Virginia, where the train
was forced to halt and stand for about 20 or 30 minutes be-
cause of a rail defect; that after the train had left IcKinney,
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and before it arrived at Petersburg, he saw a man riding
in the door-space between the baggage car and the engine;
that he, the witness, asked the man what he was doing there
and received in ieply that he was "just catching a ride";
that he, the witness, then told the man to leave the train in
Petersburg; that the man he saw there was a colored man;
and that he could not identify the man he saw because it was
dark in the place where he saw him except for the lights from
the motor and in the engine room, and because the man was
there sitting with his head down.
E. Porter, a trainman who was working in the baggage car
on the train, testified that he heard the conductor talking
8"' to a man beyond the door in the 'front of the baggage
car; that he heard the conductor tell this person to get
off in Petersburg; that he was busy working and did not hear
the answer of the man to whom the conductor was talking;
that when the train arrived in the Dunlop Street Station in
Petersburg, he saw a man on the side of the train opposite
the station who was then walking away from the train.
M. Haley Davis, an employee of the Petersburg Gas Com-
pany, which is situated near the Petersburg Hospital, testified
that he was working at the gas plant on the morning of July
18; that sometime after 7:00 A. M. he saw a number of police-
men come to search the region behind the Petersburg Hos-
pital; that just before the policemen came he saw two colored
men running down the street which extends along a portion
of the gas plant, and that these men turned and ran up into
the area which the policemen thereafter searched; that on the
same day the police took him to headquarters and asked him
to identify the defendant as one of the men whom he had
seen, and that he stated to them that the defendant was not
one of the men. When asked at the trial whether the defend-
ant was one of the two men seen by him, he again stated that
neither of the men he saw was the defendant.
Thomas Epps, an attendant at the Gulf Service Station lo-
cated at South and Washington Streets, testified that he ar-
rived at the service station at 8:30 A. M. on July 18; that
sometime between 8:30 and 9:00 A. M. he observed the de-
fendant walking calmly toward the service station from the
direction of the Dunlop Street Station; that the defendant
had a bundle of clothes under his arm; that the defendant ap-
proached him and asked him how to get out of Petersburg;
that the defendant told him where he came from; that he, the
witness, gave the defendant directions as to leaving Peters-
burg, and crossing the Appomattox Bridge. The witness fur-
ther testified that at about 1:30 on the same day, the police
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took him to -headquarters, where he told them the same thing.
The witness was positive that the defendant was the man with
whom he talked (R., pp. 198-199).
After his arrest the defendant was taken to police head-
9* quarters. The 'record shows without contradiction that
he was there severely beaten by the members of the Pe-
tersburg Police Force. He was struck over his head by a
blackjack which inflicted a severe gash and a knot on his head.
He was also hit with hard fist blows about the body and face
which caused him to bleed profusely from the head and nose.
Three glasses of water were poured up his nose as he was
pinned to the floor on his back by several police officers. A.
police officer pointed a gum in his face and threatened to kill
him. His hair was pulled, he was slapped down, and his hands
were bent backwards to the near-breaking point. All of this
was done to the defendant by the police officers in an attempt
to coerce from him a confession that he shot and killed Officer
Hatchell.
At about 11 o'clock on the same morning, a photograph was
made of the defendant and his fingerprints were taken (R.,
pp. 50, 138, 181, 187), both immediately after the assault.
The two soldiers, Jordan and Stephens, who had been ar-
rested and locked in cells about three hours earlier, were
brought in to view the defendant. The defendant testified
that they then stated that he was not the driver of the Stude-
baker (R., p. 141).
About 1:30 P. M. on the same day the defendant signed a
statement that had been prepared and typewritten by some
other person, which purported to show that he came to Pe-
tersburg" from Raleigh on a red truck. At the trial two wit-
nesses for the Commonwealth were permitted to testify that
the defendant stated that he came from Raleigh to Peters-
burg on a red truck (R.. pp. 209. 212). The defendant denied
making the statement (R., p. 154).
While the defendant was confined in a cell at the police
headquarters, the Petersburg police and the City Manager,
for two days, continued to search in and about the vicinity
of the Petersburg Hospital, the Lee Park area, and other see.
tions of Petersburg, with the aid of bloodhounds, for the per-
son who drove the Studebaker and who was suspected of hav-
ing shot the deceased (R., pp. 72-76, 184, 190-191, 201-203,
214).
10* "Finom-rprinfs were taken from the Studebaker by the
police (R., p. 187), but they were not the prints of the
defendant. The defendant's ciothine, was at all times subse-
quent to his arrival at the police headquarters in the custody
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of the police. However, his shirt and hat were introduced
into evidence after efforts were made to remove from them
the stains caused by the blood flowing from his wounds on
the morning he was beaten.
On the first day of the trial, after the Court had adjourned
for lunch, and after the defendant had been taken from the
courtroom to be returned to jail, the Court, in his absence.
directed the stenographer recording the testimony and inci-
dents of the trial not to take down statements about to b'
made by the Court, whereupon the Court turned to the jury
and stated to 'them that in the event they desired pajama,
night clothes or the like from their homes, they must not tele-
phone for the same personally, but, rather, that they must
procure the Sergeant to telephone for the same (R., p. 239).
Later, on the same day of the trial, after the defendant had
testified concerning his coming from Raleigh to Petersburg
on the Silver Meteor, and having denied on his cross examina-
tion that he made a statement that he came from Raleigh to
Petersburg on a red truck, evidence was introduced by the
Commonwealth's Attorney to the effect that the defendant
had, on the day of his arrest, stated that he came into Pe-
tersburg in a truck. Thereafter, the defendant took the stand
again and was offered as a witness in his own behalf to show
that the statement concerning the truck was not voluntarily
made by him; that it was a statement prepared and type-
written by some third person, and that he was beaten by the
police and forced to sign it under duress. The Court refused
to permit him to so testify. On the second day of the trial
the Court, in reversin- this ruling, and in announcing that
the defendant would be permitted to testify concerning the
statement made, made the following' statement in the pres-
ence, hearing and view of the jury (R., p. 261):
11* '"On yesterday, when the accused was on the stand
as a witness in his own behalf on cross examination, be
was asked by the Attorney for the Commonwealth whether
he made certain statements relative to his coming to Peters-
burg on a truck. The accused flatly denied making any such
statements. The Commonwealth's Attorney then laid the
proper foundation, told the accused that he expected to in-
troduce evidence to show that he did make those statemenis
at the time specified. If the accused had at that time desired
to make some statement about his coming into Petershur z cn
a truck, that was the time for him to say whatever he wanted
to say, althoue2h he had denied making those specific state-
ments. The Commonwealth's Attorney did introduce evi-
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dence to the effect that the statements were made by the ac-
cused.
"Last night the accused was again put back on the stand,
and the accused was asked to state what he did say in regard
to his coming into P1etersburg on a truck. At that time I ruled
that the accused had no right to make any such statement. I
am still of the opinion that I was absolutely correct in that
ruling. The accused has no right to take what is ordinarily
called 'two bites at a cherry'. tie had the right, if he denied,
as he did, making those statements, to say what, if anything,
he did say. But the accused has no right to sit idly by, so
to speak, and to take the chance that the Commonwealth will
not introduce evidence which it says it will introduce, and,
after the Commonwealth does introduce that evidence, then
to come on the stand and say I want to say what I want to
say.
"So that I think my iuling last night is absolutely correct
according to the law of the State of Virginia.
"However, this is a serious case, and I am going to reverse
my ruling in that regard because it is a serious case, and I
will let the accused go on the stand and make any statement
which he says he made in regard to coming into Petersburg
on a truck. I am not going to permit him to reiterate any-
thing which he has said about coming into Petersburg on the
Silver Meteor, because he has testified to that.
"So you may put him back on the stand, if you want to, for
him to make any statement he wants to make, which he claims
he made with regard to coming into Petersburg on a truck."
After the evidence was closed on each side and the jury were
instructed and the case argued for both sides, the jury re'-
tired, and after deliberation returned a verdict finding the d--




The Court erred in instructing and communicating with the
Jury during the trial of the case and in the absence of the
Defendant.
At common law, even in the absence of a statute or const;-
tutional provision, the rule is well settled that the personal
presence of the defendant at every stage of the trial is essen-
tial to a valid conviction on a charge of felony.
Silas Rogers v. Commonwealth of Virginia.
16 Corpus Juris, p. 813.
In Virginia it is expressly provided by statute that "A per-
son tried for felony shall be personally present during the
trial."
Code of Virginia, 1942, Sec. 4894.
This statute is merely declaratory of the common law,
Noell v. Commonwealth, 135 Va. 600, 115 S. E. 679 (1923),
and was, as was its court-created forerunner, intended and de-
signed to accomplish something more than mere formality or
technicality. It sprang from considerations deeply rooted in
an essential public interest as well as the welfare of a per-
son accused of felony. As this Court stated in Noell v. Cont-
nonwealth, supra:
"We need not here enter into any discussion of the origin
and history of this statute further than to say that the first
sentence above quoted was merely declaratory of a principle
of the common law. 3 Rob. Pr. (old) 267, 1 Chit. Crim. Law,
414; 1 Bish. Cr. Pr. Sec. 688. That principle did not spring
solely from a regard for the welfare of the accused. The
public has an interest in every case involving the life or lib-
erty of a citizen, and both in England and in this country it
has long been recognized as a settled rule of the common law
based as well upon public policy as upon the interest of the
accused, that his continuous presence, from arraignment to
sentence, is an essential part of the process of law pro-
13' vided for his trial and *without which the courts have no
jurisdiction to p-ronounce judgment upon him. Consti-
tutional provisions and statutory enactments not in conflict
with such provisions may modify or abrogate this general
rule. But in the absence of constitutional or statutory change
-and there is none as to felony cases in Viroinia-conformity
to the rule is essential to jurisdiction, and the accused cannot
waive it. The decisions in this state are directly and un-
equivocally to this effect." (Citing cases.)
And in Jackson v. Cominonwealth, 19 Gratt. (60 Va.) 656
(1870), it was
"These citations are sufficient to show the strict adherence
to the fule in all trials where the life and liberty of the ac-
cused is in jeopardy. The law is made. for the protection of
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the citizen, and all are alike amenable to its penalties and
entitled to its immunities. Whatever may be the turpitude
of his offense, however great his criminality, every man has
a right to an impartial trial according to law, and, until found
guilty by his peers, that law presumes him innocent; and gives
him the right to be present to see and know all that is said or
done by the court affecting his case." (Italics supplied.)
It is accordingly well settled in Virginia that one accused
of and tried for the commission of a felony has the right to
be present during every stage of his trial from arraignment
to judgment.
Palmer v. Commonwealth, 143 Va. 592, 130 S. E. 398 (1925).
Noell v. Commoncealth, 135 Va. 600, 115 S. E. 679 (1923).
Pierce v. Commonwealth, 135 Va. 635, 115 S. E. 686 (1923).
Fetters v. Commonwealth, 135 Va. 501, 115 S. E. 692 (1923).
Coleman v. Commonwealth, 90 Va. 635, 19 S. E. 161 (1894).
Shelton v. Commonwealth, 89 Va. 450, 16 S. E. 355 (1892).
Jackson v. Commonwealth, 19 Gratt. (60 Va.) 656 (1870).
Hooker v. Commonwealth, 13 Gratt. (54 Va.) 763 (1855).
Sperry v. Commonwealth, 9 Leigh (36 Va.) 623 (1838).
Bond v. Commonwealth, 83 Va. 581, 3 S. E. 149 (1887).
Staples v. Commonwealth, 140 Va. 583, 125 S. E. 319 (1924).
He has the right to be present when anything shall be dolne
in the prosecution of the case by which he is to be affected.
14*'  °Sperry v. Commonwealth, supra.
Hooker v. Commonwealth, supra.
Bond v. Commonwealth, supra.
Noell v. Commonwealth, supra.
Palmer v. Commonwealth, supra.
Snodgrass v. Commonwealth, 89 Va. 679, 17 S. E. 238 (1893).
"We do not inquire whether the prisoner was unfavorably
or otherwise affected by the cross examination of the witnesR
in his absence. He had the right to be present, which he did
not and could not waive. He had the riaht to observe every'
look, qesture, or move of the witness while he was testifying:
and it mattered not that the court excluded the evidence and
certified that it was repeated in his presence.'"
State v. Greer, 22 W. Va. 800 (1883). (Italics supplied.)
No part of the trial can properly proceed without the pre -
ence of the defendant,
Silas Rogers v. Commonwealth of Virginia.
Jackson v. Commonwealth, supra.
Palmer v. Commoniwealth, sitpra.
and without the continuous presence of the accused from ar-
raignment to sentence, the court has no jurisdiction to pro-
nounce judgment upon him.
Noell v. Commonwealth, supra.
Palmer v. Commoniwealth, sitpra.
Jackson v. Commonwealth, supra.
"No principle is supposed to be better settled, and, in all
criminal trials of the grade of felony, more rigidly adhered
to than that in all such trials, the prisoner has a right to be
present in every stage from the arraignment to the rendition
of the verdict. It is held to be a right of which he cannot be
deprived, and which he cannot waive. So imperative is the
rule of law, that no part of the trial can proceed without him.
If witnesses are examined, he must have an opportunity to
hear and know what they say. If notes of the testimony are,
afterwards, read to the jury, it is no less his privilege and
right to hear the reading of it. How much influence th,-
15* readinL' of the testimony in this *case may have upoli
the minds of the jury, it is impossible to determine. It
is not, however, a question whether the effect of the reading
of the testimony in his absence was unfavorable to him, or
otherwise, or bow far his case was affected by it, if at all.
Under the established and safe practice in criminal proceed-
ings, the reading of this testimony was irregular and in vio-
lation of the rights of the prisoner, who must be present at
every part of the pro,eedino's. In his absence, there can be
no trial. The law provides for his presence. And every step
taken in his absence is void, and vitiates the whole proceed-
ing. On this point all authorities agree. And no question can
be raised, as to the extent of the injury done to the prisoner,
or whether any inury resulted from his not being present.
Circumstances mioht occur, were the practice to obtain, wher.!
great wrong would result. The possibility for wrong is suf-
ficient to secure in all trials, involving life and liberty, tlhe
rigid enforcement of the law."
Jackson v. Commonwealth, supra.
The result is that a single step taken during the defendant 's
absonce is void, and its occurrence vitiates the entire nro
ceeding.
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Jackson v. Commonwealth, supra.
It has accordingly been held on numerous occasions by this
Court that the absence of the defendant during a part of the
trial constituted reversible error. In the following cases, the
conviction was reversed for this reason:
Staples v. Commonwealth, 140 Va. 583, 125 S. E. 319 (1924):
Accused absent when motion in arrest of judgment argued
and judgment entered.
Noell v. CommonwealthI, 135 Va. 600, 115 S. E. 679 (1923):
Accused absent on view by jury.
Pierce v. Commonwealth, 135 Va. 635, 115 S. E. 686 (1923):
Accused absent on view by jury.
Fetters v. Commonwealth, 135 Va. 501, 115 S. E. 692 (1923):
Accused absent on view by jury.
Colenan v. Commoniwealth, 90 Va. 635, 19 S. E. 161 (1894):
Defendant absent when motion for continuance made. This
decision changed by 1919 revision of Section 4894.
16 'Shelton v. Commonwealth, 89 Va. 450, 16 S. E. 355
(1892): Defendant absent on two occasions when mo-
tions for continuances were made. This decision changed by
1919 revision of Section 4894.
Jackson v. Conmionwealth, 19 Gratt. (60 Va.) 656 (1870):
Evidence read to jury in absence of accused.
Hooker v. Commonwealth, 13 Gratt. (54 Va.) 763 (1855):
Record showed that, when defendant's motion to set aside
verdict was made and overruled, defendant appeared by al-
torney, but failed to show that defendant was personally pres-
ent.
Sperry v. Commonwealth, 9 Leih (36 Va.) 623 (1838):
Record showed only appearance of defendant bv his attorney
during trial and conviction; nothing to show that defendant
personally present.
See also:
Bond v. Comnmonwealth, 83 Va. 581, 3 S. E. 149 (1887) : De-
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fendant absent when his attorney made, and the court heard
and overruled, motion to set aside verdict on ground of newiy
discovered evidence. Held, error, but that since defendant,
subsequently, while present, was given opportunity to renew
motion and refused to do so, the error was cured.
From beginning to end of the trial the defendant must be
present. It has therefore been held in the Virginias that he
must be present in the following instances:
(1) Upon the arraignment and plea.
State v. Younger, 2 W. Va. 579 (1868).
(2) Upon the entry of a plea of not guilty.
State v. Conkle, 16 W. Va. 736 (1880).
(3) When evidence is heard upon a plea of not guilty.
State v. Stevenson, 64 W. Va. 392, 62 S. E. 688 (1908).
I7 *'(4) Upon a motion for a continuance made after ar-
kaignment, prior to the 1919 revision.
Shelton v. Commonwealth, supra.
Coleman v. Commonwealth, supra.
(5) Upon the hearing of a motion for a change of venue.
State v. McCoy, 91 W. Va. 262, 111 S. E. 125 (1922).
(6) Upon the selection, examination and swearing of petit
jurors.
State v. Martin, 120 W. Va. 229, 197 S. E. 727 (1938).
State v. Younger, supra.
(7) When evidence is received or excluded, or witnesses are
examined.
Palmer v. Commonwealth, supra.
Jackson v. Commonwealth, supra.
State v. Stevenson, supra.
State v. Detwiler, 60 W. Va. 583, 55 S. E. 654 (1901).
State v. Sheppard, 49 W. Va. 582, 29 S. E. 676 (1901).
16 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia
even though the questions and answers are repeated in the
defendant's presence. There is nevertheless an error result-
ing from the previous proceeding during his absence which
is not cured, and this error is reversible.
Jackson v. Commonwealth, supra.
State v. Sheppard, supra.
State v. Greer, supra.
(8) When testimony is read to the jury:
Jackson v. Commonwealth, supra.
(9) Upon the argument of an objection to the introduction
of evidence.
State v. Snider, 81 W. Va. 522, 94 S. E. 981 (1918).
(10) Upon a view by the jury.
Noell v. Commonwealth, supra.
Pierce v. Commonwealth, supra.
Fetters v. Commonwealth, supra.
State v. McCausland, 82 W. Va. 525, 96 S. E. 938 (1918).
184 '(11) Upon a motion to strike the state's evidence.
State v. Sutter, 71 W. Va. 371, 76 S. E. 811 (1912).
(12) Upon the delivery of the indictment and written in-
structions to the jury.
Bowles v. Commonwealth, 103 Va. 816, 48 S. E. 527 (1904).
(13) Upon rendition of the verdict.
Gilliqan v. Commoviwealth, 99 Va. 816, 37 S. E. 962 (1901).
Jackson v. Commonwealth, supra.
Sperry v. Commonwealth, supra.
State v. Sheppard, supra.
(14) Upon the argument of a motion for a new trial.
Bond v. Commonwealth, supra.
Hooker v. Comm onwealth, supra.
State v. Grove, 74 W. Va. 702, 82 S. E. 1019 (1914).
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State v. Parsons, 39 W. Va. 464, 19 S. E. 876 (1894).
(15) Upon the argument of a motion in arrest of judgment.
Staples v. Commnonwealth, supra.
(16) Upon the entry of judgment.
Staples v. Conmmonwealth, supra.
State v. Bailey, 85 W. Va. 165, 101 S. E. 169 (1919).
State v. Dolan, 58 W. Va. 263, 52 S. E. 181 (1905).
State v. Campbell, 42 W. Va. 246, 24 S. E. 875 (1896).
In the case at bar, after the defendant had been removed
from the courtroom to the jail, the Court, in his absence, di-
rected the stenographer recording the testimony and incidents
of the trial not to take down the statements about to be made
by the Court, whereupon the Court turned to the jury and in-
structed them that in the event they desired pajamas, night
clothes, or the like from their homes, they must not tele-
19 ' phone for the same personally but, *rather, that they
must procure the Sergeant, into whose custody they had
been given, to telephone for the same (R., p. 239).
It is well settled that instructions given by the court to the
jury are a part of the trial within the rule requiring the pres-
ence of the defendant at all stages and parts thereof. It has
accordingly been held in countless cases that the absence of
the accused while the court instructed the jury constituted re-
versible error. In each of the following cases, the judgment
of conviction was reversed because of accused's absence while
the jury were being instructed.
State v. Grisafulli, 135 Oh. St. 87, 19 N. E. 2d 645 (1939).
Commonvwealth v. Cmv.iingham, 137 Pa. Super. 488, 9A. 2d
161 (1939).
Commonwealth v. Cohen, 133 Pa. Super. 437, 2 A. 2d 560
(1938).
Ah Fook Chang v. United States, 91 F. 2d 805 (1937).
Fina v. United States (C. C. A., Colo.), 46 F. 2d 643 (1931).
People v. McGrave, 336 Ill. 404, 168 N. E. 321 (1929).
Hopkins v. State. 174 Ark. 391,, 295 S. W. 361 (1927).
State v. Weiss man, 5 N. J. Misc. 625, 137 A. 718 (1927).
Duffy v. State, 151 Md. 456, 135 A. 189 (1926).
State v. Wilcoxen, 200 Ia. 1250, 206 N. W. 260 (1926).
Puckett v. Commonwealth, 200 Ky. 509, 255 S. W. 125 (1923).
State v. James., 116 S. C. 243, 107 S. E. 907 (1921).
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Mills v. State, 23 Ga. App. 14, 97 S. E. 408 (1918).
Pearson v. State, 119 Ark. 152, 178 S. W. 914 (1915).
State v. Shutzler, 82 Wash. 365, 144 P. 284 (1914).
State v. Beaudin, 76 Wash. 306, 136 P. 137 (1913).
Hill v. State, 54 Tex. Cr. R. 646, 145 S. W. 923 (1909).
Havenor v. State, 125 Wis. 444, 104 N. W. 116 (1905).
Bailey v. Commonwealth, 24 Ky. L. 1419, 71 S. W. 632
(1903).
Quinn v. State, 130 Ind. 340, 30 N. E. 300 (1892).
State v. Meagher, 49 Mo. App. 571 (1892).
State v. Myrick, 38 Kan. 238, 16 P. 330 (1888).
Roberts v. State, 111 Ind. 340, 12 N. E. 500 (1887).
Territory v. Lopez, 3 N. W. 104 (1884).
Bonner v. State, 67 Ga. 510 (1881).
State v. Blaekwelder, 61 N. C. (Phil.) 38 (1886).
See:
Bowles v. Commonwealth, 103 Va. 816, 48 S. E. 527 (1904).
20* In our own state, this Court has recognized the same
rule. In Bowles v. Commonwealth, supra, the Court, dur-
ing the absence of the defendant and his counsel, sent the in-
structions, previously given, and the indictment to the jury
room at the request of the jury. This was assigned as error.
As there were other errors in the record necessitating a re-
versal of the conviction, the Court declined to decide the point,
but said:
"Whether the sending of the instructions to the jury in the
absence of the prisoner would constitute reversible error, we
need not decide, as the case must, upon other grounds, be re-
manded for a new trial. Suffice it to say that the correct prac-
tice is that the indictment, the written instructions of the
court, or other papers proper to be given into the hands of
the jury upon their retirement from the presence of the court,
or afterwards, should be delivered to them in the presence of
the prisoner and his counsel, that objection may be made at
that time, if there be objection."
And in Palmer v. Commonwealth, supra, the court said:
"Generally stated, the rule is that he must be present on
his arraignment, when any evidence is given or excluded, when
the jury is charged, when the trial court wishes to commui-
cate with the jury in answering questions by them, and when
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the jury receives further instructions. He must be present at
every stage of the trial proper." (Italics supplied.)
Even in a civil case, it may constitute reversible error for
the Court to instruct the jury in the absence of a party.
Parfet v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 128 F. 2d 361 (1942).
Arrington v. Robertson, 114 F. 2d 821 (1940).
Krieger's Cleaners & Dyers v. Benner, 123 Oh. St. 482, 175
N. E. 857 (1931).
Monzingo v. Jones (Tex. Civ. App.), 34 S. W. 2d 662 (1931).
Burroughs v. Southern Colonization Co., 96 Ind. App. 93,
173 N. E. 716 (1931).
Boeru n v. Seymour Realty Co., 127 Misc. 577, 217 N. Y. S.
484 (1926).
Sommer v. Huber, 183 Pa. 162, 38 A. 595 (1897).
Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Robbins, 159 Ill. 598, 43 N. E. 332
(1895).
Fox v. Peninsular White Lead & Color Works, 84 Mich. 676,
48 N. W. 203 (1891).
21 "  *Fillippon v. Albion Vein Slate Co., 250 U. S. 76, 39
S. Ct. 435, 63 A. Ed. 853 (1919).
Read v. Cambridge, 124 Mass. 567 (1878).
Sargent v. Roberts, 1 Pick. (Mass.) 337 (1822).
The statements made by the Court in this case constituted an
essential part of the trial. They constituted a cautionary in-
struction to the jury as to their conduct out of Court, an
instruction as customary as the familiar instruction, in any
criminal case, that the guilt of the accused must be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. Nor are they any less essential.
Courts instruct jurors because, as individuals, they are not
always cognizant of the public function they must perform.
Numerous cases have recognized that the giving, in the ab-
sence of the defendant, of an instruction which merely ad-
vises jurors as to the manner of discharging their duties as
jurors, and which does not purport to advise them as to the
legal propositions they must apply, is reversible error. In
Daffy v. State, supra, in the absence of the defendants, the
jury foreman notified the judge that the jury desired further
instructions as to the form of their verdict. The jury were
then brought back into the courtroom, whereupon the Court
repeated the instructions previously given as to the form of
the verdict. It was held that this constituted reversible error.
In Puckett v. Commonwealth, supra, the trial judge entered
the jury room and, in the absence of the accused and his coun-
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sel, asked whether a verdict had been reached. Upon receiv-
ing an answer in the negative, the judge then further in-
structed them that no juror should subscribe to a verdict
which did not represent his conscientious opinion as to what
the verdict should be, and that the law required the Court to
keep the jury together and not permit them to separate. It
was held that this was reversible error. And in State v.
Shutzler, supra, the jury were brought back into the court-
room to be discharged. The Court was informed that they
stood eleven to one. The judge, in the absence of the accused,
then suggested that it would be proper for that one juror to
consider whether or not he was mistaken in his views, and
requested the jurors to return to their room for further
22' *deliberation. It was held that this was reversible
error.
Society is interested in having jurors arrive at their verdict
by the application of principles correctly representing the law.
Society is equally interested in having jurors arrive at their
verdict free from outside influences and pressures. This two-
fold consideration necessitates different types of instructions.
In order that jurors may know what legal principles to apply,
they must be advised as to the propositions of law which they
are to apply. In order that they may know how to discharge
their duties and functions thus placed upon them, they must
be instructed as to their demeanor while jurors. As the
considerations demanding a trial by a fair and impartial jury
uninfluenced by outside forces are as strong as the consid-
erations demanding that jurors make their determinations by
the application of correct principles of law., the instructions
necessary to accomplish the one are no less essential to the
trial of the case than the instructions necessary to accomplish
the other. Indeed, in some states, a mere omission by the
court to caution the jurors at each adjournment before per-
mitting them to separate is reversible error.
People v. Ma1ughs, 149 Cal. 253, 86 P. 187 (1906).
Johnson v. State, 68 Ark. 401, 59 S. W. 34 (1900).
Walrath v. State, 8 Neb. 80 (1878).
State v. Mulkins, 18 Kan. 16 (1877).
But even if considered as a gratuity, such instruction, if given,
is as much a part of the trial in a Virginia court as an instruc-
tion statin" a proposition of law; in this state the Court is
under no obligation to instruct the jury as to the law appli-
cable unless requested, and an unrequested instruction given
by the Court is no less an act of the Court than one requested
and granted.
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Trial by jury would indeed be a hazardous undertaking if
admonitory instructions were not given. It is highly probable
that instructions of this type are better understood and
23" mean more to jurors than those stating abstract 'prin-
ciples of law, and since the life and liberty of a defend-
ant in a capital case are as much dependent upon an immuni-
zation of the jury against persuasion and influences as upon
their being advised correctly as to the law which they must
apply, the considerations demanding his presence are simi-
larly as strong. Only instructions of the type given in the
case at bar can guarantee that essential fairness of
the trial which the courts have always so zealously guarded.
A reason sufficient to demand the defendant's presence upon
the giving of an admonitory instructionto the jury is the neces-
sity that he be there in order that he might object and except
to any action of the Court there occurring in violation of his
rights. Instruction of a jury is always fraught with danger to
the accused, and no step from arraignment to judgment fur-
nishes a greater opportunity for error and injustice. But the
principle demanding the defendant's presence is more than a
mere device for his protection. His presence is guaranteed be-
cause of an abhorrence of star chamber methods. He must
be there to see and hear all that goes on, the most minute as
well as the magnitudinous. But once it is established that the
Court iay, in the absence of a criminal defendant, advise
jurors as to their duties and caution them against improper
conduct, the gates will be opened and will never again be
closed, and the line between the permissible and the forbidden
could never again be established. The net result would be a
step calculated to destroy a good measure of that public con-
fidence essential to the functioning of our judicial system.
Nor does the fact that counsel for the defendant in this case
were present at the time of the proceeding in his absence alter
the case. In Virginia, the right of the defendant to be present
throughout the trial cannot be waived either by him or his
counsel,
Noell v. Commonwealth, supra.
Jackson v. Cornniouwealth, supra.
Pierce v. Comm onivealth, supra.
Shelton v. Commonwealth, supra.
Fetters v. Commonvealth, supra.
24* 'and it is well settled in this state that the presence re-
quired is that of the defendant personally instead of by
his attorney.
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Sperry v. Commonwealth, supra.
Hooker v. Commonwealth, supra.
Lawrence v. Commonwealth, 30 Gratt. (71 Va.) 845 (1871).
Thus, the mere presence of counsel for the defendant at the
time instructions are given to the jury in the absence of the
defendant himself does not insulate such proceeding against
error.
State v. Jovmes, supra.
People v. McGrane, supra.
Schafer v. State, 118 Tex. Cr. R. 659, 40 S. WXV. 2d 147 (1931).
If the presence of counsel nullifies, in such cases, the possi-
bility of reversal, it would do so in other cases of proceedings
occurring in the absence of the accused. Then his right to
be present in person would be reduced to a mere right to have
his counsel present.
Nor can there be raised any issue concerning prejudice or
injury to him. It is well settled in the Virginias that no preju-
dice or injury resulting from the defendant's absence need be
shown.
Jackson v. Commonwealth, supra.
State v. Grove, 74 W. Va. 702, 82 S. E. 1019 (1914).
State v. Sheppard, 49 W. Va. 582, 29 S. E. 676 (1901).
State v. Greer, supra.
"And no question can be raised, as to the extent of the in-
jury done to the prisoner, or whether any injury resulted from
his not being present. Circumstances might occur, were the
practice to obtain, where great wrong would result. The pos-
sibility for wrong is sufficient to secure in all trials, involving
life and liberty, the rigid enforcement of the law." Jackson
v.Commonwealth, supra.
It is not, however, necessary for the defendant to charac-
terize the statements made by the Court in the case at bar as
instructions in order that a reversal might be forthcoming.
The fact remains that the court did communicate with the
jury.
25 It is reversible error for the jury or a juror, either
before or after the jury have retired for deliberation, to
make any communication to, or receive any communication
from, an outsider.
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S'pooner v. State, 56 Ga. App. 618, 193 S. E. 482 (1931).
State v. Harville, 170 La. 991, 129 S. E. 612 (1930).
Pitchford v. Commonwealth, 135 Va. 65 , 115 S. E. 707
(1923).
State v. Robinson, 20 W. Va. 713 (1882).
Rigsby v. State, 64 Tex. Cr. R. 504, 142 S. W 901 (1912).
Vaughan v. State, 57 Ark. 1, 20 S. W. 588 (1892).
Accordingly, it has been held in numerous cases that it is
error for the trial judge, in the absence, or without the hear-
ing, of the accused to communicate with the jury.
Schafer v. State, 118 Tex. Cr. R. 659, 40S. W. 2d 147 (1931).
Shields v. United States, 273 U. S. 583, 47 S. Ct. 478, 71 L.
Ed. 787 (1927).
Vaughn v. State, 102 Tex. Cr. R. 207, 277 S. W. 646 (1925).
Kindrix v. State, 138 Ark. 594, 212 S. W. 83 (1919).
State v. Alexander, 66 Mo. 148 (1877).
Territory v. Lopez, N. M. 156, 2 P. 364 (1884).
Hart v. State, 95 Tex. Cr. R. 566, 255 S. W. 414 (1923).
Havenor v. State, 125 Wis. 444, 104 N. W. 116 (1905).
Kirk v. State, 14 Ohio 511 (1846).
State v. Hunt, 26 N. M. 160, 189 P. 1111 (1920).
State v. Murphy, 17 N. D. 48, 115 N. W. 84 (1908).
State v. Patterson, 45 Vt. 308 (1873).
Booth v. State, 65 Tex. Cr. R. 659, 145 S. W. 923 (1912).
Hoberg v. State, 3 Minn. 262 (1859).
The rule is the same in civil cases. In such cases, the ver-
dict will generally be set aside if the jurors converse with out-
siders,
Berland v. Barrett, 76 Va. 128 (1882).
Chaffey v. Fenelson, 263 Mass. 427, 161 N. E. 616 (1928).
Vanmeter v. Kitzbiller, 5 AV. Va. 380 (1871).
Turner v. Beardsley, 19, Wend. (N. Y.) 348 (1838).
26" *Robinson v. Donahoe, 97 Ga. 702, 25 S. E. 491 (1896).
Campbell v. Chase Granite Co., 92 Me. 90, 42 A. 228
(1899).
See :
Yeary v. Holbrook, 171 Va. 266, 198 S. E. 441 (1938).
Griffin v. Tomlinson, 155 Va. 150, 154 S. E. 483 (1930).
Virginia-Western Power Co. v. Kessinger, 122 Va. 146, 94
S. E. 186 (1917).
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New River Ry. Co. v. Honaker, 119 Va. 641, 89 S. E. 960
(1916).
and reversal is the penalty for a violation of this rule consist-
ing of a communication between the trial judge and the jury
without the presence of parties and their counsel.
Meinecks v. Fidelity Inv. Co. (Tex. Cir. App.), 62 S. W. 2d
623 (1933).
Boyd v. Peunnewell (Mo. App.), 78 S. W. 2d 456 (1935).
Hunsicker v. lVaidelich, 302 Pa. 224, 153 A. 335 (1931).
Du Cate v. Brighton, 133 Wis. 628, 114 N. W. 103 (1907).
Danes v. Pearson,6 Ind. App. 465, 33 N. E. 976 (1893).
Hurst v. Webster Mfg. Co., 128 Wis. 342, 107 N. W. 666
(1906).
Crabtree v. Hagenbaugh, 23 Ill. 289 (1860).
Vatertown Bank v. Mix, 51 N. Y. 558 (1872).
Abbott v. Hockenberger, 31 Misc. 587, 65 N. Y. S. 566 (1900).
Hoberg v. State, 3 Minn. 262 (1859).
Gibbons v. Van Alystyne, 29 N. Y. S. R. 461, 9 N. Y. S. 156
(1890).
In Du Cate v. Brighton, supra, the judge, in the absence
of the parties and counsel, went to the jury room for the pur-
pose of announcing to the jury that the sheriff would take
them to supper. After making such announcement, he cau-
tioned them with reference to their conduct while going to, at,
and returning from their meal. It was held that this was
reversible error.
In State v. Hunt, supra, the Court, during a recess, and dur-
ing the absence of the accused and his counsel, listened as a
juror requested permission to examine a certain piece of
27' evidence introduced in the case. The Court then 'in.
formed the juror that the proper course for him to pur-
sue was to return to the jury box in open court and make the
request. This was done and the Court thereupon granted the
request. It was held that this was a forbidden communica-
tion.
In Hoberg v. State, supra, the trial judge in the absence of
the accused, went to the jury room and merely informed the
jury that if they desired any information on matters of law,
they should come into the courtroom and ask for it. It was
held that this was reversible error.
In State v. Murphy, supra, the judge, after being informed
that the jury wished to communicate with him, went to the
jury room and stepped just inside the door. He was informed
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that the jury could not agree. He said: "I will ask you to
consider the matter further. Good night." The defendant
was then absent. It was held that this constituted reversible
error.
In Crabtree v. Hagenbaugh, supra, the judge went to thejury room and merely declined to explain the meaning of
the written instruction which had previously been given to
the jury. The parties were then absent. It was held that this
was a communication necessitating a reversal.
Nor does the fact that the communication may have occurred
prior to the retirement of the jury for deliberation affect the
result. In State v. Hunt, supra, the communication was made
prior to the retirement of the jury. In reversing the convic-
tion, the court said:
"There is no more reason for saying that it is improper for
the trial judge to communicate with the jury after it had re-
tired to consider of its verdict not in open court and in the
presence of the parties than for him to have such communi-
cation with the jury about the case while on trial and prior to
such retirement. Whatever fact the juror desires to communi-
cate to the trial judge relative to the case then on trial should
be made from the jury box in open court and in the presence
of the parties and likewise the answer of the judge thereto."
28' OII.
The Court Erred in Commenting, Within the Presence,
Hearing and View of the Jury, Upon the Testimony and De-
meanor of the Defendant as a Witness in His Own Behalf.
It is well settled that a trial judge must not express or in-
dicate, by word or act, an opinion as to the weight or quality
of any evidence in the case, or as to the credibility of a wit-
ness.
Anthony v. Commonwealth, 179 Va. 303, 18 S. E. 2d 897
(1942).
Jones v. Town of LaCrosse, 180 Va. 406, 23 S. E. 2d 142
(1942).
Hicks v. Commonwealth, 178 Va. 261, 16 S. E.- 2d 639 (1-941).
Pinn v. Commonwealth, 166 Va. 727, 186 S. E. 169 (1936).
Slade v. Comnmonwealth, 155 Va. 1099, 156 S. E. 388 (1931).
Mazer v. Common wealth, 142 Va. 649, 128 S. E. 514 (1925).
Dejarnette v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. 867 (1881).
State v. Summers, 118 W. Va. 118, 188 S. E. 873 (1936).
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State v. Songer, 117 W. Va. 529, 186 S. E. 118 (1936).
State v. Wallace, 118 W. Va. 127, 189 S. E. 104 (1936).
State v. Shelton, 116 W. Va. 75, 178 S. E. 633 (1935).
State v. Price, 113 W. Va. 326, 167 S. E. 862 (1933).
State v. Ilively, 103 W. Va. 237, 136 S. E. 862 (1927).
State v. Austin, 93 W .Va. 704, 117 S. E. 607 (1923).
State v. Villey, 97 W. Va. 353, 125 S. E. 83 (1924).
See also:
Jordan v. Commonwealth, 181 Va. 490, 25 S. E. 2d 249
(1943).
As this Court recently stated in Jones v. Towun of LaCrosse,
supra:
"It is well, too, to remember that in Virginia, it is the duty
of the trial judge to interpret and to apply the law; but it is
the peculiar duty of the jury to evaluate the evidence. A
judge must not express or indicate, by word or deed, an
opinion as to the credibility of a witness or as to the
29' weight or quality -of the evidence. Any question or
act of the judge which has a tendency to indicate his
thought or belief with respect to the character of the evidence
is improper., and should be avoided. The impartiality of the
judge must be preserved in form and in fact."
Likewise, in Mazer v. Commonwealth, supra, the Court said:
"The high official position of the trial judge in a criminal
case gives great weight with the jury to his words and con-
duct, and it is incumbent upon him to guard against any mani-
festation of his opinion either upon the weight of the evidence
or the credibility of the witnesses. 'All expressions of opin-
ion, or comments, or remarks upon the evidence, which have a
tendency to intimate the bias of the court with respect to the
character or weight of the testimony, particularly in criminal
cases, are watched with extreme jealousy, and generally con-
sidered as invasions of the province of the jury.' Dejarnette
v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. 867, 874."
In the case at bar., the defense was that he boarded, on the
night of July 17, the Silver Meteor in Hamlet and traveled
therefrom on said train to Petersburg; that he did not leave
the train in Raleigh or at any other point between Hamlet and
Petersburg; that he therefore could not have driven the stolen
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automobile from Raleigh to Petersburg, as testified by wit-
nesses for the Commonwealth; that he was at the Dunlop
Street Station in Petersburg at the time the deceased was
killed; and that therefore he was not the slayer. On the first
day of the trial, the defendant took the stand as a witness in
his own behalf and testified concerning his coming from
Raleigh to Petersburg on the Silver Meteor (R., p. 126, et
seq.). On his cross examination, he was asked by the Com-
monwealth's Attorney concerning a statement which he al-
legedly made on the day of his arrest to the effect that he
traveled from Raleigh to Petersburg on a red truck, the mak-
ing of which statement the defendant denied (R., pp. 150-151,
153, et seq.). Thereafter, the Commonwealth's Attorney
30* placed two "witnesses on the stand who testified that
the defendant stated that he came from Raleigh to Pe-
tersburg on a truck (R., pp. 209-210; 212-213). After this, the
defendant took the stand again and was offered as a witness
in his own behalf to testify that the statement concerning the
truck was not voluntarily made by him, but that it had been
prepared by someone else and that he was forced to sign it by
duress (R., p. 223, et seq.). The Court refused to permit him
to so testify (R., p. 223, et seq.). On the morning of the day
following, however, the Court announced that the ruling made
on the day before would be reversed, and that the defendant
could again take the stand and testify with respect to the
statement allegedly made. This announcement was made by
the Court in the presence and full hearing and view' of the
jury, and was in the form of a statement reviewing the events
leading up to the Court's ruling. During the course of this
statement, the Court said (R., pp. 225-227 ; 261-262) :
"The accused has no righ1t to take what is ordinarily called
'two bites at a cherry.' He had the right, if he denied, as he
did, making those statements,, to say what, if anything, he did
say. But theaccused has no right to sit idly by, so to speak,
and to take the chance that the Commonwealth will not intro-
duce evidence which it says it will introduce, and, after the
Commonwealth does introduce that evidence, then to come on
to the stand and say I want to say what I want to say."
The rule forbidding comment by the trial court upon the
evidence in the case, and upon the credibility of witnesses, ap-
plies with great force to statements made by the Court which
prejudicially affect the accused in a criminal case.
It is well settled that it is error for the trial judge to ex-
press, directly or indirectly, by words or by conduct, in the
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presence of the jury, an opinion which discriminates against
or points to the guilt of the accused.
Hicks v. Commonwealth, supra.
Anthony v. Commonvwealth, supra.
Finney v. Commonwealth, 154 Va. 808, 152 S. E. 555 (1930).
State v. Edgell, 94 W. Va. 198, 118 S. E. 144 (1923).
State v. Hurst, 11 W. Va. 54 (1877).
31 'Laycock v. People, 66 Colo. 441, 182 P. 880 (1919).
Fuller v. State, 85 Miss. 199, 37 S. 749 (1905).
Thus, in Hicks v. Commonwealth, supra, the defendant was
indicted for robbery. When the case was called for trial, de-
fendant was asked by the trial judge whether she had a law-
yer, and, finding that she was without counsel, and in appoint-
ing counsel for her, said to the attorney appointed: "Mr.
Parker, this girl does not have a lawyer, and I am going to
appoint one for her. It is not much to this case, and if you
want to talk to her, the court will allow you a five dollar fee."
These statements were made within the hearing of the pros-
pective jurors. It was held that they necessitated a reversal
of the conviction, the Court stating:
"The jury might have thought that the Judge had no con-
fidence in her case and that there was little to be said on her
behalf, even though a death penalty might be imposed, a state
of mind probably brought about by the fact that two of her
alleged co-conspirators had already been convicted in his
court. A 'five dollar fee' in itself would indicate that the
Judge thought that there was 'not much to this case.' What-
ever may have been his reasons, his observations were in-
judicious and might have been harmful."
Likewise, in Finney v. Commonwealth, supra, in a prosecu-
tion for rape, the trial judge stated, during defendant's ex-
amination of a witness in his behalf and after the defendant
had pointed out that the information sought to be elicited was
very material, that "If it is, it is strikingly different from
what you have asked so far." It was held that the remark was
prejudicial error, and the conviction was reversed.
In State v. Hurst, supra, the defendant was indicted for
obtaining money by false pretenses. After the evidence was
concluded and the jury had deliberated for some time with-
out reachino a verdict, one of the jurors remarked to the
Court, in the presence and hearing of the rest of the
32* jury, that 'he thoug-ht that the jury could not agree.
The Court then stated, in the presence of the jury: "I
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see no reason why the jury cannot agree upon a verdict in this
case." It was held that this remark was calculated to indicate
to the jury that, in the opinion of the Court, the case was free
from doubt. The conviction was reversed.
In State v. Edgcll, supra, a prosecution for maintaining a
moonshine still, the defendant was jointly indicted with one
Wetherholt. Wetherholt was tried first and acquitted. The
Court, in the hearing of certain jurors later impaneled as
members of the jury to try the defendant, made the following
statement while discharging Wetherholt: "Wetherholt, by
the grace of the jury, you have been found not guilty, but
Wetherholt, let me say to you, in my opinion you are as guilty
as sin." It was held that this remark was highly prejudicial
in character, and necessitated a reversal.
In Fuller v. State, supra, in denying a continuance in a
prosecution for the unlawful sale of liquor, the Court, in the
presence of the jury, stated that there had been much com-
plaint about the failure to convict "these criminals,," and that
the Court feared that it was largely due to continuances. It
was held that this statement was prejudicial error.
Likewise, remarks or conduct of the judge during the trial
indicating his opinion as to the lack of credibility of a witness
for the defense, or otherwise tending to discredit a witness
for the defense, is reversible error.
Piun v. Coimm ouwealth, supra.
Mazer v. Commonwealth, supra.
State v. Staley, 45 W. Va. 792, 32 S. E. 198 (1899).
State v. Summers, supra.
In Piniz v. Commonwealth, supra, the defendant was tried
for receiving stolen goods. During his rebuttal testimony, a
witness suggested that a stepson of the accused and one of her
principal witnesses had attempted to intimidate him. There-
upon the Court, in the presence of the jury, asked the name of
the stepson and thereupon directed the Commonwealth's
33* Attorney to 'issue a rule against the stepson to show
cause why he should not be attached and punished for
contempt in intimidating the witness. It was held that the
conviction must be reversed, the Court saying:
"We think this incident and these remarks in the presence
of the jury were prejudicial to the accused. Thejurymight well
have concluded therefrom that the presiding judge believed
the charge that Harry Pinn, the step-son of the accused, was
attempting to intimidate one of the commonwealth's principal
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witnesses. They were well calculated to highly discredit, in
the eyes of the jury, the alleged offender, Pinn, an important
witness for the defense."
In Mazer v. Commonwealth, supra, the defendant was prose-
cuted for possessing intoxicating .liquor. The defendant tes-
tified that he kept a quantity of liquor which he used for
medicinal purposes, since both he and his wife suffered from
specified ailments. Defendant's daughter testified that her
mother was sick at times and that her father gave her liquor
to relieve her suffering, and that her father, the defendant,
also suffered from ailments to relieve which he frequently em-
ployed liquor. When the daughter was testifying, and after
she had stated that both of her parents used liquor for
medicinal purposes, the Court interrupted and asked if the
mother of the witness was not in court all of the preceding
day at the trial of one Sherman and if the mother did not go
on Sherman's bond after he was convicted, to both of which
questions the witness answered in the affirmative. Sherman
was the brother-in-law of the mother of the witness, and he
had been convicted on the day before of a violation of the
prohibition law. There was no connection between Sherman's
case and the present prosecution. Four of the jurors who
sat as jurors in the trial of this case were of the twelve who
sat on Sherman's trial. It was held that the questions asked
by the Court in the presence of the jury were of such a highly
prejudicial character that the conviction must be reversed.
'Tested by either rule, the statements made by the
34' Court in this case were of such a character as to require
a reversal of the defendant's conviction, for they were
calculated to prejudice both the testimony and the credibility
of the defendant as a witness in his own behalf. It is well
settled that remarks of the Court, made in the presence and
hearing of the jury, which reflect prejudicially upon the testi-
mony or credibility of the defendant as a witness in his own
behalf, constitute reversible error.
State v. Buchanan, 216 N. C. 34, 3 S. E. 2d 273 (1939).
State v. Herman, 255 App. Div. 314.7 N. Y. S. 2d 560 (1938).
Anderson v. State, 27 Wyo. 345, 1'96 P. 1047 (1921).
People v. McElheny, 206 Mich. 51, 172 N. W. 546 (1919).
State v. Drew (Mo.), 213 S. W. 106 (1919).
McMahan v. State, 61 Tex. Cr. R. 489, 135 S. W. 558 (1911).
Presley v. State, 61 Fla. 46, 54 S. 367 (1911).
Chancey v. State, 50 Tex. Cr. R. 85, 96 S. W. 12 (1906).
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People v. Willard, 92 Cal. 482, 28 P. 585 (1891).
State v. Coella, 3 Wash. 99, 28 P. 28 (1891).
Newberry v. State, 26 Fla. 334, 8 S. 445 (1890).
Cf. Horn v. State, 106 Tex. Cir. R. 190, 292 S. W. 227 (1927).
In Anderson v. State, supra, in a prosecution for obtaining
money by false pretenses, the defendant testified to what he
claimed to be the facts of the transaction and either directly
or substantially denied all of the alleged false pretenses, and
was proceeding to testify concerning certain attempts made
by him to rescind the transaction and return to the person
whose property was allegedly taken by the defendant the
money and notes received by the defendant. At this point, the
Court said to the jury: "Gentlemen of the jury, any attempt
on the part of the defendant to settle this matter or to return
the money or the notes is no defense at all." It was held that
however true as a legal proposition this remark may
35* have been, it was improper because 'it might have been
taken as an intimation that in the mind of the Court the
crime had been proven against the defendant, and that his
statement of the facts of the transaction was not entitled to
credit. The conviction was reversed.
In State v. Drew, su-pra, in a prosecution for statutory rape,
witnesses were placed on the stand to impeach the character
of the defendant. One of the state's witnesses, on cross ex-
amination, when asked what he had heard in relation to de-
fendant's character, said that the defendant had the credit
of several girls that he had ruined that were young "like
these girls." He was then asked if the defendant had not
married these girls, and the witness replied that the defend-
ant had married two of them but could not marry them all.
He was then asked by defense counsel if the defendant had
not been tried or convicted of any offense in connection with
that, and the Court interposed upon the state's objection, say-
ing: "Well, that might be why he wasn't, if he married
them." It was held that as this remark indicated in the
judge's mind that the defendant had married the girls merely
to escape a criminal prosecution, and therefore suggested that
the defendant had a criminal character, it constituted an
error requiring a reversal of his conviction.
In Chancey v. State, supra, the accused, prosecuted for rob-
bery, testified in his own behalf, and it appeared that he had
been drinking heavily on the night of the crime. A witness
for the defendant testified to considerable drinking that night,
whereupon he was asked by counsel for the defendant if he,
the latter, was drunk. In sustaining an objection to the ques-
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tion, the Court remarked: "If he did get drunk after he got
in that condition, I don't think that his testimony would have
amounted to much." It was held that the remark reflected
prejudicially upon the defendant's testimony, and the convic-
tion was reversed.
In People v. Willard, supra, in a prosecution for receiving
stolen goods, in ruling against an objection to the ad-
36 * mission in evidence of letters from "a third person to the
defendant, the Court, in commenting upon the testimony
of the defendant in relation to it, remarked, in the presence of
the jury: "She has contradicted herself several times in the
record." It was held that these remarks constituted rever-
sible error.
In Newberry v. State, supra, the defendant, who was being
prosecuted for larceny, was about to take the stand in his own
behalf when he was instructed by the judge, in the presence of
the jury, as follows: "You can state just so much of the facts
of this case as you desire to state, but all that you do say must
be true, and no one can ask you any questions." It was held
that such statement might have intimated that the judge
doubted the truthfulness of the statement about to be made by
the defendant, and consequently was improper.
In State v. Buchanan, supra, in a prosecution for murder,
the defendant was asked by the solicitor if certain money
which the officers found when he was arrested came from the
sale of liquor, to which the defendant answered in the nega-
tive. The solicitor then stated that he was not working, and
asked where he got it from. The defendant's counsel objected
with the remark that the defendant had not stated that he
was not working. Thereupon the Court, in the presence of
the jury, stated: "He swore both ways." It was held that
the effect of this observation, although one of "those slips, or
casualties, which, now and then, befalls the most circumspect
in the trial of causes on the circuit," was to discredit the de-
fendant's testimony in the eyes of the jury, so that his con-
viction must be reversed.
The statements made by the Court in the case at bar were
made in relation to the time at which the defendant should, in
the Court's opinion, have testified concerning the statements
allegedly made by him. None the less, they were as harmful
and prejudicial to the defendant as if the weight of his testi-
mony or his credibility as a witness had been directly
37* assailed. The 'rules forbidding prejudicial comments
by the Court condemn the indirect as well as the direct.
Consequently, numerous cases have held that remarks directed
toward the defendant's manner of testifying as a witness in
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his own behalf, but which reflect prejudicially upon the merit
of his testimony or his credibility as a witness, constitute re-
versible error.
State v. Bryant, 189 N. C. 112, 126 S. E. 107 (1925).
State v. Fenik, 45 R. I. 309, 121 A. 218 (1923).
State v. Rogers, 173 N. C. 755, 91 S. E. 854 (1917).
McIntosh v. State, 140 Ala. 137, 37 S. 223 (1903).
Synon v. People, 188 Ill. 609, 59 N. E. 508 (1901).
People v. Hill, 37 App. Div. 327, 56 N. Y. S. 282 (1899).
Cf. Mavnning v. Sta-te, 37 Tex. Cr. R. 180, 39 S. W. 118 (1897).
Thus, in State v. Bryant, supra, in a prosecution for murder,
the defendant took the stand in his own behalf. The Court
remarked, during his testimony: "This witness has the weak-
est voice or the shortest memory of any witness I ever saw,"
referring to the defendant. This statement was made after
the judge had requested the defendant several times to speak
louder and to answer the questions addressed to him by coun-
sel. It was held that this remark was clearly susceptible of
the construction that the testimony of the defendant was at
least questioned by the Court, if not unworthy of credit, and
necessitated a reversal of his conviction.
Likewise, in Mcntosh v. State, supra, a prosecution for the
illegal sale of liquor, the prosecuting attorney, during the
examination of the defendant as a witness, asked certain ques-
tions concerninog the defendant in relation to other liquor
transactions, which the defendant failed to answer except to
say that he did not know. He was ordered by the judge to an-
swer, the judge then remarking: "Your memory seems to be
remarkably clear about other things, and very cloudy about
this." It was held that the conviction must be reversed.
38' And, in People v. Hill, supra, a prosecution for per-
jury, the defendant, during his cross examination, was
given a paper purportinc to bear the signature of the sheriff
of the county, by the defendant as deputy, and was asked if
that was his simnature, whereupon the defendant evaded the
question, and the prosecuting attorney then stated to the de-
fendant that he desired an answer to the question, and told
him to stop "quibbling'." The judge then intervened by say-
ing: "Yes, answer the question and stop quibbling." It was
held that although the Qourt's remark was provoked by the
evasive answers of the defendant, it was absolutely improper,
and that the defendant was entitled to a new trial on account
thereof.
Again, in State v. Rogers, supra, the judge directed the de-
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fendant, who was being cross-examined under a charge of
cruelty to animals, to answer the questions concisely "and not
be dodging." It was held that although the remark was in-
advertently made and without an intention to discredit the
defendant, it was nevertheless calculated to have that effect,
and the conviction must therefore be reversed.
In Synon v. People, supra, in a prosecution for murder, it
appeared that the defendant, testifying in his own behalf, had
failed to make answers according to questions put to him by
his counsel, and was disposed to make statements not perti-
nent to the issue. He was thereupon harshly rebuked by the
Court in the presence of the jury. In reversing the conviction,
the appellate court said:
"The jury might well have inferred from the language of
the learned judge who sat in the trial of the case that his
opinion was that the plaintiff in error was making orations
and arguments instead of giving testimony, and was also mis-
behaving himself as a witness; that he was recalcitrant, and
showed a disposition to wilfully disobey or disregard the di-
rections or admonitions of the court. Su~h an impression con-
veyed to the jury by the presiding judge could not be other-
wise than greatly prejudicial to the defendant and to his de-
fense. " 1
39* 'Further, the statements made bv the Court in the
case at bar actually imputed misconduct on the part of
the defendant. Remarks and expressions by the Court indi-
cating that the Court entertains such an opinion as respects
the defendant require a reversal of his conviction.
Anthon.y v. Commonwealth, supra.
Boyer v. State, 16 Okl. Cr. 388, 183 P. 620 (1919).
Hart v. United States, 153 C. C. A. 597, 240 F. 911 (1917).
Collins v. State, 99 Miss. 47, 54 S. 665 (1911).
Allen v. United States, 115 F. 3 (1902).
Strange v. Commonwealth, 23 Ky. L. 1234, 64 S. W. 980
(1901).
People v. Moyer, 77 Mich. 571, 43 N. W. 928 (1889).
Bowman v. State, 19 Neb. 523, 28 N. AV. 1 (1886).
State v. Rothschild, 68 Mo. 52 (1878).
In Anthony v. Commonwealth, supra, the defendant was
prosecuted for operating an automobile while intoxicated.
'When the case was called for trial, the defendant moved for a
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continuance. The motion was supported by the affidavit of
the defendant and the certificates of two physicians, and was
based upon the absence of material witnesses. Thereupon the
court, in the presence of the veniremen who later qualified as
jurors in the case, said: "With reference to the motions for
a continuance in this case,, the court is satisfied that they are
not bona fide and that the motions are made for the purpose
of securing a continuance, a further continuance of the case,
and for the purpose of wearing it out on the docket." In re-
versing the conviction, this Court said:
"The nonjudicial statement of the court, made in the pres-
ence of the veniremen who later qualified as jurors, was preju-
dicial to the accused. These jurors might well have inferred
that the presiding judge did not think the testimony material,
or if material, that it was not entitled to credence. These
jurors might have inferred also that the presiding judge was
of opinion that the accused was guilty and that the motion
for a continuance was simply a device to evade or post-
40' pone the trial of a '-guilty person. All expressions of
opinion, comments or conduct, which has a tendency to
intimate to the jury the bias of the court with respect to the
character or weight of the testimony, particularly in criminal
cases, 'are watched with extreme jealousy, and generally are
considered as invasions of the province of the jury.' Hicks v.
Commonwealth, 178 Va. 261, 16 S. E. 2d 639, 640."
In Allen v. United States, supra, the defendant filed a mo-
tion for a continuance on the ground of the absence of a wit-
ness. The motion was supported by affidavits of himself and
his counsel setting out the facts to which the witness would
testify. The district attorney refused to admit that the wit-
ness would so testify, on the ground that the wife of the witness
had told him that the defendant's attorney had tried to get
her husband to give such testimony, but that the same was not
true. The statement made by the district attorney was cor-
roborated by the presiding judge as a matter of personal
knowledge, the remarks of both being made in open court and
in the presence of the jurors. It was held that the remarks
of the attorney and the Court, reflecting, as they did, upon
both the defendant and his attorney, and going to the jurors
unchallenged, were calculated to unduly prejudice them
against the defendant, and to prevent hini from having a fair
and impartial trial, and constituted reversible error.
And in State v. Rothschild, sapra, upon a prosecution for
larceny, a witness for the prosecution testified that he had
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been induced to leave the state, and had received money for
that purpose. The evidence failed to connect the defendant
with the transaction. However, the judge and the prosecuting
attorney instituted an investigation for the purpose of show-
ing by the witness that the parties implicated were certain of-
ficers of the law. Defendant having frequently interposed ob-
jections to the prosecution of this inquiry, the judge remarked
in the presence of the jury: "I am asking for this testimony.
This case seems to have been born in sin and brought forth in
iniquity. That is the reason I asked those questions. If the
officers of this court, and of this city, of these United States,
are to get before the grand jury evidence *without pre-
41' ferring preliminary charges in the preliminary courts,
and then buy off witnesses without any preliminary ex-
amination, I will see that they are brought to justice, and that,
too, speedily, without any preliminary charges. If the de-
fendant is not connected with it, it can be withdrawn from the
jury by instruction." It was held that the natural inference
following from this was that the defendant was, through the
agency of others, in some way connected with the matter of
getting the witness out of the way, and consequently the state-
ment was reversible error.
The statements made by the Court in the case at bar left
the defendant in a most precarious position before the jury.
The sole defense was that the defendant got aboard the Silver
Meteor in Hamlet and rode thereon through to Petersburg,
and that be did not leave the train in Raleigh. If he rode the
Silver Meteor from Raleigh to Petersburg, he could not have
stolen the Studebaker, and there was no evidence that the
defendant could have ridden this train into Petersburg and
then killed Officer Hatchell. Rather, the sole theory of the
Commonwealth was that the driver of the Studebaker was the
murderer, and in support thereof was attempting to show that
even though the defendant might have ridden the train from
Hamlet into Raleigh, he departed therefrom in Raleigh, stole
the automobile and killed the Officer in an effort to escape ar-
rest for the theft. Therefore, from the viewpoint of the de-
fendant, everything depended upon the establishment of his
contention that he traveled from Raleigh to Petersburg on
the train.
The Court's statements discredited not only the most im-
portant link in the defense, but also the most vital witness for
the defense-the defendant himself. Since it was imperative
that the jury believe the defendant's testimony with regard to
his coming to Petersburg, it would not be necessary that such
testimony be conclusively disproven in order that substantial
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prejudice to the defendant might result. On the con-
42* trary, anything put before the jury Ohaving the slightest
tendency to cast suspicion upon this highly essential tes-
timony would necessarily imperil the entire defense, and an
expression of the kind here involved, coming from the Court
itself, would be well nigh fatal. Even a minute indication by
the Court at this point could have turned the scales against
the defendant.
"It has long been recognized that even a slight remark, ap-
parently innocent in its language, may, when uttered by the
court, have a decided weight in shaping the opinion of the
jury. Vested as he is with superior authority, disinterested,
and possessing experience not available to the ordinary lay-
man, jurors, as a rule, are anxious to catch his view, upon
which to found their conclusions. As the jurors should be the
triers of the facts, such judicial influence should be studiously
guarded against." State v. Austin, supra.
And the statements made by the Court in this case were
more than slight. The Court stated that if the defendant had
desired to make some statement concerning his coming to Pe-
tersburg, he should have done so upon his cross examination
by the Commonwealth's Attorney, and that "The accused has
no right to take what is commonly called 'two bites at a
cherry' " and that "the accused has no right to sit idly by, so
to speak, and to take the chance that the Commonwealth will
not introduce evidence which it says it will introduce, and, af-
ter the Commonwealth does introduce that evidence, then to
come on the stand and say I want to say what I want to say."
This statement was not even made hypothetically. The direct
charge of the Court was that the defendant, having been asked
concerning the statements by the Commonwealth's Attorney,
either had something further to say which he did not deem
wise to say until after the extent to which the Commonwealth
could prove the making of the statements could be ascertained,
or that he was not telling the truth when he first testified that
he came to Petersburg on the train and that he did not make
the statements attributed to him, and consequently could not
concoct his reply or remove the contradiction until after
43* ascertaining the nature and *kind of the Common-
wealth's evidence on the point to be made; that the de-
fendant was either speculating upon the inability of the Com-
monwealth to prove that he made such statements, or else was
lying from beginning to end. In either view the Court's state-
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ments imputed to the defendant misconduct of the most ab-
horrent and fatal kind. As a manifestation of an opinion that
the defendant's testimony was false, the jury could hardly
react in any fashion save to convict; if, on the other hand, they
believed that the defendant was "taking two bites," there
would occur a most effective impeachment of the defendant
as a witness in his own behalf, affording a ready basis for the
jury to rec6ncile the conflicting evidence by discarding that
coming from the defendant.
There was nothing in the evidence to show or indicate that
the defendant was attempting to take "two bites at a cherry,"
or that he was taking the chance that the Commonwealth
might not introduce evidence upon, or might be unable to
prove, the making of such statements by him. Nor was it
clear that the defendant had ever made such statements to
the police officers voluntarily. Counsel for the defendant had
explained to the Court that the defendant was recalled to ex-
plain the circumstances surrounding the making of such state-
ments (R., pp. 229-230), and the rule forbidding comment by
the Court upon controverted facts demanded that nothing be
said or done to intimate the opinion of the Court with regard
thereto.
The mere fact that the statements were inadvertently made
is immaterial.
State v. Austin, supra.
State v. Bryant, supra.
State v. Rogers, supra.
State v. Buchanan, supra.
State v. Coella, supra.
III.
The Verdict WTas Contrary to the Evidence, and Lacked Evi-
dence Sufficient to Support It.
There were no eyewitnesses to the crime for which the de-
fendant was convicted. On the contrary, the Common-
44' wealth, in obtaining this conviction, "'relied exclusively
on the theory that the defendant was the driver of the
stolen Studebaker, and killed Officer Hatchell in an effort to
escape arrest. In the opinion of your petitioner, this theory
is not sustained by the evidence in the case, and the verdict
and judgment of guilt of murder in the first degree were
plainly wrong and manifestly erroneous.
When the crime charged involves the presence of the ac-
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cused at the time of its commission, the burden rests primarily
upon the prosecution to show that fact beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Draper v. Commonwealth, 132 Va. 650, 111 S. E. 471 (1922).
State v. Aliff, 122 W. Va. 16, 7 S. E. 2d 27 (1940).
State v. Parsons, '90 W. Va. 307, 110 S. E. 698 (1922).
State v. Lowry, 42 W. Va. 212, 24 S. E. 561 (1896).
There is no burden of any sort on the accused to show that
he was not present at the time and place of the crime, until
the Commonwealth has made out a prima facie case against
him. The burden is on the Commonwealth to prove his pres-
ence beyond a reasonable doubt.
Draper v. Commonwealth, supra.
State v. Aliff, supra.
State v. Parsons, supra.
State v. Lowry, supra.
To warrant a conviction of crime, the evidence must iden-
tify, beyond a reasonable doubt, the accused as the person who
committed the offense charged.
Stine v. Commonwealth, 162 Va. 856, 174 S. E. 758 (1934).
Davis v. Commonwealth, 99 Va. 838, 38 S. E. 191 (1901).
Johnson v. Commonwealth, 29 Gratt. (70 Va.) 796 (1878).
People v. Gold, 361 Ill. 23, 196 N. E. 729 (1935).
A defendant in a criminal prosecution is not to be preju-
diced by the inability of the Commonwealth to point out any
other criminal agent. Nor is he called upon to vindicate his
own innocence by naming the g'uilty party. He rests secure
in that presumption of innocence until proof is produced
which establishes his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
45 *Stine v. Commonwealth, supr.
Consequently, a judgment of conviction will be reversed
where the evidence does not satisfactorily establish the de-
fendant's identity as a participant in the crime of which he
was convicted,
Stine v. Commonwealth, supra.
Davis v. Commonwealth, supra.
Johnson v. Commonwealth, supra.
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People v. Gold, supra.
McNeil v. State, 104 Fla. 360, 139 S, 791 (1932).
for while the identification and whereabouts of the defendant
at the time the crime was committed are, in the first instance,
questions for the jury, yet where, from the entire record, there
is a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt, the judg-
ment of conviction will be reversed.
People v. Gold, supra.
It is submitted that there is not sufficient evidence in the
record to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the de-
fendant was the driver of the stolen car, or that he was pres-
ent in the vicinity of the Petersburg Hospital at the time the
deceased was shot. The testimony upon which an identifica-
tion of the defendant was sought to be established is of a too
untrustworthy and precarious character to accomplish this.
and, in the face of the alibi which was completely established
by the testimony of the defendant and other witnesses who
testified on his behalf, could not justify the verdict which was
returned in this case.
It is true that the two soldiers, who were found in the
wrecked car, testified that the defendant was the driver of
that car. But it was shown that they had every motive to
falsify their testimony in this connection, and that the same
was entirely unworthy of belief. They admitted that they
were deserters from the Army at the time they accepted the
ride (F., pp. 86, 99) and had been for several days prior
thereto. While, in fact, they were then stationed at Jackson
Barracks, New Orleans, they told the police, after they were
arrested, that they were stationed at Camp Pickett. Believ-
ing this, and knowing that Camp Pickett is situated not far
from Petersburg, they were released. They then went
46* to Providence, Rhode Island. The police were then
'forced to send to Providence for them, to bring them
back to Petersburg, and to keep them safely behind bars of
the city jail until the trial (R.. n). 87-88, 98, 101-103, 193-194).
Nor must the fact that they had been caught riding in a stolen
automobile, which would naturally occasion a disinclination to
tell the truth if the truth would implicate them, be over-
looked.
Further, indications that their identification could easily
have been inaccurate is not lacking. According even to the
testimony of witnesses for the Commonwealth, the defendant
was never identified by these soldiers from a line-up or group
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of persons; rather, he was merely brought before them alone,
whereupon they were asked whether he was the driver (R., pp.
208, 210, 214). It was dark when they got into the car (R., pp.
83, 93) and one of them went to sleep (R., p. 101). There
was substantial variance in their testimony concerning the
distance the police car was from the Studebaker (R., pp. 83-
84, 95). Stephens wavered on the stand when asked concern-
ing the presence of blood on defendant's person and clothes at
the Station House on the day of the defendant's arrest (R.,
pp. 100-101). If the defendant's testimony in this connection
is believed, they refused to identify him at that time at all
(R., p. 141).
No more persuasive was the testimony of Corporal Jolly.
He got within range of the driver of the car only during the
brief moment when his patrol car pulled up by the Stude-
baker (R., pp. 70-71). It is undisputed that the driver almost
immediately pulled off at great speed (R., p. 71). At the
only time he could, according to his own testimony, look at
the driver, he was driving his own car (R., p. 61) and was
10 feet away from (R., p. 64, p. 70) and behind the driver (R.,
pp. 62-64). He admitted that he could not get a front view
of the driver's face, but only a view from the side (R., p. 71).
Furthermore, he testified that he could not tell who the sol-
diers riding in the car were (R., p. 70), or what kind of hats
they had on (R.. p. 71), or whether they had on any hats
47* at all (R., p. 71), or even whether both were *seated in
the back seat, the front seat, or whether one was in front
and the other in the back (R., pp. 70-71). Perhaps his desire
to bring to justice the murderer of his fellow worker extended
his imagination beyond the point of reality.
The person seen by Bain, the patient in the hospital, was
running past his window, and a basis for an accurate identi-
fication, in the short glance which the witness got, is not ap-
parent. Furthermore, the man seen by Bain was hatless (R.,
pp. 108, 113), while the testimony proceeding from every other
person who saw the driver of the car is to the effect that lie
wore a white sailor bat. Bain admitted that he was only
casually lookinog out of the window when he saw this man
(R., T). 113) ; that he could see no more of his body than from
a little below the shoulders upward (R., pD. 107, 112) and that
he was not certain of the color of the shirt which the mar
wore (R.. p. 112).
Mrs. Marie Davis could merely state that the driver of the
Studebaker wore a wbite hat and a tan shirt. She admitted
that she could not identify the defendant as the driver '(F.,
p. 80) ; that she did not make a close inspection or examina-
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tion of the driver (R., p. 80), and that she at first thought
that the driver was an orderly at the hospital because he
looked like one (R., pp. 77, 80).
Mrs. Prince, the nurse, only stated that she saw a dark-
skinned man wearing a tight-fitting hat on the opposite side
of the line of hedges located south of the hospital, and stated
further that she could not identify the man as the defendant
(R., p. 120), that she could see him only through the stems of
the hedge (R., p. 117) and that she could see no more of his
body than from 8 to 10 inches below his chin upward (R., p.
117).
This was the only evidence produced by the Commonwealth
tending to establish the presence of the defendant at the scene
of the shooting.
On the other hand, the defendant gave a full explanation of
his whereabouts on that fateful night which was completely
corroborated and substantiated by completely disinterested
witnesses who had no motive to falsify. •
48* *It is indisputablv shown that the defendant was ho-
boing up from Florida to New York in order to report
for induction (R.. p. 126). There is no dispute as to his ar-
rival in Hamlet, North Carolina, at about 6:00 o'clock on the
evening of July 17, and his remaining there until the second
section of the Silver Meteor left at about 11 :00 P. M. (R., pp.
126, 127). He went to a movie, returned to the train yard.
talked to pDersons whom he found working there, and found
out about departine' trains and how to get out of Hamlet (R..
pp. 127-128). Ilavin_ been told that there was a small space
on the Meteor. located between the engine and the bagg!-age
ear, whi-h was largre onou'h for a man to get in and take a
ride unobserved, the defendant climbed aboard and hid him-
self in that snne., T ester Evans, a Seaboard emolovee at
Hamlet. who testified that he was at that time working at the
car next to the engoine (R., -. 157). also testi-fld that he saw
a man Eet on that verv train on that very nig'ht in the same
identical place in which the defendant and other witnesses
stated he was (F.. p. 158). and that the nin whom be saw was
the defendant (R.. nn. 159, 160. 161). Te exMlained that lip
saw the defendant. before be boarded +he train. 69ll1in- to
another emnloveo in the yard (R.. n. 157) who told him thnt
I- bad told the defendant to z'et into Ihat snae (R., n. 158).
Tj(,re is not a shred of evidence in the record contradictory
of Ihes facts.
Tf be-no" eonclusivelv stablisied that the cl-fendant took the
,Silver Meteo-r in Rlpioh. the Commonwalfh onild nrove it-
fheprv only by establishing that the defendant left the trai
in Raleigh.
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But the evidence in the case conclusively establishes that
the man who was thus hidden on this train remained thereon
after the train left Raleigh, and there can be no doubt but
that the defendant, the man who secreted himself into this
space in Hamlet, remained therein until the train arrived in
Petersburg, and was the man seen and known to be there long
after the train had passed through Raleigh.
49 " 'The defendant testified that the train, after leaving
Raleigh and before arriving in Petersburg, was forced
to stop because of rail trouble (R., p. 130), and that several
other trains were also stopped there (R., p. 130). That this
was true is.established by Captain Bright, the conductor on
the train (R., pp. 163-164) and Porter (R., p. 169) who was
working in the baggage car on that train. Furthermore, the
defendant related his conversation with the engine attendant
(R., p. 130) and the conductor (R., p. 130) while he was rid-
ing in the same door space and after the train had passed the
point of the split rail. Captain Bright testified that he saw
"a man" in the space when the train was between McKenney
and Petersburg, that he asked him what he was doing there,
and was informed by "the man" that he was "just catching
a ride," whereupon the witness advised him to leave the train
in Petersburg (R., pp. 164-165). He testified further that
the man he saw in that space was a colored man (R., p. 166),
and that he could not identify him because the light there
was dim and the man was sitting there with his head down
(R., p. 166). Furthermore, Porter testified that he heard the
conductor talking to a man beyond the door in front of the
baggage car (R., pp. 170-171) ; that he heard the conductor
tell this person to leave the train in Petersburg (R., p. 170) ;
that he was busy working and did not hear the answer of
this man (R., p. 170). The defendant further testified that
when he left the train in Petersburg, at the Dunlop Street
Station, he got off on the side opposite the station (R., p.
131) and Porter testified that he saw a man on the side of
the train opposite the station who was then walking away
from the train (R., pp. 170-171). The defendant was also
able to describe, on the witness stand, the station (R., p. 132)
and the situation of the ticket office and colored waiting room
therein (R., pp. 133-134).
Nor can such a theory as the Commonwealth was thus forced
to rely upon be reconciled with the events which occurred fol-
lowing the defendant's departure from the station. After
50" changing his clothes in the colored men's lavatory " (R.,
pp. 132-133), and, with his extra clothes in a bundle un-
der his arm, the defendant walked to the service station lo-
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cated at the corner of South and Washington Streets (R., pp.
134-135, 150, 195). He there met Thomas Epps, who testi-
fied that he saw the defendant walking from the direction olC
the Dunlop Street Station (R., pp. 195-196); that the defend-
ant appeared to be calm (R., pp. 196-197); that he had a
bundle of clothes under his arm (R., p. 198) ; that the defend-
ant approached him and he, the witness, gave the defepdant
directions as to leaving Petersburg by crossing the Appomat-
tox Bridge (R., p. 197). The witness was positive that the de-
fendant was the man with whom he talked (R., pp. 198-199)
and stated that on the day of the defendant's arrest he told
the police the same thing at headquarters where he was taken
to identify the defendant (R., pp. 198-199).
If the defendant had not been aboard the train from Ra-
leigh to Petersburg, he could not have knoNvm of the rail
trouble and the stop at McKenney. He would not have been
able to describe the conversation with Captain Bright. He
would not have known that the man on the train left from
the side opposite the station, nor would he have been able
to describe the station or the ticket office and waiting room
therein. Hardly would he have approached Epps at the serv
ice station from the direction of the railroad station, which
is diametrically opposite to the direction from which he could
have come from the Petersburg hospital. Hardly would h
have been calm. The only theory consistent with this evi-
dence is that the defendant was on the train and not in the
Studebaker from Raleigh to Petersburg.
The defendant was arrested at about 9:40, or two hours
after the officer was shot (R., p. 52). It would appear un-
reasonable to assume that a man who had just killed another
would consume such a period of time in traveling to a point
such a little distance from the scene of the crime. Likewiso,
the defendant had his clothes under his arm when a-
51 rested (R., D. 136) and we *know this to be the fact be-
cause the clothes which he carried bundled under his
arm had to be procured from the Commonwealth in order that
the defendant might introduce the same into evidence at the
trial (R., p. 132). It could hardly be assumed that had tb
defendant killed Officer Hatchell. le would not have utilized
the opportunity to chanoge into clothino, which did not match
those which he wore at the time of the shooting', or that he
would not have disposed of at least the tan shirt which he
allegedly wore at that time. Nor is ;t onn'eivable that a man
who jumps from a stolen automobile before it stops would
bother to carry his extra clothing with him as he attempted
to escape, or as he overpowers an armed police officer, or
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that, wearing the same clothes in which he committed a double
crime, he, a perfect stranger in the city, would try to leav
the same by crossing a bridge on an open highway known to
be watched in broad daylight.
Nor does it appear that the police were satisfied that they
had the right man after the defendant had been arrested.
The uncontradicted evidence is that the defendant was badly
mistreated when he was brought to the police headquarters;
that he was hit on the head with a blackjack, struck by fists
in his face and about his body; that three glasses of water
were poured up his nose; that a gun was thrust in his face
and backed up with a threat of death; that his fingers were
bent backwards and his hair pulled. Witnesses even for the
Commonwealth were forced to admit that they saw the mani..
festations of the brutality of which the defendant was the
victim, and not an iota of evidence was introduced to show
that the defendant was never struck or otherwise mistreated.
A sordid picture of police violence inflicted upon a helpless
man is painted by the record in this case (R., pp. 57, 90, 91,
100, 101. 136, 137, 138, 139, 195, 196, 199, 200, 214, 215). But
the confession sought to make the Commonwealth's case
against him still was not forthcoming.
Despite the number of witnesses who testified that they saw
blood on the shirt and hat of the defendant after he was taken
to the police station, these two articles of clothing were intro-
duced into evidence by the Commonwealth after efforts
52* were made to remove the bloodstains (R., p. 54). The
defendant * (R.. p. 138-139) and other witnesses (R., pp.
91, 199, 215) testified that the shirt had been washed, and
since Captain Beaslev testified that he had bad the custody
of the clothing from the time of the arrest until the time oF
the trial (R., i-o. 56-57), this could only have been done by
the police authorities.
The stolen Studebaker was finger-Drinted by the police, and
prints were found (R., T. 187). The prints found did not.
however, match those of the defendant (R., p. 188). It is in-
conceivable that a man could drive an automobile from Ra-
leigh to Petersburuo on a hot summer night and not leave at
least one Pood fingerprint therein.
The police took the defendant to Raleigh and there at-
temnted to 4ind szomeone who could identify him. but no one
could (T?.. uDp. 140. 186). They stopped at several service sta-
tion s between Raleigh and Petersburg, but were unsuccessful
in their efforts to obtain wn identification (R.. p). 140. 141).
The defendant was also taken over in the colored section of
Petersburg. Again no one could identify him (R., p. 142).
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After the defendant had been arrested and locked in a cell
at police headquarters, the Petersburg police, in large forec,
continued to search in and about the vicinity of the Petersburg
Hospital, the Lee Park area, and other sections of Peters-
burg, with the aid of bloodhounds, for the person who drove
the Studebaker and who was suspected of having shot the de-
ceased (R., pp. 72-76, 184, 189, 190-191, 201-203, 214). On at
least one occasion a suspicious man was seen and fired at by
the police officers, but he managed to make good his escape
(R., pp. 202-203).
Even when the Commonwealth makes out a prima facie
case of the defendant's presence, if the defendant relies on
the defense of alibi, he is not required to prove it beyond a
reasonable doubt, or even by a preponderance of the evidence.
He is only required to introduce such evidence as will, when
the whole evidence is considered, create in the mind of the
jury a reasonable doubt as to his guilt.
534" 'Draper v. Commonwealth, supra.
State v. Parsons, supra.
State v. Lowry, supra.
Consequently, if the evidence offered to establish the pres-
ence of the accused at the commission of the crime is circum-
stantial in whole or in part, and the evidence in support of
the alibi raises a reasonable hypothesis of his innocence, an
acquittal of the accused should be directed.
State v. Aliff, supra.
And where the defendant is a stranger to the identifying
witnesses, the Court, in reviewing the evidence is required to
consider and weigh the attendant circumstances, together with
the probability or improbability of an adequate opportunity
for definite identification,
People v. Gold, supra.
and alibi testimony cannot be disregarded where the only evi-
dence contradictory hereof rests on the identity of the de-
fendant as the person who committed the crime.
People v. Gold, supra.
It is therefore submitted that the Commonwealth failed to
sufficiently establish the presence of the defendant at the
crime.
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Even if the defendant were shown to be the driver of the
stolen car, this would be a circumstance too meager in char-
acter to justify his conviction of the murder of Officer
Hatchell.
There is an obvious distinction between the sufficiency of
circumstances to convict, and their admissibility as facts in a
chain of circumstances tending to show guilt.
Davis v. Commonwealth, 99 Va. 838, 38 S. E. 191 (1901).
State v. McHenry, 93 W. Va. 400, 117 S. E. 143 (1923).
Even when admissible as items of proof of guilt, they must
be scanned with great care,
54 *Clarke' v. Commonwealth, 159 Va. 908, 168 S. E. 541
(1932).
Johnson v. Commonwealth, 152 Va. 973, 146 S. E. 260 (1929).
State v. Bennett, 93 W. Va. 548, 117 S. E. 371 (1923).
State v. McHenry, supra.
and, when considered as a basis for conviction of crime, must
be acted on with the utmost caution.
Anderson v. Commonwealth, 83 Va. 326, 2 S. E. 281 (1887).
Johnson v. Commonwealth, 29 Gratt. (70 Va.) 796 (1878).
See:
Abdell v. Commonwealth, 173 Va. 458, 2 S. E. 2d 293 (1939).
Smith v. Commonwealth, 171 Va. 480, 198 S. E. 432 (1938).
And, in order to warrant a conviction, circumstantial evidence
must rise to that convincing power which satisfies the jury
of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,
Gamble v. Commonwealth, 161 Va. 1024, 170 S. E. 561
(1933).
Massie v. Commonwealth, 140 Va. 557, 125 S. E. 146
(1924).
Porterfield v. Commonwealth, 91 Va. 801, 22 S. E. 352 (1895).
and must be consistent with the hypothesis that the accused
is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis
that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis
except that of guilt.
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Stone v. Commonwealth, 176 Va. 570, 11 S. E. 2d 728 (1940).
Stone v. Commonwealth, 162 Va. 856, 174 S. E. 763 (1934).
Hurd v. Commonwealth, 159 Va. 880, 165 S. E. 536 (1932).
Spratley v. Commonwealth, 154 Va. 854, 152 S. E. 362
(1930).
Canter v. Commonwealth, 123 Va. 794, 96 S. E. 284 (1918).
Burton v. Commonwealth, 10S Va. 892, 62 S. E. 376 (1908).
Johnson v. Commonwealth, 29 Gratt. (70 Va.) 796 (1878).
The test is not whether the facts and circumstances proved
are consistent with his guilt. They must also be inconsistent
with his innocence.
55 Gamble v. Commonwealth, supra.
Massie v. Commonwealth, supra.
Brown v. Commonwealth, 97 Va. 791, 34 S. E. 882 (1900).
If the circumstances are as compatible with innocence as with
guilt, an acquittal is required, and of two possible hypotheses
supported by the evidence, that of innocence must be adopted.
Hurd v. Common'wealth, supra.
Burton v. Commonwealth, supra.
Canter v. Commonwealth, supra.
It was about 7:10 A. M. on that morning when Officer Jolly
and the deceased arrived at the Petersburg Hospital (R., pp.
106-107). The deceased was not shot until 7:40 or 7:45 (R.,
pp. 36, 38). We are certain of the time at which he was shot
because a nurse hearing the shots had just previously looked
at her watch (R., p. 38). The last witness who purported to
identify the defendant, prior to the shooting, was Bain. The
man he saw passed his window at 7:10 (R., pp. 106-107). Even
assuming, therefore, that the identifications of the defendant
in this case are accurate, there elapsed at least 30 minutes
prior to the shooting during which anything might have hap-
pened and anyone might have acquired and utilized an op-
portunity to kill the deceased.
No one saw the shooting. No one had the deceased in sight
when he was shot. No one had his assailant in sight when
the shots were fired. There is no evidence in the record as to
how the deceased was shot. There is no proof even that the
fatal shot was fired by the deceased officer's gun. All that
we know is that he was shot partially from behind.
No witness could identify the defendant as a person within
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the vicinity of the Petersburg Hospital within 30 minutes
prior to the shooting, and there is no evidence whatsoever
that the defendant or any person remotely resembling him was
in the vicinity of the hospital at any time after the shots were
fired. Assuming that the defendant left the wrecked auto-
mobile in front of the hospital, where was he for the next 30
minutes? How was the officer killed? Did the defendant
shoot him? Was the situation such that no one else but
56* the defendant "could have shot him? The record is de-
void of evidence which would answer these questions.
Yet the defendant stands before this Court convicted of mur-
der in the first degree.
The territory to the rear and south of the Petersburg Hos-
pital is easily conducive to the escape of a fugitive. The area
is large (R., p. 30). There are thick bushes down by the
branch which meanders past the rear of the hospital (R., p.
30). The testimony in the case establishes that there were
many avenues leadin, into, and exits from, the area in which
the search for the driver of the Studebaker was being con-
ducted. A more natural cover for escape could hardly be
desired.
The evidence in this case does not show that the police put
such a net around the area that the driver could not have
gotten away with comparative ease. On the contrary, the evi-
dence shows that other persons were in the area besides the
officers and the driver. Officer Jolly testified that he saw a
local man on the railroad tracks lying to the northeast of
the hospital (R., pp. 67, 74). He also told of tracks which
were found by the branch (R., p. 67). A most significant piece
of evidence came from Al. Haley Davis, an employee at the
Petersburg Gas Company, which is located near the Peters-
burg Hospital. He testified that sometime on the morning of
July 18, a number of Petersburg policemen came to and
searched the region behind the Petersburg Hospital (R., pp.
175, 178); that just before the policemen came, he observed
two colored men running down the street which extends along
a portion of the oas plant: that these men turned and ran up
into the area which the policemen subsequently searched; that
one of these men came back, looked up the street, and then
ran back up into the bushes (R., pp. 175, 176, 177); that the
defendant was not one of the two men he saw (R., p. 1-77)
and that he had so advised the policemen on the day that the
defendant was arrested when he. the witness, was taken to
headquarters and asked to identify the defendant as one of
the men he had seen (R., pp. 176-177). What happened to
these men does not appear from the evidence, nor does wh,- ,
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happened to Officer Hatchell appear.
57A 'The man Bain saw was running away from police
officers. There is no reason to assume that he did not
utilize his opportunity to escape and continue to run away.
The driver of the Studebaker was not shown to have been
armed, and could hardly have hoped to cope with an experi-
enced policeman carrying a pistol or,much less, with a num-
ber of policemen searching for him. Indeed, the natural im-
pulse of the driver would appear to have been escape. He
had nothing to gain and everything to lose by remaining in
the vicinity of the hospital. The time intervening between his
arrival at the hospital and the shots was sufficient to permit
him to get a substantial distance from the hospital, and it
would be entirely too charitable to the Commonwealth to as-
sume that he would tarry there for 30 minutes. Apparently
the killer, whoever he was, did not remain in the neighbor-
hood of the hospital long after the shooting, for no one ever
saw a trace of him. If he could escape so readily after kill-
ing another, it is difficult to see how a person who merely
stole an automobile would have any greater trouble.
The evidence, rather, reveals a wide-open situation such
that anyone, for any reason, might have killed this officer.
There has been offered no explanation for the many questions
which arise in connection with an attempt to tie the driver of
the Studebaker to the murder of Officer Hatchell, and there
are too many hypotheses which are consistent with the inno-
cence of even the driver and certainly the defendant in thib
case. The defendant could not point out the guilty party.
Nor was he required to do so. He rests secure until the Com-
monwealth has proven a case against him beyond a reason-
able doubt. This being lacking, his conviction was not just;-
fied in this case.
The conviction will be reversed where the evidence is in-
sufficient to connect the defendant with the crime.
Stine v. Commonwealth, 162 Va. 856, 174 S. E. 758 (1934).
Davis v. Commonwealth, 99 Va. 838, 38 S. E. 191
58-- (1901).
'McBride v. Commonwealth, 95 Va. 818, 30 S. E. 454
(1898).
Garner v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. Dec. 458, 26 S. E. 507
(1897).
Pryor v. Commonwealth, 27 Gratt. (68 Va.) 1009 (1876).
Parker v. State, 43 Okl. Cr. 374, 279 P. 362 (1929).
State v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 53 Mont. 104, 161 P. 951"
(1916).
Stewart v. State, 58 Fla. 97, 50 S. 642 (1909).
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And this Court has on numerous occasions reversed convic-
tions where the evidence gave rise to no more than mere sus-
picion or conjecture of guilt on the defendant's part,
Stone v. Commonwealth, 176 Va. 570, 11 S. E. 2d 728 (1940).
Spicer v. Commonwealth, 156 Va. 971, 157 S. E. 566 (1931).
Warren v. Commonwealth, 144 Va. 669, 131 S. E. 227 (1926).
Lindsay v. Commonwealth, 135 Va. 580, 115 S. E. 516 (1923).
Brown v. Commonwealth, 97 Va. 791, 34 S. E. 882 (1900).
a result not affected by the fact that the greater weight or
preponderance of the evidence may support the charge in the
indictment.
Lindsay v. Commonwealth, supra.
Brown v. Commonwealth, supra.
To say the least of the evidence in this case, a verdict- and
judgment of murder in the first degree is unjustified. There
is not the faintest indication that this homicide in this case
was committed by any of the means specified in Section 4393
of the Code of Virginia which are thereby required to be
shown in order that there may be a conviction of first degree
murder. The record in this connection, as in others, is sim-
ply entirely lacking in evidence to support such a verdict.
Where the crime with which the defendant stands charged
embraces different grades of degrees, and there exists a rea-
sonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt in the greater
59' grade or degree, he cannot be convicted "thereof. The
prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the
detrree of the crime as well as the other facts of the crime it-
self, and the accused need not satisfy the jury that the lower
dlegree only has been committed.
Galloway v. State, 47 Fla. 32, 36 S. 168 (1904).
Likewise, where a particular intent is a necessary ingredient
of the crime, the evidence, whether direct or circumstantial,
must be sufficient to establish it beyond a reasonable doubt,
Tester v. Commonwealth, 157 Va. 826. 160 S. E. 62 (1931).
State v. McHenry, 93 W. Va. 396, 117 S. E. 143 (1923).
and a conviction based upon a total lack of proof as to an in-
tent essential to the crime must be reversed.
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Tester v. Commonwealth, supra.
Ward v. State, 67 Fla. 174, 64 S. 750 (1914).
State v. Hammond, 35 Wis. 315 (1874).
The presmnption was that the homicide of Officer Hatcheil
was murder in the second degree, and the burden was on the
Commonwealth to raise it to murder in the first degree.
Puckett v. Commonwealth, 157 Va. 800, 160 S. E. 19 (1931).
Nelson v. Commonwealth, 153 Va. 909, 150 S. E. 407 (1929).
Williams v. Commonwealth, 128 Va. 698, 104 S. E. 853
(1920).
Watson v. Commonwealth, 85 Va. 867, 9 S. E. 418 (1899).
McDaniel v. Commonwealth, 77 Va. 281 (1883).
There appears nothing in this record to carry this burden.
Where the evidence is manifestly insufficient to prove any
essential element of the crime, the conviction will be reversed.
Hurd v. Commonwealth, 159 Va. 880, 165 S. E. 536 (1932).
Gottlieb v. Commonwealth, 126 Va. 807, 101 S. E. 872 (1920).
People v. Lewis, 246 App. Div. 93, 284 N. Y. S. 940 (1936).
Gra'nt v. State, 112 Tex. Cr. R. 20, 13 S. W. 2d 889
60' (1928).
*Worster v. State, 82 Fla. 463, 90 S. 188 (1921).
Your petitioner submits that for the reasons set out in this
petition, which is hereby adopted as his brief, that the judg-
ment of the trial court should be set aside and a new trial
awarded him.
Counsel for the petitioner hereby request that they be per-
mitted to argue orally the matters contained in this petition
upon the application for a writ of error and supersedeas, and
certify that a copy hereof has been forwarded by registered
mail to the Honorable Oliver A. Pollard, Commonwealth's At
tornev for the City of Petersburg, Petersburg, Virginia, who
was Commonwealth's Attorney when this case was tried and
who prosecuted the same on behalf of the Commonwealth.
Said copy was mailed February 28, 1944. The original is
filed with the Clerk of this Court in Richmond, Virginia.
SILAS ROGERS, Petitioner.
By Counsel.
]?. H. COOLEY, JR.,
133 Harrison Street,
Petersburg, Va.
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SPOTTSWOOD W. ROBINSON, III,
Consolidated Bank Building,
Richmond, Va.
J. BYRON HOPKINS, JR.,







We, Robert H. Cooley, Jr., Spottswood W. Robinson, III,
J. Byron Hopkins, Jr., and Lynwood E. Smith, attorneys prac-
ticing in the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, do cer-
tify that in our opinion it is proper and the ends of justice
will be served for this Court to issue its writ of error and
supersedeas and review the judgment of the Hustings Court
of the City of Petersburg in the case of the Commonwealth v.
Silas Rogers, of which this record is annexed.
R. H. COOLEY, JR.,
133 Harrison Street,
Petersburg, Virginia.
SPOTTSWOOD W. ROBINSON, III,
Consolidated Bank Building,
Richmond, Virginia.
J. BYRON HOPKINS, JR.,





Received February 29, 1944.
M. B. WATTS.
March 14, 1944. Writ of error and supersedeas awarded by
the Court. No bond required.
I .M. B. W.
. w . I
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RECORD
VIRGINIA:
In the Hustings Court of the City of Petersburg.
Commonwealth of Virginia, Prosecuting,
V.
Silas Rogers, Defendant.
UPON AN INDICTMENT FOR FELONY FOR MURDER.
State of Virginia,
City of Petersburg, to-wit:
I, Robert G. Bass, Clerk of the Hustings Court of the City
of Petersburg, in the State of Virginia, do hereby certify
that, before applying for a transcript of the record in the
above-entitled case, the defendant, by his attorneys, gave
written notices to the Attorney for the Commonwealth of his
intention so to do, which notices are on file in my office afore-




The Honorable Oliver A. Pollard,
Commonwealth's Attorney for City of Petersburg,
Petersburg, Virginia.
You are hereby notified that on Wednesday, December 29,
1943, in the Hustings Court of the City of Petersburg, Vir-
ginia, at 10:00 o'clock A. M., or as soon thereafter as counsel
can be heard, the undersigned will tender to the
page 2 . Honorable R. T. Wilson, Judge of the Hustings
Court of the City of Petersburg, Virginia, for his
signature, certain bills of exception in the case of Common-
wealth of Virginia v. Silas Rogers.
Given under my hand this 20th day of December, 1943.
ROBERT H. COOLEY, JR.,
ROBERT H. COOLEY, JR..
Attorney for Defendant.
Silas Rogers v. Commonwealth of Virginia.
Legal service of the above notice is hereby accepted this
21st day of December, 1943.
OLIVER A. POLLARD,
OLIVER A. POLLARD,




The Honorable Oliver A. Pollard,
Commonwealth's Attorney for City of Petersburg,
Petersburg, Virginia.
You are hereby notified that on Monday, January 17, 1944,
in the Office of the Clerk of the Hustings Court of the City
of Petersburg, Virginia, at 11:00 o'clock A. M., the under-
signed will apply to the Honorable R. G. Bass, Clerk of the
Hustings Court of the City of Petersburg, Virginia, for a
transcript of the record in the case of Commonwealth of Vir-
ginia v. Silas Rogers, on indictment for a felony, for
page 3 the purpose of presenting the same to the Supreme
Court of Appeals of Virginia, for application for
writ of error.
Given under my hand this 14th day of January, 1944.
SILAS ROGERS,
By ROBERT H. COOLEY, JR.,
ROBERT H. COOLEY, JR.,
Of Counsel for Defendant.
Legal service of the above notice is hereby accepted this
14th day of January, 1944.
OLIVER A. POLLARD,
OLIVER A. POLLARD,
Commonwealth's Attorney for the City of
Petersburg, Virginia.
Given under my hand this 17th day of January, 1944.
ROBERT G. BASS, Clerk.
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PLEAS at the Courthouse of the City of Petersburg, be-
fore the Hustings Court of said City, on January 17th, 1944.
Be It Remembered, that heretofore, to-wit: At a Hustings
Court held for the said City of Petersburg, at the Court-
house thereof, on August 2nd, 1943, the Grand Jury appeared
according to their adjournment (except Win. A. Worth), to-
wit: William R. Wood, Foreman, Robert T. Jones, Carl G.
Haering, Shelton H. Shortt, and Arthur H. Jones
page 4 who was not present on the first day of the term of
Court, and they were again duly sworn, and again
being charged, the said Grand Jury were sent out of Court,
and after some time returned into Court and presented:
"An Indictment against Silas Rogers for felony a truc




City of Petersburg, to-wit:
In the Hustings Court of said City:
The Grand Jurors of the Commonwealth of Virginia, in and
for the body of the City of Petersburg, and now attending
the said court, upon their oaths, present, that SILAS
ROGERS on the Eighteen day of July, in the year Nineteen
Hundred and Forty-three, in the said city, and within the
jurisdiction of the said court, feloniously did kill and mur-
der one Robert B. Hatchell against the peace and dignity of
the Commonwealth of Virginia,
Upon the testimony of
Capt. Beasley
James Jordan (soldier) Off. C. R. Mason
Charles Stevens (soldier) Win. Goodwyn
Cpl. Jolly.
sworn in court and sent to the Grand Jury to give evidence.
ROBERT G. BASS, Clerk.
Aug. 2/43.
Silas Rogers v. Commonwealth of Virginia.
page 5 t And in said Court on said day, August 2nd, 1940,
to-wit:
ORDER.
Silas Rogers who stands indicted of felony, for murder, was
led to the bar in the custody of the jailor of this Court.
Whereupon, R. H. Cooley, stated that he was counsel for the
defendant, and the Court inquired of the accused if the said
Cooley was his counsel, and he replied that he was and he de-
sired him to act as such in his case.
And, thereupon, the said defendant, by his said attorney,
moved the Court for a change of venue, and the said motion
was continued till tomorrow morning.
And the said Silas Rogers is remanded to jail.
And in said Court on August 3rd, 1943, to-wit:
ORDER.
Silas Rogers who stands indicted of felony, for murder,
was led to the bar in the custody of the jailor of this Court.
And, thereupon, the said defendant, by his attorney, stated
to the Court that he desired to withdraw his motion made on
yesterday for a change of venue, which is accordingly done.
And the said Silas Rogers is remanded to jail.
And in said Court on August 24th, 1943, to-wit:
ORDER.
Silas Rogers who stands indicted of felony, for
page 6 murder, was led to the bar in the custody of the
jailor of this Court, thereof arraigned, and after
consultation with his attorney pleased "Not Guilty" to the
indictment. And, thereupon, the said defendant moved the
Court for a continuance of his case till the next term (Se)-
tember) of this Court on the ground that he had several wit-
nesses that he had not been able to get in touch with, which
motion was opposed bv the Attorney for the Commonwealth,
and the said motion beinx fully considered, the Court doth
overrule the same. to which action and ruling of the Court,
the said defendant, by his said attorney, excepted.
Whereupon, from the persons summoned for his trial and
in attendance five (5) only were found free from exception.
58 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia
to-wit: William C. Strother, Oscar Suttle, James M. Mur-
ray, Jr., Charles G. Edmonds, and James F. Morrissette.
Whereupon, it is ordered that another ven'ire facias be
awarded to the Sergeant of this City, to be directed to cause
to be summoned from a list to be furnished by the Court
F ifty (50) persons to complete the panel, and to appear here
on Thursday morning (the 26th) at ten o'clock a. m.
And the said Silas Rogers is remanded to jail.
And in said Court on August 26th, 1943, to'-wit:
ORDER.
Silas Rogers who stands indicted of felony, for murder,
was again led to the bar in the custody of the jailor of this
Court. And, thereupon, the said defendant, by his
page 7 said attorneys, moved the Court to allow him to
withdraw his motion heretofore made for a continu-
ance of his case to the next term (September) of this Court,
which is accordingly done; and the five (5) persons on the
24th inst. found free from exception appeared and took seats
in the jury box, to-wit: William C. Strother, Oscar Suttle,
James M. Murray, Jr., Charles G. Edmonds, and James F.
Morrissette, and for good and satisfactory reasons to the
Court, and with the consent of the Attorney for the Common-
wealth, as well as the accused, William C. Strother, Oscar
Suttle, and James F. MNorrissette were excused from jury
service in this case.
Whereupon, from the venire facias of fifty (50) persons-
ordered on the 24th inst. to be awarded to the Sergeant of
this City, directed to cause to be summoned from a list to
be furnished by the Court to complete the panel,-Pollard
Acree, J. Alvin Bailey, William J. Barton, Vincent R. Beachy,
Henry C. P. Burke, R. Harrison Bryant, Edward B. Coleman,
Nathaniel H. Cole, Marvin D. Goodrich, Marvin W. Gill, Jr.,
William H. Harville, B. Russell Holmes, Edlow S. Harlow.
William M. Houser, J. Emory Lawrence, Irving C. Lunsford,
Irving C. Munt, and Herbert B. Prichard, eighteen of the per-
sons summoned for said trial by virtue of the said last men-
tioned vevire facils were found free from exception.
And a panel of twenty (20) persons, free from exception.
being so completed, the Attorney for the Commonwealth and
the defendant, alternately, struck four (4) persons
page 8 each from the said panel. to-wit: Pollard Acree.
J. Alvin Bailey, Henrv C. P. Burke, William IT.
Harville, B. Russell Holmes, J. Emory Lawrence, Irving C.
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Munt, and Herbert B. Prichard, and the remaining twelve (12)
constituted the jury for his trial, to-wit: James M. Murray,
Jr., Charles G. Edmonds, William J. Barton, Vincent R.
Beachy, R. Harrison Bryant, Edward B. Coleman, Nathaniel
H. Cole, Marvin D. Goodrich, Marvin W. Gill, Jr., Edlow S.
Harlow, William M. Houser, and Irving C. Lunsford, who be-
ing so selected in the manner prescribed by law, were duly
sworn the truth of and upon the premises to speak,-and
then A. Morgan Rucker and Worthington Romaine being se-
lected in the manner prescribed by law as "Alternate Jurors"
were duly sworn according to law, and assigned seats near
the jury box, and having partly heard the evidence and the
Court taking a recess for dinner, the said jury were com-
mitted to the custody of W. Grey Andrews, City Sergeant
of this City, who is directed to keep them together without
communication with any other person, and to cause them to
appear here at two (2) o'clock p. m., and the Court admon-
ished the jury not to talk with any one about this case, nor
allow any one to talk with them.
And the following oath was administered to the said W.
Grey Andrews, Sergeant as aforesaid: "You shall well and
truly, to the best of your ability, keep this jury and neither
speak to them yourself, nor suffer any other persons to speak
to them, touching any matter relative to this trial now or
hereafter when they are placed in your charge, and until the
same is concluded."
page 9 And after the said dinner recess, the said Silas
Rogers, who stands indicted of felony, for murder,
was again set to the bar, and the said jury sworn as afore-
said for his trial, was brought into Court by the said W.
Grey Andrews, Sergeant as aforesaid, and having now heard
all the evidence offered by the Commonwealth, the defendant
moved to strike the said evidence on the ground it was in-
sufficient to support a verdict, which motion being argued
and maturely considered, the Court doth overrule, and to
which action and ruling of the Court, the said defendant, ex-
cepted, and then the evidence of the defendant being partly
heard, and the Court taking a recess for supper, the said jury
were again committed to the custody of the said W. Grey
Andrews, Sergeant as aforesaid, who is directed to keep them
together without communication with any other person and
to cause them to appear here at eight-thirty (8:30) o'clock
p.m.
And after the said supper recess, the said Sihs Rogers,
who stands indicted of felony, for murder, was again set to
the bar, and the said jury sworn as aforesaid for his trial, was
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia
brought into Court by the said W. Grey Andrews, Sergeant
as aforesaid, and having now heard all the evidence offered
by the Commonwealth and the defendant, and the Court tak-
ing a recess till tomorrow morning, the said jury were again
committed to the custody of the said W. Grey Andrews, Ser-
geant as aforesaid, who is directed to keep them
page 10 together without communication with any other
person, and to cause them to appear here tomor-
row morning at ten (10) o'clock, and the Court again admoi.-
ished the jury not to talk with any one about this case, nor
allow any one to talk with them.
And the said Silas Rogers is remanded to jail.
And in said Court on August 27th, 1943, to-wit:
ORDER.
Silas Rogers, who stands indicted of felony, for murder,
was again led to the bar in the custody of the jailor of this
Court, and the jury (and the alternate jurors) sworn on yes-
terday for his trial was brought into Court by W. Grey An-
drews, City Sergeant of this City; and, thereupon, the said
defendant moved the Court to allow him to take the witness
stand and testify as to certain matters which the Court re-
fused on yesterday just when the evidence was for the de-
fendant being about to be concluded, which motion being
argued and maturely considered, the Court doth overrule,-
and to which action and ruling of the Court, the said defend-
ant, excepted. And, thereupon, on the motion of the Attorney
for the Commonwealth, as well as the defendant, by his at-
torneys, the Judge and Clerk of this Court, with the said jury
in the custody of said W. Grey Andrews, Sergeant
page 11 as aforesaid, as well as the defendant, Silas Rogers,
the Attorney for the Commonwealth, and the at-
tornevs for the said defendant, all went to view the scene and
premises in and around the Petersburg Hospital, Inc., where
the alleged crime is said to have been committed, and after
some time all returned into Court. and then the said defend-
ant again moved the Court to strike out the Commonwealth's
evidence for the reasons made and assigned, which motioii
was again overruled, and to which action and ruling of the
Court the said defendant, excepted; and the said jury, for the
purpose of havinoT dinner, were again committed to the cus-
tody of the said W. Grey Andrews, Sergeant as aforesaid,
who is directed to keep them together without communication
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with any other person, and to cause them to appear here at
one (1) o'clock p. m.
And after the said dinner recess, the said Silas Rogers, who
stands indicted of felony, for murder, was again set to the
bar, and the said jury sworn as aforesaid for his trial, was
brought into Court by the said W. Grey Andrews, Sergeant
as aforesaid, and then the "Court's Instructions" as givei
were read to them in the presence of the accused, and having
heard all the arguments of the Attorneys, were sent out of
Court to consider of their verdict, and after some time re-
turned into Court, and reported that they had not reached a
verdict, and the Court taking a recess for supper,
page 12 . the said jury were again committed to the custody
of the said W. Grey Andrews, Sergeant as afore-
said, who is directed to keep them together without communi-
cation with any other person, and to cause them to appear
here at eight-thirty (8:30) o'clock p. m., and the Court again
admonished the jury not to talk with any one about this case,
nor allow any one to talk with them.
And after the said supper recess, the said Silas Rogers, who
stands indicted of felony, for murder, was again set to the
bar, and the said jury sworn as aforesaid for his trial, was
brought into Court by the said W. Grey Andrews, Sergeant
as aforesaid, and were again sent out of Court to consider of
their verdict, and after some time returned into Court, and
upon their oath do say
"We the jury find the defendant, Silas Rogers, guilty of
murder in the First Degree as charged in the indictment aid
fix his punishment Death."
Whereupon, the said defendant, by his said attorneys,
moved the Court to set aside the verdict of the jury and
grant him a new trial on the ground that the same is Con-
trary to the Law and the Evidence.
And the Court at this time not being advised of its opinion
in the premises doth take time to consider thereof.
And the Court certifies that at all times, during the trial of
this case, the defendant was present in person.
And the Court further certifies that the said de-
page 13 . fendant had the advice of, and was represented by,
three able counsel of his own race and of his own
choosing.
And the said Silas Rogers is remanded to jail.
And in said Court on September 21st, 1943, to-wit:
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ORDER.
Silas Rogers, who stands convicted of felony, for first de-
gree murder, was again led to the bar in the custody of the
jailor of this Court, and the defendant's motion heretofore
made to set aside the verdict of the jury and grant him a nev
trial for the reasons made and assigned, being fully heard
and argued, and the Court at this time not being advised of
its opinion in the premises doth take time to consider thereof.
And the said Silas Rogers is remanded to jail.
And in said Court on November 16th, 1943, to-wit:
ORDER.
Silas Rogers, who stands convicted of felony, for first de-
gree murder, was again led to the bar in the custody of the
jailor of this Court, and the defendant's motion heretofore
made to set aside the verdict of the jury and grant
page 14 . him a new trial herein on the grounds heretofore
made and assigned, being fully argued and ma-
turely considered, and the Court having read to the said de-
fendant a paper marked "STATEMENT TO THE AC-
CUSED", and which is hereby made a part of the record,
doth overrule the said motion, and, thereupon, the said de-
fendant, by his said attorneys, again renewed his motion to
set aside the said verdict of the jury and grant him a new
trial, for the same reasons heretofore made and assigned,
which motion the Court doth again overrule, and to which
action and ruling of the Court, the said defendant, by his said
attorneys, excepted.
And it beino demanded of the said Silas Rogers, if anything
he had or knew to say, why the Court here should not now
proceed to pronounce judgment against him according to law,
and nothing being offered or alleged in delay of judgment, ex-
cept the fact that the said Silas Rogers, in pursuance of Sec-
tion 4930 of the Code of Virginia, asked for time to apply to
the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia for a writ of error,
it is considered by the Court that the said Silas Rogers be
electrocuted until he be dead, and that the execution of this
judgment be made and done upon him, the said Silas Rogers.,
in the manner and at the place provided by law, on Friday,
January 21st, 1944, by the Superintendent of the Penitentiary,
or the assistants appointed by him for the purpose.
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And it is ordered that as soon as possible after
page 1.5 the entry of this order that a certified copy thereof
be sent or delivered to the said Superintendent of
the Penitentiary at Richmond.
MEMORANDUM: At the request of the defendant, by his
said attorneys, he having asked for time in which to apply to
the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia for a writ of error,
the execution of the said sentence is suspended for a period
of sixty (60) days, to enable him to so do.
And it is further ordered he be allowed sixty (60) days in
which to prepare and tender his Bills or Certificates of Ex-
ceptions.
And the said Silas Rogers is remanded to jail.
The "STATEMENT TO THE ACCUSED" read to him
by the Court, and referred to in the Above Order, is in the
following words and figures, to-wit:
You, Silas Rogers, have been found guilty by a jury of
murder in the first degree, and the jury has ascertained your
punishment at death.
Through your counsel you have made a motion to set aside
this verdict as contrary to the law and the evidence. Both in
the brief submitted to me by your counsel and in
page 16 the oral argument four grounds are assigned for
the motion. Those grounds are as follows:
I.
The action of this Court in instructing and communicating
with the jury during the trial of the case and in the absence
of the accused constituted reversible error.
II.
The conviction of the defendant constituted, under the cir-
cumstances of this case, a violation of his rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States.
III.
Contradiction of the accused upon his cross examination,
by the use of prior inconsistent written statements allegedly
made by him, constituted, under the circumstances, reversible
error.
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IV.
The verdict of the jury is contrary to the evidence in the
case.
The stenographic copy of the proceedings of your trial
which has been handed to me does not accurately set forth all
of the incidents of the trial and is incorrect in some particu-
lars. I shall correct the stenographic record so that it will ac-
curately set forth the incidents of the trial. Also, the state-
ment which was made to the Court by your counsel on the
afternoon of August 26, 1943, when your counsel made a mo-
tion for a mistrial, does not correctly state what
page 17 had happened. This mistake on the part of your
counsel the Court of course knows was not an in-
tentional mistake.
I shall discuss, first, the first ground assigned by your
counsel in support of your motion to set aside the verdict of
the jury.
The Court hereby certifies that what actually happened on
August 26th was as follows:
Before the Court adjourned, W. Grey Andrews, City Ser-
geant of this city, was sworn by the Clerk to take charge of
the jury and the jury was committed to him and he was di-
rected to keep them together and to cause them to appear at
two o'clock. The Court admonished the jury not to talk with
anyone about this case nor to permit anyone to talk with them
about it. The above are stated in the order entered in this
case on August 26th. The Court further directed the two
alternate jurors not to discuss the case with the regular jury
of twelve men. The Court then directed the sergeant to ad-
journ Court until two o'clock. This he did. The courtroom
was crowded with spectators and before Court was adjourned
the spectators were instructed by the Court not to leave the
courtroom until after the accused had been taken to jail. Af-
ter the adjournment of the Court the Sergeant took the ac-
cused to jail. Then the spectators began to move out of the
courtroom. Your counsel got up from their seats
page 18 - and were moving around the courtroom. The jury
was also moving around.
In a room that enters into the courtroom there is a tele-
phone, and the Judge of the Court knew by experience that
sometimes jurors desire to go into that room and use the tele-
phone. The Judge of the Court, during the recess of the
Court and not while the Court was in session, then stated to
the jury that, if any one of them wanted pajamas or night
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clothes or things like that, they should get the sergeant to
'phone for them, but that they should not 'phone themselves.
This was done, nOt during the trial of the case but during the
recess of the Court.
The Court certifies that the above were the facts in the
matter. It is true that the Judge stated to the stenographer
not to take down that statement which he made to the jury
because it was not a part of the trial of the case.
What the Judge said to the jury during the recess of the
Court is nothing more than if he had met the jury on the
street and said "Good morning".
There is no question of the fact that you have a right to be
present at all times during the trial. You were present at all
times during the trial.
There is quite a difference between your being present dur-
ing the trial and whether or not, when the trial is not in prog-
ress, the Judge of the Court does an improper act. If the
Judge does an improper act during the "recess of a
page 19 case, then it must be shown that this improper act
was to the prejudice of the accused in order for the
verdict to be set aside. Your counsel do not claim that what
the Judge did during the recess of the Court in any way
prejudiced your case. It did not.
If the position taken by your counsel is correct, then the
Judge of the Court cannot, at any time, even say "Good
morning" to the jury unless vou are present, although the
Judge might meet the jury on the street on some morning be-
fore the time for the jury to come into Court. In fact, your
counsel took practically this position in the oral argument.
Suppose the Judge had met the jury on the street on the
morning" to the jury unless you are present, although the
men, did you sleep well last night.?". Also suppose after the
court had adjourned for the day the Judge had met the jury
on the street and one of the jurors had inquired as to whether
or not the Sergeant could .take them to see a motion picture
and the Judge had replied, "Yes". Would either of those
acts on the part of the Judge be acts of the Court during the
progress of the trial and in the absence of the accused? The
Court does not think so. If they are then a Judge during the
recess of the trial could not even tell a sick juror that he could
have the Sergeant phone for a doctor unless the accused was
present to hear that remark.
What the Judge did in this case from the stand-
page 20 point of your being present at all times during
your trial was similar to what I have referred to
above. The Court did not give any instruction to the jury in
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your absence during your trial. The Judge of the Court did
make a remark to the jury when the trial was not in progress.
The distinction between what the Court cannot do during the
trial and the acts of the Judge when the trial is not in progress
should be kept in mind.
In this trial you have been present at all times during its
progress and the conduct of the Judge of the Court when the
trial was not in progress was not to your prejudice. This
assignment for the setting aside of the verdict of the jury is
without merit.
The second ground for the setting aside of the verdict by
the jury which is advanced by your counsel is that under the
circumstances of this case there was a violation of your rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States.
As you are not a lawyer I will not go into any technical
matters.
It is true that you were mistreated by the police when you
were first brought to the police station after your arrest. This
was in the morning. You know that after the Court was ad-
journed after the trial I did not let the spectators leave the
courtroom until I had denounced vigorously the
page 21 treatment which had been given you. You further
know that I ordered a grand jury investigation of
this matter and vou went before the grand jury and testified.
However, such mistreatment as you may have received when
you were first brought into the police station had absolutely
no bearing on your guilt or innocence. No statement made by
you at that time or any time soon thereafter was introduced
as evidence against you. In fact, there is no evidence that.
there was any attempt made at that time to get any statement
from you.
The only statements made by you which were introduced in
evidence were statements which you made in the afternoon in
the police court building to the Attorney for the Common-
wealth in the presence of most reputable people, which state-
ments were introduced by the Commonwealth for the purpose
of impeaching you after a proper foundation had been laid.
There was no coercion and you on the stand testified that the
Attorney for the Commonwealth was nice to you and bought
you a coca-cola.
So in this case there is absolutely no question as to state-
ments made by you under pressure, threats, or mistreatment.
The statements introduced in evidence claimed to have been
made by you were statements made in the orderly questioning
of you by the Attorney for the Commonwealth.
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However reprehensible the conduct of some police officers
may have been when you were brought to the police
page 22 station it had no bearing on your statements made
in the afternoon to the Attorney for the Common-
wealth. Consequently there has been no evidence introduced
in your case against you which was obtained from you other
than in the orderly questioning of you under proper circum-
stances. Therefore no right of yours under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States has been
violated, and this ground assigned for setting aside the ver-
dict of the jury is without merit.
The third ground for the setting aside of the verdict of the
jury which is advanced by your counsel is that you were con-
tradicted upon your cross examination by the use of prior in-
consistent written statements, allegedly made by you.
The Commonwealth did not attempt to contradict you by
any allegedly written statements made by you. No written
statements made by you were ever offered in evidence. You
were asked certain questions. A proper foundation was laid
to contradict what you said, and testimony was introduced
which contradicted your statements. However, no written
statement made by you was either introduced in evidence or
offered in evidence. The Attorney for the Commonwealth
did have in his possession several sheets of paper. What was
on those sheets of paper the Court does not even now know.
When the jury was not in the courtroom the Attorney for the
Commonwealth stated that these papers contained statements
made by you. He offered all of those papers to
page 23 your counsel, but your counsel refused even to look
at them. The Attorney for the Commonwealth then
put- the papers back in his file. As you know, these papers
were never introduced in evidence. So the third assignment
of your counsel for the setting aside of the verdict is without
merit.
The fourth assignment of your counsel why the verdict of
the jury should be set aside is that the verdict is contrary to
the law and the evidence. I do not think it would serve any
good purpose for me to review the evidence in the case. You
know what it was. You set up as a defense an alibi. Whether
or not you were the one who killed Officer Hatchell was a ques-
tion for the jury, and by their verdict they have decided that
you were the one who did the killing. That was the main
question in this case. You offered certain witnesses to sub-
stantiate your alibi. These witnesses contradicted your testi-
mony in some particulars.
You were identified as the driver of the automobile by
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persons who had ample opportunity to look at you. They
testified positively that you were the driver of the automobile
that was driven up to the Petersburg Hospital.
I feel it proper that I should say that you are a most un-
usual looking man. Your physical appearance is not that of
the Negro who has lived among us through the years. Your
appearance indicates that you have in you a strain of foreign
blood. Your appearance is such that the ordinary
page 24 - man would remember you for years, if he should
ever get a good look at you. You are the most un-
usual looking member of the Negro race that I have ever seen.
The jury saw your physical appearance as did I. It had a
right to take into consideration your physical appearance
when it was passing upon the question of whether or not per-
sons who identified you had ample opportunity to identify
you.
There has been no question raised by your counsel as to
whether or not you should be convicted of murder in the first
degree if you were the one who committed the crime. In fact.
the argument of your counsel before the jury indicated that
your counsel thought that the evidence warranted either the
death penalty or an acquittal. You will recall that many
times during the argument of your counsel before the jury
your counsel shouted, "Don't kill Rogers!"
There was ample evidence in the case for the jury to con-
clude that you killed Officer Hatchell. The question of the
amount of punishment was solely a question for the jury. So
the fourth ground assigned by your counsel for setting aside
the verdict of the jury is without merit.
Your motion to set aside the verdict as contrary to the law
and the evidence is therefore overruled.
A proper order will be entered which will make this state-
ment of mine to you a part of the record in this case.
page 25 BILL OF EXCEPTION NO. 1.
Be It Remembered that on the trial of this case the follow-
ing evidence on behalf of the Commonwealth and of the de-
fendant, respectively, as hereinafter denoted, is all of the evi-
dence that was introduced, except two shirts, two caps, two
pairs of trousers, two plats, one coat, one strap, one photo-
graph and one pair of shoes, and the evidence obtained from
a view of the scene of the crime.
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page 26 . WHITWORTH W. COTTEN,
sworn for the Commonwealth:
DIRECT EXAMINATION.
By Mr. Pollard:
Q. Please state your name, residence, and occupation?
A. Whitworth W. Cotten; 1670 Powhatan Avenue, Peters-
burg, Virginia; City Engineer of the City of Petersburg, Vir-
ginia.
Q. Mr. Cotten, as City Engineer of the City of Petersburg,
have yoq, at my request, prepared a plat drawn to scale from
your measurements, showing the location of the Petersburg
Hospital and the surrounding grounds?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Have you that plat?
A. Yes, sir.
Mr. Pollard: I would like to introduce this plat, if your
Honor please, marking it Exhibit W. W. C. No. 1.
The Court: It is so ordered.
Plat referred to marked and filed in evidence.
By Mr. Pollard:
Q. Have you also prepared a plat, Mr. Cotten, showing a
miniature outline of the Petersburg Hospital and the course
of Lieutenant Run as it meanders from the location of that
Petersburg Hospital, in a northerly direction, to east Bank
Street in this City?
A. Yes, sir.
(Plat produced).
page 27 Mr. Pollard: I offer that plat in evidence and
ask that it be marked Exhibit W. W. C. No. 2 and
filed in evidence.
The Court: It is so ordered.
Plat referred to accordingly marked and filed in evidence.
By Mr. Pollard:
Q. Mr. Cotten, will you take a rule or something and indi-
cate to the jury on that plat the outline of the southern wall
of the hospital?
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A. (Indicating) This represents the south side of the Op-
erating Room, in the Dunlop Memorial Building, I think it
is, of the hospital at the southern edge of the hospital prop-
erty.
Q. Now, will you indicate what lies on the south of the
southern wall of the hospital?
A. Innediately south is a grass plot.
Q. Is that a cleared space in there?
A. That is entirely clear, with the exception of a few shrubs
as shown here (indicating).
Q. Will you explain to the jury what is lying south of the
shrubbery?
A. That is a line of hedge, which is about ten or twelve
feet high. The individual pieces of hedge are between 18
inches and three feet apart. And this fine line here (indicat-
ing) represents the center line of that hedge, and it extends
all the way out to Madison Street.
page 28 Q. Will you state how far from the ground the
branches of the hedge start growing out on it?
A. There are not many branches below three feet. The
ground is very irregular. It is two to four feet to the begin-
ning of the branches.
Q. South of that hedge, how is the ground there?
A. By actual measurement, opposite the window of Room
107 of the hospital, the ground south of the hedge is on a slope
of one and one-half to one, which means that, in a nine-foot
horizontal, the ground falls six feet.
By the Court:
Q. It falls six feet in a nine-foot distance?
A. That is correct.
Q. Indicate the elevation?
A. It is quite a long slope east of these steps (indicating).
And west of the steps, the slope extends from here to here
(indicating); and then there is another flat area here (indi-
cating). And there is another slope beyond that.
By Mr. Pollard:
Q. Your last statement referred to the portion of the
grounds south of the hedge, which would be an extension of
Madison Street, doesn't it?
A. I do not understand your question.
Q. I mean this: your last statement referred to the portion
of the grounds lying south of the hedge, which would be an
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extension of Madison Street; in other words, the grounds to
the extreme west of the hospital grounds?
A. That is correct.
Q. Will you state whether or not you found any
page 29 * portion of that hedge damaged materially; if so,
point it out to the jury on that map?
A. These two dots, one here and one here (indicating), rep-
resent the location of two of the pieces of hedge, or shrubs,
that were damaged, apparently by being hit by some object.
One is decidedly knocked down the hill, and the other knocked
to the side and down the hill; and also they were skinned up
somewhat.
By the Court:
Q. You have indicated two dots. Tell the jury and the
Court about where they are?
A. They are about ten feet east of Madison Street, and just
east of the steel barricade at the end of Madison Street.
By Mr. Pollard:
Q. Now, as to the other plat, Mr. Cotten, which has been
introduced, will you point out on that plat where the minia-
ture outline of the hospital is shown?
A. That is here (indicating). This map is drawn to the
scale of one inch to one hundred feet. The other map is
drawn to the scale of one inch to ten feet.
Q. Will you point out to the jury on that map the course of
Lieutenant Run?
The Court: Put in the record that that question refers to
Exhibit W. W. C. No. 2.
A. Lieutenant Run flows in a northerly direction from
Wythe Street, as shown by these two lines, to East Bank
Street, and thence north to the river.
page 30 By Mr. Pollard:
Q. Is that land, lying to the east and to the west
of Lieutenant Run, free of bushes or not?
A. In the whole of the Lieutenant Run bottom to East Bank
Street-I have been there in the last few days-there are
thick bushes, all along from East Bank Street up to Wythe
Street-to within three hundred or four hundred feet of
Wythe Street-on both sides.
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Q. Do those bushes extend up Lieutenant Run, on each side
of it, as far as the rear of the Petersburg Hospital?
A. To about there (indicating).
Q. How far, Mr. Cotten, does your Exhibit W. W. C. No. 2
show it is from East Bank Street, up Lieutenant Run, to the
rear of the Petersburg Hospital?
A. By scale it is 1,300 feet.
Q. That is slightly over a quarter of a mile?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you know how far it is from the City Limits to the
Petersburg Hospital; if so, please state the distance?





Q. (Indicating) This represents the steps on Madison
Street?
A. Yes, gir. And they continue on down.
Q. Are there any houses on the east side of Madi-
page 31 son Street at the foot of those steps?
A. There is a store on the corner of Wythe
Street. I do not recall whether there is any other house there
or not.
Q. At the end of those steps, you do not know whether there
are any houses there?
A. There are no houses here (indicating). There are no
houses shown within the limits of that map.
Q. You mean the map does not show them?
A. They are not there.
The Court: He has said three times that there are no
houses shown within the limits of the map.
By Mr. Cooley:
Q. My question is, Do you recall whether or not there are
actually any houses on the East side of Madison Street at the
foot of these steps?
A. No, I do not.
Q. You do not recall that?
A. I do not know that.
Q. Then, from the description that you give about what is
Silas Rogers v. Commonwealth of Virginia.
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in this area-Lieutenant Run-do you mean that there is
a large drop in the lay of the land?
A. It slopes in this portion down to about here (indicat-
ing) It is a one and one-half to one slope all the way down to
here (indicating). The ground here is thirty feet higher than
the ground around Lieutenant Run.
Q. On this Exhibit W. W. C. No. 2, do you recall a fence at
the Petersburg Gas House, near Lieutenant Run?
page 32 Witness: Where is that?
Attorney: Near Lieutenant Run, on East Bank
Street.
Witness: Along East Bank Street?
Attorney: Yes, sir, and parallel with Lieutenant Run. Did
you notice that fence?
A. Yes, there is a fence there on the west of Lieutenant
Run.
Q. What is the approximate distance from that fence to
Lieutenant Run?
A. As I recall, it varies.
Q. I mean, on East Bank Street.
The Court: Do you mean at the curb of East Bank Street,
the distance that the fence is from Lieutenant Run?
Attorney: I mean the distance from the sidewalk.
The Court: I judge, Mr. Cotten, that he means this, What
is the distance, on the sidewalk of East Bank ,Street, from the
fence to Lieutenant Run.
A. Estimating it from memory, I would say one hundred
feet.
By Mr. Cooley:
Q. Do you recall the Gas House building?
A. Yes, sir, it is up in this section (indicating). It is not
shown on this map.
Q. What would you say the distance is from the east wall of
that building to Lieutenant Run?
page 33 [ A. I did not measure that. Estimating it from
memory,, it is two hundred feet.
Witness stood aside.
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WILLIAM T. GOODWYN (colored),
sworn for the Commonwealth:
DIRECT EXAMINATION.
By Mr. Pollard:
Q. Please state your name, residence, and occupation?
A. William T. Goodwyn; 605 Cedar Street, Petersburg, Vir-
ginia; Orderly at the Petersburg Hospital.
Q. Were you on duty on the morning of July 18th at around
7:35 of that morning?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you hear any shbts fired at that time?
A. No, sir.
Q. At around that time did you go nut of the hospital for
any purpose; if so, what?
A. No, sir, I did not.
Q. What time did you go out of the hospital, if at all, for
some purpose that morning?
A. When they called me.
Q. About what time was it when they called you?
A. About 7:40.
Q. When they called you, did you go out there?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What side of the hospital did you go to?
page 34 A. Towards the Operating Room; through the
side door.
Q. And what did you find out of that door, on the grounds




Q. How did you find him out there? What was his condi-
tion?
A. He was lying down.
Q. Had he been shot, or not?
A. He had.
Q. Did he have his hat on?
Mr. Cooley: I object to that. That is a leading question.
The Court: That is not a leading question, to ask whether
the man had his hat on or not. A leading question suggests
the answer.
A. It was off.
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By Mr. Pollard:
Q. Did you see the officer's hat or cap?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Where was it lying with reference to Officer Hatchell?
A. On the east side of him, above his head.
Q. Did you see any handcuffs there?
A. They were lying on the same side; on the east side.
Q. On the east side of where the officer was lying?
A. That is right.
Q. Now, the point at which you went out there
page 35 and saw the officer's body lying, was that point in
the City of Petersburg, Virginia?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Was that point on the south side of the hospital build-
ing or not?
A. On the south side.
Q. Between the hospital building and the hedge?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Was there anything there, lying to the south of the body,
to indicate exactly where you found that body?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What was there ?
A. Steps.
Q. Will you come up here and look at the map filed here as
Exhibit W. W. C. No. 1, and point out on the map to the jury
where you found the body?
(Witness did as requested)
Q. Will you put an x-mark there where you found the body,
on Exhibit W. W. C. No. 1?
(Witness did as requested)
Q. Did any one assist you with the body then?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Who ?
-k. Three nurses and another person: Miss Lowder, Miss
Akers, Miss Batts, and James Edwards.
No cross examination.
page 36 By the Court:
Q. Just in order that it may be put down in the
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record, although the jury are supposed to know the answer
to this question, I will have to ask you this question: You are




sworn for the Commonwealth:
DIRECT EXAMINATION.
By Mr. Pollard:
Q. Please state your name, residence, and occupation?
A. Bernice Akers; Petersburg Hospital, Petersburg, Vir-
ginia; Student Nurse.
Q. Were you on duty at the Petersburg Hospital on the
morning of July 18th, between 7:35 and 7:40 of that morn-ing?
A. I was.
Q. Did you or not hear any shots fired at that time?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. How many shots did you hear?
A. Two.
Q. Did you hear anything other than the shots?
A. No, I did not.
Q. About what time, Miss Akers, did you hear the two shots
fired?
A. Between 7:40 and 7:45 A. M.
page 37 Q. What did you do after hearing the shots fired?
A. I went out in the yard, through the side door
of the hospital, and saw a policeman lying on the ground; and
then I helped to take him into the Operating Room of the hos-
pital.
Q. Was the body lying to the south side of the hospital,
between the hospital and Wythe Street?
A. I do not understand that.
Q. I say, was the body lying to the south side of the hos-
pital building? That is, the side of it towards Wythe Street?
A. Yes, it was.
Q. Was there anything there on the ground, south of where
you saw the body lying, to indicate to you where the body was
actually picked up?
A. No, sir.




Q. What were you doing at the time of morning when you
heard the shots fired?
A. I was giving medicine.
Q. In what part of the hospital were you located?
A. On the first floor.
Q. On the north or east side of the hospital, or were you
in any particular room?
A. I was in the hall at the time I heard the shots.
Q. What time did you hear the shots fired?
page 38 A. It was between 7:40 and 7:45.
Q. How do you know that that was the time?
A. Because I was preparing the medicine, and I had looked
to see what time it was to give it at the correct time.
Witness stood aside.
MISS HAZEL LOWDER,
sworn for the Commonwealth:
DIRECT EXAMINATION.
By Mr. Pollard:
Q. Please state your name, residence and occupation?
A. Hazel Lowder; Student Nurse at the Petersburg Hos-
pital; Petersburg, Virginia.
Q. Were you on duty on the morning of July 18th, between
7:35 and 7:45 of that morning?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you or not hear any shots fired at that time?
A. Yes, sir, I did.
Q. How many shots?
A. Two shots.
Q. After hearing the shots, what did you do?
A. I listened and heard a man holler, "Help" twice, and
then I went to the window.
Q. And what window did you go to?
A. To the window in Room 211.
Q. On which floor is that?
A. The second floor.
Q. What did you then do?
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page 39 } A. I went downstairs and out of the back door
and across the lawn and helped to pick the man
up.
Q. Were you assisted in picking him up?
A. Yes, sir, I was.
Q. Did you carry him into the hospital or not?
A. He was carried to the Operating Room.
Q. You found him lying on the south side of the hospital?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. In the clearing?
A. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cooley: I object to that as leading.
The Court: I sustain the objection.
By Mr. Pollard:
Q. Which side of the hospital was the body lying on?
A. It was lying on the south side.
Q. In the clearing or not?
Mr. Cooley: I object to that.
The Court: It is overruled.
Mr. Cooley: Exception.
A. Yes., sir, he was in the clearing.
No cross examination.
Witness stood aside.
page 40 . DR. E. L. McGILL,
sworn for the Coihmonwealth:
DIRECT EXAMINATION.
By Mr. Pollard:
Q. Please state your name, residence, and occupation?
A. E. L. McGill; Petersburg, Virginia; Physician and Coro-
ner of the City of Petersburg.
Q. You are Coroner of the City of Petersburg?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you, Doctor, as Coroner of the City of Petersburg,
view the body of Officer Robert B. Hatchell on the 18th day
of July, 1943?
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A. Yes, sir.
Q. At what time did you view the body?
A. I could not say the exact time. I was notified on Sun-
day morning between 8:15 and 8:30, and'I dressed and went
immediately to the hospital.
Q. Did you subsequently perform an autopsy?
A. Yes.
Q. And when was that performed?
A. On the same day.
Q. July 18, 1943?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did the autopsy disclose the cause of death of Officer
Ilatchell?
A. Yes, sir, it was hemorrhage.
Q. Will you please state your findings at the autopsy?
A. I viewed his body at the hospital., and noticed
page 41 certain -things there.
Q. Will you state to the jury what you noticed?
A. At the hospital he was lying in the room called the
Rotunda, north of the Operating Room, on the table. He was
dressed with trousers and shirt. On the scalp, on the left
side of the head, I noticed clotted blood. His belt had been
loosened, and I saw a bullet wound in the abdomen, below the
navel, and another bullet wound in the left flank. His re-
volver was missing from his holster. I did not find his hand-
cuffs in the leather box on the belt. The strap which had held
his revolver I examined and took it off. There was a metal
swivel at one end of the strap, and a ring holding a snapper
that goes into a ring on the butt of the revolver; that had
been straightened out.
Q. Have you that strap?
A. No, sir, I gave it to Lieut. Thompson.
(Strap sent for, and subsequently produced !
Q. And the cause of death was hemorrhage?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you state where the bullet entered?
A. I performed an autopsy. Three and one-half inches be-
low the navel and one and one-half inches to the right of the
midline of the body, there was a bullet wound with skin pro-
truding. That was the exit of the bullet. And then, five and
one-half inches back of the hip bone and one and one-half
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inches below the level of the exit wound, there was
page 42 another wound. That was the entrance.
By the Court:
Q. The bullet went in where?
A. (Illustrating) Five and one-half inches posterior to
where my finger is, and one and one-half inches below was the
entrance of the bullet.
Q. In other words, you mean the bullet entered the body
from the rear and came out of the stomach?
A. Partially, but not absolutely in the back; but it entered
the hip bone here (indicating).
By Mr. Pollard-
Q. It entered the left flank and came out of the abdomen?
A. Yes, sir. The abdomen was opened, and there was a
large escape of blood and clots; and also the iliac artery was
cut, and one of his intestines was cut. And he died as the
result of hemorrhage.
By the Court:
Q. You mean that the hemorrhage was the result of his be-
ing shot?
A. Yes, sir, the blood-vessel was cut by the bullet.
By Mr. Pollard:
Q. What did you do with the strap that you took off of
Officer Hatchell?
A. I gave it to Lieut. Thompson.
Q. Was the strap on the right or left shoulder when you
took it off?
A. The right shoulder.
page 43 Q. (Exhibiting strap) Is that the strap?
A. (Examining) Yes, sir, that is the strap.
Q. Now, will you explain about the ring?
A. There was a ring in the butt of the revolver, and there
was a snapper attached to this strap that goes into that ring
in the butt of the revolver. It had been pulled loose, and the
revolver was missing.
Bv the Court:
Q. Was it in the condition in which it is now when you
found it?
A. Yes, sir.
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Mr. Pollard: I offer in evidence that strap.
Strap referred to accordingly filed in evidence, designated
as Exhibit E. L. McG. No. 1.
By Mr. Pollard:
Q. Now, you spoke of a swivel on the strap or on the butt
of the gun?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. I hand you a gun and ask you whether or not that at-
tachment is what you were speaking of as the swivel?
A. (Examining) No, sir, the swivel was here (indicating
end of strap).
Q. Will you please explain it to the jury, using the strap
and the gun, how it was hooked up?
A. There should be a snapper on here (indicating end of
strap), and that catches and holds itself into the
page 44 ring. It is now gone off of this strap.
Q. When you took the strap off of Officer
Hatchell, was the snapper on it?
A. No, sir.
Q. You did not see the revolver?
A. No, sir.
Q. (Indicating gun) Is that the ring that holds the snapper
on the butt of the gun? Is that what was there?
A. Yes, sir.
Mr. Hopkins: There is no foundation for that testimony,
because there is no proof here as to the type of gun that the
officer had. So that I do not think that the exhibiting of this
gun before the jury is proper.
The Court: Gentlemen of the jury, do not take into con-
sideration anything to the effect that that gun, which is in the
hands of Dr. McGill, is the gun that Officer Hatchell had, if
he bad a gun; or that it was a gun like this one. There is no
evidence here yet to what the gun was like. All of Dr. Mc-
Gill's evidence that I will permit you to consider is that that
strap, which he has, shows the condition of the strap when he
found it. Whether it was hooked up or not is not in evidence
here.
Mr. Cooley: And I submit that this testimony is prejudicial
to the defendant; and we ask your Honor to with-
page 45 draw a juror and declare a mistrial.
The Court: It is overruled.
Mr. Cooley: We note an exception.
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CROSS EXAMINATION.
By Mr. Hopkins:
Q. Did you take the bullet out of the body?
A. It went through and through. There was no bullet in
the body.
Q. Do you know what kind of bullet it was?
A. No, sir. I never saw it. And I could not know that.
Q. Can you testify whether he was killed with a bullet or
not ?
A. I do not know anything other than that it was a bullet
that made those two wounds in going through the man.
Q. I say, can you testify whether he was killed with a bullet
or not?
A. I would say that they were bullet wounds.
Q. You would?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Will you explain to the jury upon what you base that
statement?
A. There was a smaller entrance wound, with a larger exit
wound, with the tissues protruding from the exit and larger
wound, which is characteristic of bullet wounds.
Q. Could that have been done by any other type of missile
that would not necessarily have to be a bullet?
A. I do not think so. How a man could stick an
page 46 object through the bone and through the body I do
not see.
Q. But you do not know?
A. I would say, No.
By the Court:
Q. In other words, I understand your answer is that that
wound, which you saw, could have been made solely by some
bullet?
A. Yes, sir. There was no shrapnel around here and no
war going on here.
By Mr. Hopkins:
Q. Is that a positive statement that it could not have been
made by anything else other than a bullet?
A. In my opinion, yes.
By Juror:
Q. Was there more than one bullet wound, or just one?
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A. There were two wounds made by one bullet?
Witness stood aside.
Note: The jury, including the two alternate jurors, put in
the hands of the Sergeant.
The Court: You two gentlemen are alternate jurors. Do
not discuss this case or mention it to anyone not even the
twelve men on the panel.
And, Sergeant, do not let the jury talk about the case. Try
to have them back here at 2:00 o'clock.
page 47 (Recess until 2:00 P. M.)
2:00 P. M. trial resumed.
Mr. Hopkins: I wish to make a motion.
The Court: The jury will retire.
(Jury retired.)
Mr. Hopkins: If it please the Court, just before your Honor
and counsel and the jury left the courtioom, your Honor in-
structed the Court Reporter not to take down certain remarks
that the Court made to the jury; and, after that instruction
was given, your Honor advised the jury about communicating
with each other, advised the two alternate jurors about com-
municating between themselves and with the other jurors.
Your Honor advised them about communicating with their
homes, and instructed them that, in the event that it became
necessary for them to communicate with their homes, by rea-
son of the fact that they may be held over night, that that
should be done through the Sergeant of the City of Peters-
burg. That was done out of the presence of the accused.
The defense takes the position that that was an instruction
to the jury which was an essential part of the trial, and the
defense takes exception to the Court's instruction to the jury
out of the presence of the defendant, and asks that your Honor
withdraw a juror and declare a mistrial.
Mr. Pollard: It is my recollection, if the Court pleases,
that, prior to any remark that the Court addressed to the
jury on the occasion referred to by counsel for the
page 48 defense, the Court had been adjourned and the ac-
cused had been removed from the courtroom. The
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court was not then in session, and any remark that your Honor
made at that time to the jury could not in any sense of the
word constitute a part of the trial of the defendant here.
The Court: The defendant has been present at all times
during the trial of this case, which fact the Court here now
certifies. The court adjourned for the dinner recess, and,
after the adjournment, the accused was taken to jail. There-
after, the Judge of the Court did advise the jury as to cer-
tain things. It was exactly the same thing as if I had met
the jury down on the street and one of the jurors had asked
me could he phone to his home and I had replied, No. There
were some statements made to the jury by the Judge of this
Court, not to phone to their homes, but it was no part of
the trial of this case; and the defendant has been in the court
at all times during the trial of the case.
And the motion is overruled.
Mr. Hopkins: We note an exception.
(Jury recalled.)
page 49 t OFFICER R. L. JACKSON,
sworn for the Commonwealth:
DIRECT EXAMINATION.
By Mr. Pollard:
Q. Please state your name, residence, and occupation?
A. R. L. Jackson; 1419 Custer Street, Petersburg, Vir-
ginia; occupation, Detective Police Force, Petersburg, Vir--
o'inia.
Q. Is it or not a part of your duty or duties to take pic-
tures of defendants down there at the Station House?
A. Yes, sir, it is.
Q. Did you on the morning of Sunday, July 18, 1943, take
a picture of the defendant. Silas Rogers, just after he wa';
brought into the Station House?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Have you that picture with you?
A. Yes, sir.
(Photograph produced.)
Mr. Pollard: I desire, if the Court nlease, to introduce the
picture as Exhibit R. L. J. No. 1 with Mr. Jackson's testi-
mony.
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By the Court.
Q. Was it one or two pictures?
A. Two pictures; a side view and a front view.
The Court: It is so ordered.
Mr. Hopkins: I object to the introduction of the picture. I
do not know the purpose of it.
The Court: The -Court has no right to ask counsel for the
Commonwealth his purpose in introducing evi-
page 50 dence. The evidence is admissible. You may cross
examine the witness with reference to it.
Mr. Hopkins: Then, we object on the ground that it is ir-
relevant.
The Court: The objection is overruled. And the picture is
ordered to be marked Exhibit R. L. J. No. 1 and filed.
Mr. Hopkins: We note an exception.




Q. Mr. Jackson, how long had the accused been in the Po-
lice Station when this picture was taken?
A. I took that picture between 11:00 and 1:00 o'clock of
that morning; or around 11:00 o'clock.
Q. How long had he been at Headquarters?
A. I do not know.
Q. Did you pour some water into the nose of the accused
before the picture was taken?
A. No, I did not.
Q. Had you struck him before the picture was taken?
A. No, sir.
Q. Were you at the Police Headquarters when he was
brought in?
A. I was downstairs.
Q. Did you see him when he was brought in?
page 51 A. No. sir.
Q. Before the picture was taken and before you
had him pose for the picture, you do not know his condition
then, do you?
A. He seemed to be normal.
Q. You did not see him when he was brought in?
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A. No, sir.
Q. Who tore his shirt?
A. I do not know.
Q. Did you see him upstairs before you took
A. Yes, sir. Officer Kirkland and I carried
and took his picture.
Q. Just you two?
A. And a soldier, next door; he was there.
Q. And whatever happened to him before the






OFFICER CURTIS R. MASON,
sworn for the Commonwealth:
DIRECT EXAMINATION.
By Mr. Pollard:
Q. Please state your name, residence, and occupation?
A. Officer C. R. Mason; Colonial Heights Police.
Q. And where do you live?
A. I live in Colonial Heights, Virginia.
Q. Were you on duty on the Sunday morning of
page 52 July 18, 1943?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What time were you on duty that morning?
A. I did not get to work that morning until about 8:00
o 'clock.
Q. Will you look at the defendant here, Silas Rogers, and
state whether or not you arrested him, and, if so, where and at
what time?
A. Yes, sir, I arrested'him on the north end of the Appo-
mattox Bridge, about 9:40 A. M.
Q. Will you state to the jury how be was dressed at that
time?
A. He had on brown pants and a brown shirt and a white
sailor hat.
Q. Did he at the time of his arrest make any statement to
you?
A. The only statement he made to me was, when I told him
to stick his hands up, he turned around and said, "Lordy,
Captain, I haven't got any gun." And then I asked him
Silas Rogers v. Commonwealth of Virginia.
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where he was from; and he said he was from Florida. And I
then put him under arrest.
Q. Did he ask you what he was charged with?
A. No, sir.
Q. What was the condition of his hair?
A. It was very rumpled up or messed up.
Q. Was he apparently calm or nervous?
A. He was very nervous.
page 53 Q. I hand you a photograph marked Exhibit R.
L. J. No. 1, and ask you to look at that exhibit and
state whether or not, after now looking at the defendant, Silas
Rogers, his hair looked like it now looks, or whether it looked
like it looks in the picture at the time you arrested him?
Mr. Hopkins: We object.
The Court: It is overruled.
Mr. Hopkins: We note an exception.
A. (Examining) His hair looked as it is in this picture
now.
By Mr. Pollard:
Q. Could you identify the clothing worn by Silas Rogers at
the time you arrested him?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. I hand you a sailor cap, a shirt, a pair of pants, and a
pair of black shoes, and ask you to examine those articles of
clothing and state whether or not that was the clothing worn
by Silas Rogers at the time you arrested him on Appomattox
Bridge in Petersburg, Virginia, at 9:30 o'clock on Sunday
morning, July 18, 1943?
A. (Examining) Yes, sir, those are the clothes.
Q. Were the sleeves to that shirt, that you have just ex-
amined, torn?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Will you state whether or not the sleeves to the shirt
were torn at the time you arrested him?
A. The right arm of the sleeve was torn.
page 54 . Q. Do you know whether or not the other sleeve
was also torn?
A. No, sir. I was on another case, and I just picked this
man up.
Q. Will you state whether or not, prior to the time that
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you arrested the defendant, you had received any description
by broadcast of any man?
A. Yes, sir, I had.
Mr. Cooley: I object to that as hearsay.
The Court: He can say that he received the description.
Mr. Cooley: I note an exception.
By Mr. Pollard:
Q. Will you state whether or not, in stopping and arresting
Silas Rogers, you did so as the result of the description which
you had received?
A. Yes, sir, I did.
The Court: Are you filing those clothes in evidence?
Mr. Pollard: Yes, sir. I would like, if your Honor pleases,
to file the clothing in evidence, marking the hat Exhibit C. I.
M. No. 1, the shirt Exhibit 'C. R. M. No. 2, the pants Exhibit
C. R. M. No. 3, and the shoes Exhibit C. R. M. No. 4 in con-
nection with Mr. Mason's evidence.
The Court: It is so ordered.




Q. What part of the bridge was Rogers on when you saw
him ?
A. That bridge has columns or posts to it. He was four
light posts or columns from the north end of the Appomattox
Bridge.Q. Had you seen any other stranger on that bridge?
A. No, sir, not at that time.
Q. You picked him up because he was a stranger?
A. No, sir, I picked him up because of the description that
I received from Sgt. Crowder of the Petersburg Police De-
partment.
Q. How long did you remain at Headquarters of the City
of Petersburg after you took him in there?
A. I would say between twenty and thirty minutes.
Q. He had no blood on him when you arrested him, did he?
A. I could not say. I did not pay very close attention to
his clothes, except that I noticed the shirt sleeve was torn.
Silas Rogers v. Commonwealth of Virginia.
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By the Court:
Q. You are a member of the White race, are you not?
A. Yes, sir.
Witness stood aside.
page 56 CAPTAIN F. C. BEASLEY,
sworn for the Commonwealth:
DIRECT EXAMINATION.
By Mr. Pollard:
Q. Please state your name, residence, and occupation?
A. F. C. Beasley; Captain of Detectives and Assistant
Chief Petersburg Police Force; Petersburg, Virginia.
Q. Will you state whether or not you could identify the
clothing worn by the defendant, Silas Rogers, at the time of
his arrest?
A. Yes, sir, I can.
Q. I hand you a hat, which has been filed as Exhibit C. R.
M. No. 1 with Officer Mason's testimony, a shirt, filed as Ex-
hibit C. R. M. No. 2, pants, filed as Exhibit C. R. M. No. 3,
and shoes, filed as Exhibit C. R. M. No. 4, and ask you to ex-
amine those and state whether or not those were the clothes
that the defendant wore at the time that he was brought into
the Petersburg Police Station?
A. (Examining) Yes, sir, these are the hat, the pants, and
shirt, and shoes.
Q. Will you state whether or not those clothes were removed
from the defendant, and, if so, by whom?
A. They were removed by the City Sergeant.
Q. Was that done in your presence or not?
A. We came up here to the jail and the City Sergeant re-
moved his clothing.Q. Was it in your presence?
A. I do not know that.
page 57 Q. Have you had custody of the clothing ever
since that time?
A. Yes, sir. Ever since then I have had them locked up.
CROSS EXAMINATION.
By Mr. Cooley:
Q. Captain, were you at the Police Station when Officer
Mason brought the accused into the Police Station?
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A. I was not.
Q. When did you see him for the first time?
A. When I had a call to come in: that they had a man at
the Police Station. And I returned there then.
Q. About what time was that?
A. I judge around ten o'clock. I will not say positively.
Q. Did you see any blood on the defendant when you first
saw him?
A. When I got there he was down in the lower room; and I
carried him to my room and questioned him.
By the Court:
Q. The question is, Did you see any blood on him when you
first saw him?
A. I think he had a little on his hair, if I am not mistaken.
Q. Captain Beasley, you are a member of the White race,
are you not?
A. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cooley: Your Honor, we reserve the right to recall
this witness for further cross examination.
The Court: That will be all right.
Witness stood aside.
page 58 LESLIE COOK,
sworn for the Commonwealth:
DIRECT EXAMINATION.
By Mr. Pollard:
Q. Please state your name, residence, and occupation?
A. Leslie Cook; 309 Perry Street, Raleigh, North Carolina.
I am an Insurance Adjuster.
Q. Were you at home, Mr. Cook, on the night of July 17,
1943?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you own an automobile at that time?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you have it on the night of July 17, 1943?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What did you do with it that night?
A. I parked it on the street in front of my house.
Q. Was it left on the street that night and the next morn-
ing, July 18, 1943?
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A. It was gone the next morning.
Q. I say, did you leave it on the street then?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You left it on the street on the night of July 17th?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. When was the last time you saw it that night?
A. About 10:00 o'clock.
Q. Was it where you had parked it on the morning of July
18, 1943 ?
A. No, sir.
Q. What time did you look for it that morning?
page 59 A. Between 9:30 and 9:45 o'clock.
Q. What kind of State license was on your car?
A. North Carolina.
Q. What was your license number?
A. 240-658.
Q. Did you have a 1943 tag on it or not?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What was it?
A. 511-610.
Q. Have you your title card to the car?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Will you look at it and state the motor number of your
car?
A. 115,308.
Q. And the serial number?
A. G103,262.
Q. When did you arrive in Petersburg?
A. About 9:30 this morning.
Q. Have you seen your car since you were here?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Where was it?
A. At a garage here. I do not know the name of the garage.
Q. Did you go there alone or with whom?
A. With Corporal Jolly.
Q. Did you at that time identify your car?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Is that the same car that was missing from
page 60 the front of your residence on the night of July 17.
1943, or the morning of July 18, 1943?
A. Yes, sir.
By the Court:
Q. In other words, I understand that your car was taken
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by some one from the front of your house on the night of July
17th or the morning of July 18th?
A. Yes, sir.
By Mr. Pollard:
Q. At the time that you left the car on that night, did you
leave any coat in your car?
A. No, sir.
By the Court:




CORPORAL W. M. JOLLY,
sworn for the Commonwealth:
DIRECT EXAMINATION.
By the Court:
Q. Are you a member of the White race?
A. Yes, sir.
By Mr. Pollard:
Q. Please state your name, residence, and occupation?
A. W. M. Jolly; Corporal Detective Police Of-
page 61 . ficers, Petersburg Police Force; Petersburg, Vir-
ginia.
Q. Were you on duty on Sunday morning, July 18, 1943?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What time did you go on duty that morning?
A. Approximately 7:00 o'clock.
Q. Where did you first go after going on duty that morn-
in g?
A. I went out in the patrol car, up High Street to Lafayette
Street, and through Lafayette Street into West Washington
Street, and west on West Washington Street.
Q. Were vou driving the patrol car?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Was any one in that car with you, and, if so, whom?
A. Officer R. B. Hiatchell.
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Q. Were you the only two in the car
A. Yes, sir, when we hit West Washington Street. 'We had
picked up Officer Rollison. He lives on Lafayette Street.
And we put him out on Lafayette Street and proceeded on.
Q. In proceeding west on West Washington Street, did you
pass any car which attracted your attention?
A. When we got to the traffic light at the intersection of
West Washington and South Streets it was red, and a car
rolled up on the opposite side of the traffic light, and it at-
tracted our attention by the way it stopped and the squeaking
of the brakes; and, when the light changed, we noticed a pe-
culiarity of the driver in driving: it seemed that something
was wrong; and I turned around and followed the car, and,
between Perry and Market Streets, we pulled uip
page 62 beside the driver and told him to pull over. There
was a car in front of him, and he drove along
slowly, and, when he got down to Market Street the car in
front of him made a right turn into Market Street, going
south; and then the driver of this car commenced to run,
putting the car in second gear; and we chased him from Mar-
ket Street to Madison Street, and he then made a right turn
at Madison Street, and it was a dead end street there, and he
wrecked the car by the side of the barricade at the Operating
Room of the hospital.Q. At what speed was the car going, that you were follow-
ing, from the time it left Market Street until it was wrecked
at Madison Street?
A. He increased his speed, and, when he got to the inter-
section of Washington and Sycamore Streets, he crossed that
street, through a red traffic light, about sixty miles an hour.
Q. When you told him to pull over and he did slow down
at the intersection of Washington and Market Streets, how
close did your car get to him?
A. The front of the hood of my car was not quite up to
his. I was about three or four feet back of him.
Q. You drove up parallel with his car?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you notice the driver of the car?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you notice his hat?
page 63 } A. Yes, sir.
Q. What kind of hat was it?
A. A very dirty white sailor hat.
Q. Did you notice his shirt?
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A. Yes, sir, he had on a brown shirt.
Q. Did you get a good look at the driver of that car?
A. Yes, sir, a very good look at him.
Q. Could you identify the driver of that car here today?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Will you state whether or not the defendant, Silas
Rogers, is the man who was driving that car that morning?
A. He is, sir.
Q. Is there any doubt in your mind that he is the man?
A. No, sir.
Q. I think you said a while ago that you drove up nearly
parallel with the car. Will you please state whether or not
you drove up alongside of the car?
Mr. Cooley: We object to that. He did not testify that he
drove up parallel with the car.
By the Court:
Q. He testified that he drove up, and that the hood of his
car was just a little back of the hood of the other car. Is
that correct ?
A. Yes, sir.Q. Explain a little more definitely, then, what you meant by
that?
page 64 A. When we pull up to a strange car, we do not
pull up in front of the driver. We pull up a little
bit back of the driver.
Q. Was your car on the north of this car coming down
West Washington Street?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And the front of your car was just a little back of the
front of the other car?
A. Yes, sir.
By Mr. Pollard:
Q. How far were you at that time from the driver of the
other car?
A. As far as I am to him now.
Q. How far is that?
A. About ten feet.Q. Corporal Jolly, will you look at this map, which has been
filed as Exhibit W. W. C. No. 1 with Mr. Cotten's evidence
in this case, and see if you can point out where that car was
wrecked?
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(Witness did as requested and said:)
The car was wrecked just here (indicating).
Q. Will you put an x-mark on that map?
The Court: I think it would be better, Mr. Jolly, if you
would tell the jury where the car was wrecked with relation
to the hospital.
A. The car made a right turn at the end of East Washing-
ton Street; and, on Madison Street, there is a bar-
page 65 ricade, and this car went between the barricade and
the Operating Room of the hospital and hung on
the hedge or bushes there-just right here (indicating,)-and
the car was wrecked there.
Q. Put a cross-mark there where the car was wrecked?
(Witness did as requested.)
Q. How far were you behind the car that you were pursuing
at the time it was wrecked?
A. I imagine 25 feet when it stopped.
Q. What did you do when the car stopped?
A. I ran to the car that was wrecked and got the two sol-
diers out of it.
Q. You say there were two soldiers in the car?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Who were those soldiers?
A. One was named Jordan, and I do not know the name of
the other one. He is here.
Q. What did Officer Hatchell do?
A. He ran by me when I got the soldiers out of the car, and
pursued the Negro who ran behind the hospital.
Q. Did you see the driver of the car, after the car was
wrecked, leave the car?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. In which direction did he go?
A. He ran east, on the south side of the hospital.
Q. Did any other officers come up at that time?
A. Sergeant Seward and Officer Lockett came
page 66 up.
Q. What did they do?
A. Officer Seward went around to the north side of the
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hospital, and Officer Lockett went around to the south side
of the hospital.
Q. When did you next see them?
A. When they came back to the car.
By the Court:
Q. Who came back to the car?
A. Officers Seward and Lockett and Hatchell.
By Mr. Pollard:
Q. About how long had they been gone?
A. About five minutes.
Q. And what then?
A. Officer Hatchell got in the police car between the two
soldiers, and we went north on Madison Street to East Bank
Street and then headed east on East Bank Street towards
Crater Road; and, going along there, we passed Lieutenant
Run and we saw a man up the branch; and Officer Hatchell
said to me-
The Court: Don't say that.
A. (Continued) We could not stop at the time because
there was a car behind us, and we had to go up the hill to
turn around; and Officer Hatchell got out and started in the
swamp; and then Officers Seward and Lockett came up. The
three went up in there. They got out of the car and went
south, up Lieutenant Run.
page 67 By Mr. Pollard:
Q. In what direction?
A. South.
Q. And did Officers Seward and Lockett go south too?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you see Officer Seward and Officer Lockett again
before vou left there?
A. Yes, sir. I called for the wagon to take the soldiers,
and, when the wagon got there. Officer Seward came out; and
he saw tracks through the weeds. It had knocked the dew off
of them. The weeds were about that high (indicating about
six inches). The tracks were headed towards Bolline'brook
Street. And Officer Seward's car and my car were headed
in different directions. And I got in mv car and went around
on Bollingbrook Street to see if I could see anything of the
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man. And then Sergeant Seward and Officer Lockett came
around. And a man was seen going up the railroad track
there. And I went there and found that he was a local man.
And then I came back and Sergeant Seward and Officer Lock-
ett were gone. And I went back to the branch and Officer
Hatchell had not come back; and I went back to the Peters-
burg Hospital, and the wrecker was taking the car out. And
Officer Hatchell was not there.
Q. Who called for the wrecker?
A. I did, before I left the hospital the first time. And then
I went back to the hospital and Officer Hatchell was not
there, and I went back to the branch and he was
page 68 not there; and then I went back to the hospital
and found that he had been shot.
Q. Will you stand up?
(Witness did as requested.)
Q. What kind of strap, when you last saw Officer Hatchell.
going south up Lieutenant Run, did he have around his right
shoulder?
A. The same equipment I have here.
Q. Did he have the same type of gun?
A. All except the sight.
Q. Was the butt the same?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And was the ring on the butt the same?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did the strap have a ring and a clip attached to the ring
on the gun?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you notice, when Officer Hatchell left the car and
started up Lieutenant Run south, whether it was in good con-
dition or not?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You are sure it was not pulled loose?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Will you show the jury that ring and clip on your strap
and gun?
(Witness exhibited his gun and strap to the jury.)
Q. Corporal. this morning did you go to any
page 69 garage with Mr. Leslie Cook, of Raleigh, North
Carolina?
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A. Yes, sir, I went to Mr. Vinson's Garage.
Q. Did he look at that automobile in your presence?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did he or not identify that automobile as his automo-
bile?
A. Yes, sir, he did.
Q. Was the car which he identified the same car, or not,
which you pursued on July 18th down Washington Street
and which was wrecked on the south side of the Petersburg
Hospital that morning?
A. Yes, sir, it was the same car.





Q. Who was driving the car in which you rode?
A. I was.
Q. And you stayed four feet behind the automobile that
you were trailing?
A. No, sir.
Q. How far did you stay behind the automobile that you
were trailing?
A. About fifty feet.
Q. Did the automobile ever get out of your sight?
A. No, sir.
Q. At what speed were you driving down Wash-
page 70 ington Street?
A. Sixty to sixty-five miles an hour.
Q. Going at that rate of speed you could not see the driver
so well, could you?
A. No, sir, but I had seen him previously.
Q. How close did you get to him previously?
A. About ten feet.
Q. Ten feet behind him?
A. Sort of parallel with him, but somewhat behind him.
Q. The front wheels of your car were at all times behind
the rear wheels of the red car that you were trailing?
A. No, sir.
Q. Then, how close did the front wheels of your car get to
the rear wheels of his car?.
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A. The front wheels of my car had passed the rear wheels
of his car.
By the Court:
Q. You mean when you got alongside of him?
A. When I told him to pull to the curb.
By Mr. Cooley:
Q. Then, you were always behind the driver of the red car?
A. I was not behind him so that I could not see him dis-
tinctly.
Q. And how many other persons were in that red car?
A. Two others besides the driver.
Q. Where were they?
A. I could not tell you. I do not know whether both were
in the back or one in the front. I did not pay much
page 71 attention to the occupants of the car, other than
the driver, except I know that they were two sol-
diers.
Q. Do you know whether the soldiers were white or colored?
A. They were white.
Q. Do you know what kind of hats the soldiers had on?
A. I do not know whether they had Qp hats at the time or
not.
Q. And you do not know whether both of the soldiers were
sitting in the back of the red car or not?
A. No, sir, I do not.
Q. If you saw them you must have known whether they were
in the front or the rear of the car?
A. I say I do not know.
Q. Did you see them?
A. Yes, sir. I know both of them were in the car, but I do
not know whether both of them were in the back or in the
front. I could not tell you how they were arranged in the
car.
Q. Did you get a full view of the driver's face?
A. I did not see the front view of his face. I saw the side
view. He turned his head when I told him to pull over.
0. Did he 2 et away from you swiftly?
A. As swiftly as he could.
0. Then you could not get a good view of him?
A. I drove along by him a good distance, a half block, be-
fore he had a chance to run.
Q. On that following Monday you were supposed to be
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here in the Hustings Court to testify in some cases, were you
not?
page 72 Witness: The following Monday?
Attorney: Yes, on the 19th of July.
Mr. Pollard: ;Objection. I do not see what that has to do
with the case.
The Court: Yes, but he may answer the question.
A. I do not remember it.
By Mr. Cooley:
Q. On the afternoon of Sunday, July 18th, you were in Lee
Park looking for a man who was suspected of shooting Offi-
cer Hatchell, were you not?
A. I was in Lee Park looking for a man that other people
suspected of shooting him.
Q. For whom were you looking?
A. For whoever they suspected of shooting him.
Q. Yet you knew that Silas Rogers was the man?
A. I knew that he was the man that was driving that car.
Q. Then, why did you go anywhere looking for a man?
A. Because I was detailed out there by my superior of-
ficers.
Q. Who were your superior officers?
A. Sergeant Cassidy and Captain Beasley and Sergeant
Traylor, and others.
Q. Who else were out there looking for the man who shot
Officer Hatchell?
A. I do not know. A large number of the force.
Q. Including yourself?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What time was it?
page 73 A. About 12:30 or 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon
of that day.
Q. Where was Silas Rogers?
A. In jail, at the Police Headquarters, in the cell.
Q. You were not quite so sure that you had the right man,
were you?
A. I was.
Q. Was Officer Seward in that group at Lee Park looking
for the man who shot Officer Hatchell?
A. I do not know.
Q. Was Officer Lockett in that group at the park looking
for the man?
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A. I do not know. I think he was.
Q. Was Captain Beasley out there?
A. No.
Q. Was Officer Mason, of Colonial Heights, out there look-
ing for him?
A. I do not know.
Q. Was Detective Jackson out there in Lee Park looking for
the man?
A. I do not know that either.
Q. Name the officers that you do know who were out there.
A. I have named them.
The Court: Name them again?
A. Lieutenant Thompson, Sergeant Cassidy, and the City
Manager, and Officer E. M. Andrews, and Sergeant Iview An-
drews. I was stationed at a certain place and did not see all
of the officers. They were scattered over a wide
page 74 . area.
By Mr. Cooley:
Q. Didn't you say about half of the police force was out
there?
A. A large number of them.
Q. Now, down on East Bank Street you saw a man go up
the street, and you went to him and found that he was a local
man?
A. He was on the railroad track.
Q. And he was a local man?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you ask him whether he was the one?
A. No, sir.
Q. How do you know he was not the one?
A. I know he was not. I knew the man's face that was on
the railroad track, and I knew he was a Petersburg man.
By the Court:
Q. I understand that when you saw that man, that was be-
fore you knew that Officer Hatchell had been shot?
A. Yes, sir.
By Mr. Cooley:
0. Who were you looking for?
A. T was lookino_. for Silas Rozers at first.
Q. And you were looking for Silas Rogers at Lee Park?
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A. No, sir, we had him locked up then.Q. Then, what were you doing out there?
A. I was detailed out there by my superior of-
page 75 . ficers.
Q. For what?
A. To look for the man the bloodhounds were running.
Q. Did you have bloodhounds out there?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you have to get bloodhounds to chase Silas Rogers?
A. I was not with them at that time.
Q. Where was Silas Rogers picked up?
A. I could not tell you that. I did not pick him up.
Q. Were bloodhounds ever put on the trail of the man who
shot Officer Hatchell-from the Petersburg Hospital?
A. I do not know. I was not over there then.
Q. Who had charge of the bloodhounds that were on the
trail of the person for whom you were looking in Lee Park?
A. They came from the State Penitentiary or the State
Farm; I do not know which.
Q. Were the bloodhounds ever put on the trail at the Pe-
tersburg Hospital?
A. I could not tell you. I do not know. It would be only
hearsav evidence.
Q. What makes you so certain that it was Silas Rogers who
was driving that automobile?
A. Beeause I saw him distinctly.
Q. Did you tell your superior officers that?
A. I did.
0. And they did not believe it?
A. I do not know whether they did or not.
Q. And yet, that Sunday afternoon, your su-
page 76 . perior officers and about half of the police force
were out at Lee Park looking for the man that shot
officer Hatchell?
A. They were out there looking for somebody.
0. Were they out there on Monday looking for the man?
A. No, sir.
By Juror:
0. Mr. Jolly, when you stopped this car on West Wash-
inzton Street and when you first spoke to the driver, did any-
t'hing about the condition of his hair make any impression on
you?
A. Yes, sir. But the car never stopped. It slowed down to
about 15 miles an hour for about a half block.
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Q. Tell us what impression he made on you.?
A. He had on a sailor hat, his hair was long, and it was
straight back on his neck.,
Witness stood aside.
MRS. MARIE DAVIS,
sworn for the Commonwealth:
DIRECT EXAMINATION.
By Mr. Pollard:
Q. Please state your name, residence, and occ'ipation?
A. Mrs. Marie Davis; 336 East Washington Street, Peters-
burg, Virginia; housekeeper.
Q. Is 336 East Washington Street situated at the south-
west corner of the intersection of Madison and Washington
Streets or not?
A. It is situated there.
page 77 [ Q. Were you at home on Sunday morning, July
18, 1943, at around 7:10 o'clock?
A. That is right.
Q. Did you observe any cars racing around East Washing-
ton Street or Madison Street that morning?
A. Yes.
Q. State to the jury what you saw?
A. About 7:00 or 7:15 1 was feeding my baby, and this car
made an awful lot of noise, the brakes; and it aroused my curi-
osity, and I looked out of the window and saw that he had
lost control of the car there, and had headed this way (indi-
cating south) on Madison Street; and I knew something was
wrong because it was a dead-end street there; and I noticed
that the driver had on a little white cap, and I at first thought
it was an Orderly at the hospital; and driving so fast I
thought he was bringing somebody to the hospital. And then
after he turned that way (indicating south) I knew that
something was wrong.
Q. When he turned that way, what happened then?
A. He lost control of the car and headed towards my bed-
room window, and it scared me, and I went out on the back
porch, and then he cut the wheels to the dead-end of the
Street.
Q. Where did he finally go?
A. Into the bushes behind the hospital.
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Q. Did the car stop at the bushes or not?
A. It stopped in the bushes.
Q. What happened to. the driver?
page 78 . A. He jumped out before the car stopped run-
ning.
Q. And where did he go?
A. Towards the clearing on the hospital grounds.
Q. In which direction?
A. Back behind the hospital-behind the Operating Room.
Q. Was there anybody in the car with him?
A. There was one soldier in the front of the car and one
soldier in the back of the car.
Q. And did you see a police car come up there afterwards?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you know Corporal Jolly when you see him?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did he come up there afterwards?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What did he do?
A. He took the soldiers.
Q. Did you notice the shirt that the driver of the car had
on?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What color was it?
A. It was tan.
Q. Did you notice the sleeves of that shirt ?
A. Yes.
Q. Were they torn or not?
A. They were torn on the shoulder.
Q. Did you notice any other officer in the car with Corporal
Jolly when he came up there?
page 79 A. Yes, sir.
Q. What did he do ?
A. He went around behind the hospital, in the same direc-
tion the driver of the other car took.
Q. Did you see anything else that morning?
A. After that happened, and after Mr. Jolly had put the
soldiers in his car, I came back in the house to dress; and,
before I came back out again, a wrecker had come to get the
car. And I watched them get the car out.
Q. Did anything happen after that?
A. The wrecker with the car had not more than gotten out
of sight when I heard the shots.
Q. How many shots did you hear?
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A. Two.
Q. From what direction did the shots come?
A. From behind the Operating Room.
Q. Which side of the hospital was that?
A. On the Wythe Street side.
Q. Do you know the direction?
A. The south side.




Q. Mrs. Davis, were you on your front porch or in your
front yard when the car was there?
A. I stayed out there until Mr. Jolly put the sol-
page 80 diers in the car, and then I went in.Q. At first did you come out of the front of your
house or the back?
A. Out of the back of the house.
Q. And you say you thought the driver with that hat on was
one of the Orderlies at the hospital?
A. It looked like it, by his having a little white cap on, not
making a close examination. But I soon found out he was
not an Orderly at the hospital.
Q. But you do not know who he was?
A. No, sir.
By the Court:





sworn for the Commonwealth:
DIRECT EXAMINATION.
By Mr. Pollard:
Q. Please state your name?
A. Private James Jordan.
Q. And residence?
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A. I am in the Army.
Q. Will you look at the defendant here, Silas Rogers, and
state to the jury whether or not you saw him on the
page 81 early morning of Sunday, July 18, 19437
A. I did.
Q. Where did you see him?
A. In a car coming from near Raleigh, North Carolina.
Q. How close to Raleigh, North Carolina?
A. About three to five miles the other side of Raleigh.
Q. Who was with you?
A. Charles Stephens.
Q. Did you get in the car with this man or not?
A. Yes, sir, I did.
Q. And did Charles Stephens get in the car with him .
A. Yes, he did.
Q. What seat did you get on?
A. Right next to that man (indicating the accused).
By the Court:
Q. On the front seat, you mean?
A. Yes, sir.
By Mr. Pollard:
Q. What seat did Charles Stephens get in?
A. In the back seat.
Q. Were you still in that car when you got to Petersburg,
Virginia?
A. That is right.
Q. Had you gotten out of the front seat from the time you
got in it, near Raleigh, to the time you got to Petersburg?
A. No, sir.
Q. Were you in that car when it was chased by
page 82 . the police officers?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Were you in that car when it was wrecked up near the
hospital here?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now, state to the jury whether or not there is any doubt
in your mind that this man here is the man who was driving
that car?
A. No doubt whatsoever.Q. How was he dressed?
A. He had a light tan shirt on, with the sleeves cut off or
ripped off right near the elbows. And he had on a pair of
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big balloon pants, with blue stripes; and high black top shoes;
and a sailor hat on the back of his head.
Q. Could you identify that clothing?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. I hand you a hat and a shirt and pants and shoes, which
have been filed in evidence here in the order named as Ex-
hibits C. R. M. Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4 with the evidence of Officer
Mason, and I will ask you whether or not, after an examina-
tion of them, you can state that they are the clothing worn by
the defendant, Silas Rogers, while you were with him on the
morning of July 18, 1943?
A. (Examining) Those are the clothes, sir.
Q. Is there any doubt in your mind that that is the clothing
worn by the defendant on that morning in that car?
A. No doubt.
page 83 Q. What time did you get in the car near Raleigh,
North Carolina?
A. 3:30 or 4:00 o'clock.
Q. Was it dark or daylight?
A. It was dark.
Q. About how long a time was it before it got daylight?
A. About an hour and one-half.
Q. Do you remember what time you got to Petersburg?
A. It was between 6:00 and 6:30.
Q. Did you have any trouble with the car after he got to
Petersburg; if so, what?
A. The car got heated up and stalled, and we pushed it into
a side street and let it cool off; and then, when we got it
started, we came back down West Washington Street; and
that is when the police officer chased us.
Q. How far did he chase you?
A. To where the car was wrecked.
Q. Did the police officer say anything to you from the time
he started chasing you to the time of the wreck?
A. He told us to pull over.
Q. Where was that?
A. On West Washington Street.
Q. Did the driver of your car pull over?
A. He slowed down. Did not stop exactly. And after the
policeman came next to him, he took off.
Q. How close did the police car get to your car?
A. From me to that lawyer there (indicating about 7 feet).
Q. Can you estimate the distance?
page 84 A. Not exactly.
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The Court: Put in the record that the witness indicated
about seven feet.
Witness: About six or seven feet.
By Mr. Pollard:
Q. Did the police car come up on the north or south side of
the car that you were in?
A. He was to the north of us, and we were coming east
when the police pulled to the side of us.Q. Do you know where Sycamore Street is in Petersburg?
A. Yes, sir.Q. Do you know where Washington Street is in Petersburg?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Which way was your car headed-down West Washing-
ton Street towards Sycamore Street, the way you were going?
A. Towards Sycamore Street.
Q. Which way was the police officer's car headed when he
told you all to pull over?
A. He was headed along with us, towards Sycamore Street.
Q. Did he pull up alongside of the car you were in then?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What did the driver of your car then do?
A. He bent down and gave it the gas and kept going; and
made a right turn into a dead-end street.
Q. How fast was he going before he turned into the dead-
end street?
page 85 A. Sixty or seventy miles an hour.
Q. Did he jump out?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Had the car stopped?
A. The front wheels were off the cliff there, and the car
then stopped.
Q. Was he out of the car then?
A. He was out of the car then.
Q. When did he get out?
A. As the car was heading for the cliff.
Q. Then, did you and Private Stephens get out?
A. No, sir, not until Officer Jolly made us get out.
Q. Where did the man go when he got out?
A. He ran between the hospital and the bushes.
Q. In which direction?
A. I do not know, but he ran to the left of where the dead-
end street was.
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Q. He ran away from the dead-end street that you went
down?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What time were you shown this man at the Police Head-
quarters that same morning?
A. About two hours after he had been arrested.
Q. Did you identify him at that time as the man, or not?
A. Yes, sir, I did.
Q. Is there any doubt in the world in your mind that he is
the man that was driving that car all the way from near
Raleigh, North Carolina, to Petersburg, Virginia?
page 86 A. None whatsoever.
Q. Can you possibly be mistaken?A. No, sir.
CROSS EXAMINATION.
By -Mr. Cooley:
Q. How long have you been in the Army?
A. Eight months.
Q. When did you go in?
A. On February 15th. I mean seven months.
Q. Where were you when you entered the Army?
A. I was in Providence, Rhode Island.
Q. Where is your home?
A. Providence, Rhode Island.
Q. At what Camp were you stationed on July 18th?
A. I was stationed at Jackson Barracks, New Orleans,
Louisiana.
Q. Were you on official leave?
A. No, sir.
Q. Where were you going?
A. Home.
Q. Were you A. W. 0. L.
A. That is right.
Q. How many days had you been A. W. 0. L.?
A. Four days.
Q. How did it happen that you got into that red automo-
bile?
A. I was hitch-hiking.
Q. Why didn't you get in some other automobile?
A. Because this one happened to come along.
page 87 Q . Didn't others come along too?
A. No.
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Q. No other automobiles were on the highway?
A. Not at that time.
Q. How long had you been hitch-hiking?
A. I hitch-hiked four days and four nights.
Q. How long had you been in Raleigh?
A. We just came through Raleigh.
Q. You did not stay all night there?
A. No.
Q. And was the other soldier who was with you a member
of your same company?
A. He was in the same company, but we were under differ-
ent officers.
Q. Was he a deserter too?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How long did you stay at the Police Headquarters?
A. Six hours.
Q. And then you were released?
A.. Yes, sir.
Q. Where did you go?
A. Home.
Q. Were you ever arrested again?
A. No, sir. I came back. I was there two days before they
came after me.
Q. Then you did not come back. They came after you?
A. I consented to come back. I signed for the
page 88 men to come after me.
Q. Who came and got you?
A. I do not know exactly his name, but one was named Of-
ficer Kirkland, and one fellow they called "Bozo".
Q. W~here did the other soldier live?
A. He lived across the water from me.
Q. Wlhere?
A. At Providence, Rhode Island.
Q. Did the Petersburg Police Officers get him too?
A. No, the Providence Police got him, and then they turned
him over to the Petersburg Police, and the Petersburg Police
brought us both back here.
Q. You did not know that the Petersburg Police wanted you
so soon?
A. Yes, sir, I did. I had received a telegram.
Q. Where have you been staying since you have been in
Petersburg?
A. At the Police Station here.
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Q. You mean you have been in jail at the Police Station
here ever since?
A. That is right.
Q. Now, going back to Raleigh, North Carolina, was it dark
when you got in the automobile?
A. That is right.
Q. Did you go to sleep?
A. No, sir.
page 89 Q. When you were in Petersburg, on West Wash-
ington Street, when you say the police officer said,
"Pull over", some automobiles were in the front of your car,
weren't they?
A. That is right.
Q. Where did they go?
A. We were waiting for the red light to change then; and
then the light turned green and the car in front of us left,
and then we left.
Q. Where did the ear in front of you go?
A. I do not know.
Q. Up Washington Street, did the police car turn around?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How did that happen?
A. They were going in the opposite direction at first.
Q. This clothing here which you have identified, you have
seen those clothes many times before, haven't you?
A. I had seen them about three times.
Q. Where?
A. When I identified the man.
Q. Did he have them on?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. When did you see them again?
A. That is the only time I saw them-those three times
when I identified him. I identified that man after he was
brought in. He had those clothes on then.
Q. And you had seen those clothes three times before?
A. Yes.
page 90 Q. Where were those occasions that you saw the
clothes?
A. At the Police Station.
Q. When you were brought back here the second time, did
you see the clothes again?
A. That is right.
Q. What did the officer hit this boy on the head withT
A. I do not know anything about that.
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Q. You saw that knot on his head, didn't you?
A. Yes.
Q. While you were locked in the cell, didn't you see the
officers hit Rogers?
A. No, sir.
Q. Isn't it a fact that when you first saw this man, Rogers,
in the Police Headquarters, you were not so certain whether
or not he was the man?
A. I was positive that he was the man.
Q. Was it Charles Stephens, the other soldier, who was not
so positive of it at first?
A. He was positive.
Q. The very first time you saw him, was there blood on
him?
A. I did not notice it.
Q. You never saw blood on him?
A. Once I saw it.
Q. What makes you so positive that Rogers is the man who
was in the automobile with you?
A. Because I rode with him from North Carolina here. I
lit cigarettes for him and smoked cigarettes with
page 91 him and rode with him two hours; and I know the
man.
Q. Then, why did you tell the police you were not certain
he was the man?
A. I did not tell them that.
Q. When did you, ever see blood on Rogers?
A. One time at the Police Station.
Q. Which time was that?
A. I believe it was the first time.
Q. When did you see him again after that time?
A. I think it was the next day, or two days afterwards.
Q. And he did not have blood on him then?
A. No.
Q. Where was the blood when you saw it on him-?
A. There was a little on his shoulder.
Q. On his shirt?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Was it on his head?
A. I did not notice that it was on his head.
Q. Pick out the place on the shirt where the blood was when
you saw it?
A. (Examining shirt) It was right along here somewhere
(indicating).
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Q. Is it on there now?
A. Some of it.
Q. Some of it is?
A. Yes, sir.
page 92 By the Court:
Q. You are a member of the white race, are you
not?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You say you were locked up. Were you locked up as a
material witness in this case, or were you locked up and
charged with a crime?
A. As a material witness, sir.
Witness stood aside.
PRIVATE CHARLES STEPHENS,
sworn for the Commonwealth:
DIRECT EXAMINATION.
By Mr. Pollard:
Q. Please state your name and residence?
A. Private Charles Stephens; Providence, Rhode Island.
Q. What is your occupation at the present time?
A. I am in the Service.
Q. In the United States Army?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Will you look at the defendant here and tell the jury
whether or not you saw him on the early morning of Sunday,
July 18, 1943?
A. Yes, sir, I did.
Q. Where did you see him?
A. At Raleigh, North Carolina.
Q. Who were you with?
A. Private Jordan.
page 93 - Q. What was this man Rogers doing when you
saw him that morning?
A. I)riving a car.
Q. Did you ride in the car with him?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. From what point? Where did you first get in the car?
A. At Raleigh, North Carolina.
Q. Did you get in the front or the back seat?
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A. The back seat.
Q. Where did Jordan get in?
A. In the front seat.
Q. How far did you ride in the car with him?
A. About one hundred miles or so.
Q. Were you in the car when it got to Petersburg?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Were you in the car when it was wrecked at the Peters-
burg Hospital?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Had you gotten out of the car from the time it left
Raleigh to the time it was wrecked at the Petersburg Hos-
pital?
A. No, sir.
Q. Was it dark when you got in the car at Raleigh, North
Carolina?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How long was it dark after you got in the car?
A. About an hour.
page 94 Q. How many hours were you on the road fromRaleigh to Petersburg?
A. Two or three hours.
Q. Was the driver driving fast or slow?
A. Fast.
Q. Did you have any trouble with that car when you got to
Petersburg?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What kind of trouble?
A. We had to stop; in fact, it stalled; and we took it into
a side street and cooled it off and then came back on West
Washington Street.
Q. And did you ride on down West Washington Street?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you know where Sycamore -Street is in Petersburg?
A. No, sir.
Q. Do you know where West Washington Street is in Pe-
tersburg?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Have you ever been stationed at Camp Lee or Camp
Pickett?
A. I have been stationed at Camp Pickett.
Q. In which direction down West Washington Street were
you coming after you got the car started again?
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A. Down West Washington Street towards Sycamore
Street.
Q. You were coming downtown?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you see any police car then?
A. Yes, sir.
page 95 } Q. What did that car do?
A. A man stopped us at a light-was ahead of
us-and the driver of our car jammed down the brakes; and,
later, two other officers came up. And the first officer pulled
by the side of us and told the man to pull over.
Q. How close did the officers get to him?
A. On the left side of the car we were in.
Q. Did the officers say anything to him?
A. They told him to pull over.
Q. How close was the officer that told him to pull over to
the driver of the car that you were in?
A. Right by the side of him.
Q. As far as from you to me (indicating about twelve feet) ?
A. Right by the side of the car.
Q. How far would you say would be the distance from you
to me?
Mr. Cooley: I object.
The Court: Make your question a little plainer as to the
distance. Make your question plain.
By Mr. Pollard:
Q. How far was the officer driving the police car from the
driver of your car when he told him to pull over?
A. About a foot.
Q. A foot?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What happened then?
A. He pulled over, and then there were some
page 96 . cars in front of us, and, when the cars got from the
front of his car, he ran down the street.
Q. How fast?
A. Sixty or seventy miles an hour.
Q. Where did he then go?
A. He made a right turn and ended up near the hospital;
on the left side of the iron bars there.
Q. Were you still in the car when it stopped?
A. Yes, sir.
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Q. Was the driver still in the car when it stopped?
A. No, sir.
Q. When did he get out?
A. He jumped out and ran to the back of the hospital.
Q. How long was it before the officers came up then?
A. They were right back of the car.
Q. How was the driver of that car, that picked you up close
to Raleigh, North Carolina, dressed?
A. He had on a sailor hat, and a yellow shirt with the
sleeves torn, and brown pants.
Q. Did you notice his shoes?
A. No, sir.
Q. You were in the back of the car?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you ever look in the front seat of that car?
A. Yes, sir, when the officers told him to pull over I asked
him was he crazy, pulling away from the officers.
Q. You asked who that?
page 97 - A. The man that was driving the car.
Q. And did you look in the front seat then?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you see any object in the front seat then ?
A. I saw a coat.
Q. What color coat was it?
A. It seemed to me like it was a dark blue coat.
Q. I hand you a hat and shirt and trousers, filed in evi-
dence as Exhibits C. R. M. Nos. 1, 2, and 3, in that order, with
Officer Mason's evidence in this case, and ask you whether
or not you can identify first that hat as the hat that the de-
fendant had on?
A. (Examining) Yes, sir.
Q. Second, I hand you the shirt and ask you to look at that
carefully and say whether or not that is the shirt he had on?
A. (Examining) Yes, sir.
Q. Did you get a good look at the trousers that the man
had on?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Can you say whether or not these trousers, filed as Ex-
hibit C. R. M. No. 3 with the testimony of Mr. Mason, are the
trousers that the man had on?
A. (Examining) Yes, sir.
Q. And I think you said you did not see his shoes?
A. That is right.
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Q. You have been held at the Station House for
page 98 some days, haven't you?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Were you held as a material witness or as a prisoner?
A. As a material witness.
Q. Did you volunteer to come back from Rhode Island with
the officers?
A. Yes, sir, I did.
Q. Of your own accord and voluntarily?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Where is your home?
A. Providence, Rhode Island.
Q. Are you married?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Does James Jordan live up there in Providence, Rhode
Island?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And is he married?
A. Yes, sir.





Q. At what Army Camp are you stationed?
A. New Orleans, Louisiana.
Q. What is the Camp?
A. Jackson Barracks.
page 99 Q. Are you A. W. 0. L.?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How long had you been absent or a deserter on that day?
A. About seven days.
Q. Was the other soldier, James Jordan, with you at all
times?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How did you get into Raleigh, North Carolina?
A. We rode with an officer near that place; and he told us
that Raleigh was straight ahead.
Q. About how many cars passed you, when you were walk-
ing. before you were picked up by the car in wbich you came
to Petersburg?
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A. I do not know. We fell asleep by the side of the road,
and then Jordan got up and thumbed this ride.
Q. You do not know how many cars passed you while you
were walking, coming towards Raleigh?
A. No, sir.
Q. But a large number passed you, did they not?
A. I do not know anything about a large number. I did not
pay any attentioin to the cars that passed by us.
Q. But some passed by you. did they not?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Were there quite a few cars, or about ten cars, or how
many?
A. We fell asleep, and I do not know.
Q. Well, while you were awake?
page 100 A. I was asleep, and Jordan got up, and he
thumbed the ride. I was still asleep then.Q. But you did see some pass you before you went to sleep,
didn't you?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you did see some pass after you were awake?
A. I was still sleeping when Jordan thumbed the ride.
Q. When you were on West Washington Street-(illustrat-
ing) say this is the red car in which you were riding and this
is the police car-did the police car remain behind your car
all of the time, or did it get up beside you?
A. It got up beside us.
Q. Even?
A. No, sir.
Q. He got right up beside the car?
A. That is right.
Q. In which seat were you riding?
A. In the back seat.
Q. When you got to Police Headquarters, did you see any
blood on Rogers's shirt?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Pick that shirt up (indicating) and show the jury where
that blood was when you saw it?
A. I saw blood on his jacket. I did not look at his shirt to
see whether there was blood on it or not.
Q. You just said that you saw blood on there?
A. Yes.
page 101 Q. Do you want to change it now?
A. I thought maybe it was on his shirt.
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Q. Then, when you saw him, was the blood on him or on the
shirt?
A. On the back of his head.
Q. And it was also on his shirt?
A. I do not know about that. I am not positive. I am not
sure about that.
Q. You went to sleep in the automobile again, didn't you .
A. That is right.
Q. And it was dark when you got in the car?
A. That is right.
Q. And when you awoke it was in Petersburg?
A. No, sir.
Q. Now, when you identified Rogers as being the man who
was driving that automobile in which you were riding, were
there any others brought before you other than Rogers?
A. No, sir.
Q. He was alone and not with a group of men?
A. He was alone.
Q. Which one of you soldiers was it who was not so certain
that Rogers was the man the first time you went to Head-
quarters, you or Jordan?
A. We always knew it.
Q. Then, why did the police let you go?
A. Because we told them we belonged at Camp Pickett.
Q. Did you, as h matter of fact, belong at Camp Pickett?
A. No, sir.
page 102 } Q. So you did not tell them the truth at that
time?
A. That is right.
Q. As a matter of fact, have you ever been stationed at
Camp Pickett?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. So the officers had a hard time finding you?
A. No, sir.
Q. They thought you were at Camp Pickett?
A. Well, they looked for us there. They checked up on us
there.
Q. They checked up on you after you had been released?
A. Yes.
Q. Then, why did you tell the police officers you were from
Camp Pickett?
A. Because we had come all the way from New Orleans to
get home; and I wanted to go home.
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Q. And, when the officers released you, they thought you
were going back to Camp Pickett?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And then they found you up at your home?
A. That is right.
Q. What police arrested you at your home., the Petersburg
police or some other police?
A. Some other police came up home then.
Q. When were you turned over to the Petersburg police?
A. I do not exactly know that.
page 103 Q. You did not tell the Petersburg police that
you lived in Providence, Rhode Island, did you?
A. Yes, sir, I did.
Q. You told them that that was your home?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. But you had led them to believe you were going back to
Camp Pickett?
A. That is right.
Q. And you have been in prison here ever since they caught
you the second time, haven't you?
A. As a material witness, yes, sir.
Q. And you say you saw a coat lying on the front seat of
the automobile?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And in two or three hours the automobile came from
Raleigh to Petersburg?
A. That is right.
Q. What else was in the automobile besides a blue coat?
A. I do not know.
Q. What color was the outside of the car?
A. A reddish color.
Q. What color was the interior?
A. I could iiot tell you about the inside of the car. I did
not notice that.
Q. What color was the steering wheel?
A. Black.
Q. What kind of automobile is it f
page 104 A. A Studebaker.
Q. Now, the first time you went to the Police
Headquarters you were not so certain really that it was this
man here (indicating the accused)?
A. We always were certain.
Q. Now, when you say that the two automobiles were side
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by side, is that as true as everything else you have said since.
you have been on this witness stand?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You mean to tell the jury that everything else you have
said since you have been on this witness stand is as true as
what you said about the position of those automobiles?
A. Yes, sir.




Q. You have been asked by counsel for the defense why you
told the Petersburg Police that you were from Camp Pickett;
and you replied that you wanted to go home. Why were you
so anxious to go home?
A. My wife was going to have a birth.
Q. She was going to have a baby, you mean?
A. Yes, sir.
By the Court:
Q. In other words, you were going home because your wife
was gcing to have a child?
page 105 A. Yes, sir.
. And you are a member of the white race?A. Yes. sir.
RE-CROSS EXAMINATION.
By Mr. Cooley:
Q. Why did you desert the Army?
A. To see my wife.
Q. Couldn't you have gotten a leave of absence to go to see
your wife?
A. Not in that camp.
Q. Do you know the other soldier who was with you very
well?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Where does he live?
A. In Providence, Rhode Island.
Q. Was his wife going to have a baby too?
A Yes, sir.
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Witness stood aside.
Mr. Cooley: May I recall Private James Jordan?
The Court: Yes.
PRIVATE JAMES JORDAN,
recalled by the defendant for further cross examination:
By Mr. Cooley:
Q. At the time that you deserted the Army and were going
to your home, were you going home because your wife was
sick?
A. My wife was pregnant.
page 106 - Q. She was pregnant at that time?
A. Yes, sir.




sworn for the Commonwealth:
DIRECT EXAMINATION.
By Mr. Pollard:
Q. Please state your name, residence, and Occupation?
A. Charles Leonard Bain; 331 Dalton Avenue, Petersburg,
Virginia; bottler, Bain Bottling Works, Petersburg, Virginia.
Q. On Sunday morning, July 18, 1943, will you state whether
or not you were a patient in the Petersburg Hospital?
A. Yes, sir, I was.
Q. What was the number of the room you occupied?
A. 105.
Q. Is that on the first, second, or third floor?
A. The first floor.
Q. On which side of the hospital?
A. The south side.
Q. Will you come over here and look at this plat, filed as
Exhibit W. W. C. No. 1, and point out on that map the loca-
tion of Room No. 105?
(Witness did as requested)
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Q. Were you awake that morning at about 7:10 A. M. ?
A. Yes, sir.
page 107 Q. Did you see any person outside of your win-
dow at approximately that time?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Who was that person that you saw?
A. I saw a colored fellow pass the window; approximately
about eight feet from my window.
Q. How far down his body could you see?
A. From the shoulders up.
The Court: Indicating a little lower than the shoulders on
his body.
By Mr. Pollard:
Q. You could not see any lower on his body than that?
A. No, sir.
Q. In what direction was the colored man traveling?
A. He was going east.
Q. To the rear or front of the hospital?
A. To the rear of the hospital.
Q. When you first saw him, was he running or walking?
A. He was running.
Q. Was he still running the whole time you were looking
at him?
A. No, sir, he stopped and looked directly towards my win-
dow, looking back, west, in the direction of Madison Street.
Q. And then what?
A. He kept going.
Q. When he stopped and turned around and looked what
was his position relative to the south window of
page 108 . your room from which you were looking? Where
was he?
A. At the side of the window.
Q. Can you identify the man who turned and looked back
in the direction of Madison Street that morning?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Will you look around and see if you see him?
A. Yes, sir (pointing to the accused).
Q. You are pointing at the defendant, Silas Rogers?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Is there any question in your mind, Mr. Bain, as to
whether or not this defendant, Silas Rogers, is the man you
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saw that morning at 7:10 o'clock running back of that hos-
pital?
A. Not the least doubt.
Q. I hand you a picture, which has been filed as Exhibit
R. L. J. No. 1 with the evidence of Detective Jackson, and
will ask you whether or not, on that morning when you saw
the defendant, Silas Rogers, his hair looked like it now looks,
fixed back with vaseline, or something, or whether it looked
like it is shown in that picture?
Mr. Hopkins: I object, for the reason that there is no evi-
dence here to that effect.
The Court: It is overruled.
Mr. Hopkins: Exception.
A. His hair was in this condition (indicating on photo-
graph).Q. Did he have a hat on?
A. No, sir.
page 109 Q. Could you see his hand?
A. No, sir.
Q. You do not know whether he had his hat in his hand or
not?
A. No, sir.
Q. After you saw that man run back of the hospital, did you
see anybody else on that morning on that side of your window ?
A. Shortly after that I saw Officer Lockett.
Q. Of the Petersburg Police Force?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. About how long afterwards?
A. A very short while.
Q. Which way was he going?
A. In an easterly direction, to the back of the hospital.
Q. Do you know whether he came back to the front of the
hospital?
A. I saw him come back to the front of the hospital.
Q. Did you know Officer Hatchell, of the Petersburg Police
Force., before his death?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you see him after you saw Officer Lockett that morn-ing?
A. Yes, sir.Q. How long afterwards?
A. Some few minutes. Probably twelve or fifteen minutes.
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Q. What did you see Officer Hatchell doing?
A. He was standing at my window, and I was talking with
him.
page 110 Q. And you were in your room?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And after your conversation with him, where did he go?
A. He went west, towards Madison Street.
Q. And what did you do?
A. I relaxed back on the bed.
Q. How long was it before you again looked out of the win-
dow?
A. About three or five minutes.
Q. What did you see then?
A. As I was looking out of the window, I happened to see
Officer Hatchell's hat fly through the air.
Q. Did you know it was Officer's Hatchell's hat at that time?
A. No, sir.
Q. What kind of hat was it?
A. An officer's cap; it was blue.
Q. And it flew through the air?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And what else?
A. Just before the hat hit the ground, there were two dis-
charges from a revolver.
Q. You heard two shots?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And then what?
A. I saw Officer's Hatchell's cap drop to the ground, aid
I saw him reel and fall.
Q. Did you see anybody else with him at that time ?
A. No, sir.
page 111 } Q. When the shots were fired, could you then
see Officer Hatchell?
A. At about the crack of the gun, or shortly after the crack
of the gun, I saw him reeling.
Q. In which direction was he reeling?
A. South.
Q. Can you go to that plat again and point out your reom
and where you saw that officer's cap fly out, and where you
saw the officer reeling?
A. (Witness did as requested, and said:) Officer Hatchell's
hat fell just about here (indicating). His body fell right here
(indicating).
Q. By those stone steps?
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A. Just above the steps. In a straight course here, there
was a telephone pole (indicating).
Q. Is that telephone pole marked on that map?
A. No, sir, but there was a telephone pole there. There
was a telephone pole between Mr. Hatchell's body and my
window.
Q. What does that marking "nine-inch pole" mean? Was
that the location of the pole'?
A. Yes, sir, and he was between the pole and this shrub
(indicating), and his body fell here, right above the steps
(indicating).
Q. Do you know Mrs. 0. E. Prince?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What is her occupation?
page 112 . A. Nursing.
Q. After you saw Officer Hatchell reel and fall
by those steps, did Mrs. Prince come into your room or not?
A. Yes, sir, she did.
Q. Did she look out of that window?
A. To my knowledge she did, sir.
CROSS EXAMINATION.
By Mr. Cooley:
Q. You say the only part of the man you saw, going away,
was from his shoulders up?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And he was how far from your window?
A. Approximately about eight feet. From here to the end
of -Mr. Pollard's desk (indicating about eight feet).
Q. Will you show the jury on the map where he was when
you saw him?
A. (Indicating) Here is Room 105. He came within eight
fe~t of this window, and, as he passed the window, I looked
straight at him, face to face.
Q. Which way was he going?
A. East, towards the rear of the hospital.
Q. What kind of shirt did he have on?
A. I could not give an exact description of his shirt. It
was somewhat brownish.
Q. But you are not certain of that?
A. I could not say for sure what was the color of his shirt.
Q. Did he have on a collar?
page 113 A. The neck of the shirt was open.
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Q. Did he have on a hat?
A. No hat.
Q. And you saw no other part of his body ?
A. That is right.
Q. When you saw him, he was on a flat surface, and he dis-
appeared?
A. He was not quite on a flat surface. I was looking at him
through the window, anT, as he passed the window, he turned,
and then I got a good look at him.
Q. How long had you been awake I
A. I do not know. It was early in the morning.
Q. What about this man was there that attracted your at-
tention?
A. I just happened to notice him. I usually spoke to the
Orderlies when they came on duty in the morning.




page 114 MRS. 0. E. PRINCE,
sworn for the Commonwealth:
DIRECT EXAMINATION.
By Mr. Pollard:
Q. Please state your name, residence, and occupation?
A. Mrs. 0. E. Prince; 216 Lee Avenue, Colonial Heights,
Chesterfield County, Virginia; Registered Nurse.
Q. Mrs. Prince, were you on duty on Saturday night, July
17, 1943, at the Petersburg Hospital, in Petersburg, Virginia ?
A. Yes.
Q. What time were you supposed to go off duty on the
morning of July 18, 1943 ?
A. At 8:00 o'clock in the morning.
Q. Then, you were on duty that morning, the morning of
July 18, 1943, from approximately 7:15 o'clock to 7:42 or 7:48
o'clock?
A. From 7:00 to 8:00 o'clock.
Q. Now, in what room were you nursing?
A. 107 principally.
Q. Is that room, No. 107, on the first, second, or third floor
of the hospital?
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A. The first floor.
Q. On which side of the hospital, north, south, east, or
west ?
A. The south side.
Q. Is that the side overlooking Wythe Street?
A. Yes.
Q. Where was the patient's bed located in that room?
A. The head of the bed would be at the west
page 115 wall.
Q. Towards Madison Street?
A. Yes.
Q. Where is the window located in that room?
A. There are two windows in that room. They are located
on the south wall of the hospital.
Q. With respect to those two windows, where was the pa-
tient's bed?
A. The head of the bed was at the west wall, by the first
window.
Q. Was the bed up against the window or not?
A. About two feet from the window.
Q. That morning, July 18, 1943, at around 7:15 o'clock, did
you see any one out there on the south side of that hospital.
out of the window of room 107?
A. Yes.
Q. Who did you see?
A. A tall, slim officer.
Q. What was he doing then?
A. He was running around the side of the hospital build-
ing.
Q. Going in which direction?
A. Back; from Madison Street back.
Q. What did you do?
A. I went to the Ambulance Drive, in the back of the hos-
pital, which would be the north side of the hospital.
Q. And what did you do?
A. I saw there another officer, a State Officer.
page 116 - and he asked us if we had seen a Negro man; anl
we said, No.
Mr. Cooley: I object to that.
The Court: The objection is sustained. Don't'niv aiiv at-
tention. gentlemen of the jury, to the answer of the witnesg
as to the officer asking her a question- Any conversation is
stricken out.
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By Mr. Pollard:
Q. And then what did you do?
A. I went back to my room, 107.
Q. And that was about 7:15 A. M.
A. Yes.
Q. Now, did you observe anything else after that on that
same morning?
. A. About twenty minutes after that I observed the same
officer coming from Madison Street, on the same side of the
hospital, running this time, with a gun in his hand, and then
I saw a dark-skinned colored man, with lots of hair and a
tight-fitting white hat, and then the officer had the gun on
him.
Q. Do you know where the hedge is there which lies south
of the hospital?
A. Yes.
Q. When you saw the officer running, with the gun in iis
hand, which side of the hedge was he on-the hedge away
from the hospital or not?
A. He was between the south wall of the hospital and tLe
hedge.
page 117 Q. And where was the colored man?
A. On the other side of the hedge.
Q. How much of that colored man could you see?
A. I did not see more than about this far down.
The Court: Indicating up from about eight or ten incie,
below the chin, on the chest.
By Mr. Pollard:
Q. What kind of hat did he have on?
A. A tight-fitting white hat.
0. Did you notice his hair?
A. He had a rlenty of hair.
0. Was he of light or dark complexion?
A. Dark complexion,
0. A colored man or a white man?
A. A colored man; dark-skinned.
0. How could yoll see him through the hedge?
A. Just through the stems of the bushes.
Q. How do you account for the fact that you could only see
f rin just below the shoulders up?
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A. Because there is a declivity or hill there, and I could not
see any more than that.
Q. The hill is on which side of the hedge?
A. Towards Wythe Street. That would be the south side
of the hedge.
Q. After you saw the officer running, with the gun in his
hand, between the south wall of the hospital and the hedge,
and you saw the man on the other side of the hedge
page 118 * through the stems of the hedge, what happened
then?
A. The officer backed towards Madison Street and this
man followed him on the other side of the hedge, and then
they got to the corner of the hospital and I could not see them
any more.
Q. After they disappeared around the corner of the hos-
pital, did you see or hear anything else?
A. I heard two shots very soon after that.
Q. How long after they disappeared around the corner of
the hospital was that?
A. A very short while. A couple of minutes at the most, i
should say.
Q. Did one follow the other?
A. Yes, right in succession.
Q. And how many shots did you hear?
A. Two.
Q. Did you hear anything else?
A. I heard some one call for help twice.
Q. What did you do then?
A. I went into Room 105.
Q. Who was in that room?
A. Mr. Charles Leonard Bain.
Q. And what did you do?
A. I looked out of the window there, and I could see the
officer lying on the ground.
Q. From the window in Room 105?
A. Yes.
page 119 . Q. And then what?
A. I went out of the back door of the hospital,
which is still on the south side, and went out there and helped
to carry the man into the Operating Room.
Q. And that is all you know about it?
A. Yes, sir.
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CROSS EXAMINATION.
By Mr. Cooley:
Q. Mrs. Prince, the person you saw with the tight-fitting
hat on-are you familiar with the diagram here (indicating
Exhibit W. W. C. No. 1)? Have you been instructed about
that?
Mr. Pollard: I object to the question.
The Court: Gentlemen of the jury, pay no attention to that
remark of counsel. I will ask the question.
Do you know about this plat?
Witness: Yes, sir.
The Court: Can you come up here and show it or explain
it?
Witness: Yes, sir.
The Court: The witness may answer the question.
By Mr. Cooley:
Q. Will you show the gentlemen of the jury the room in
which you were at the time you saw the officer?
A. That is the one (indicating).
Q. And from that diagram can you point to
page 120 where you saw the man who had on the tight-
fitting white hat ?
A. Just about along in here, between the hedge and the
hospital (indicating). I just saw him outside of the window.
Q. And below the window?
A. Yes.
Q. You really do not know who the man is, do you?
A. No, I could not identify him.
By the Court:
Q. Mrs. Prince, you are a member of the white race, are you
not?
A. I think so.
The Court: That is for the record. Of course the jury here
knows that.
Witness stood aside.
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ROYAL N. GUNTER,
sworn for the Commonwealth:
DIRECT EXAMINATION.
By Mr. Pollard:
Q. Please state your name, residence, and occupation?
A. Royal N. Gunter; garage operator; Kenilworth, Peters-
burg, Virginia.
Q. On the morning of July 18, 194 3, did you remove an au-
tomobile from a point south of the Petersburg Hospital, Pe-
tersburg, Virginia?
A. Yes, sir.
page 121 . Q. Were you in charge of the wrecker which re-
moved that car?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. At that time was there a coat in the wrecked car or
not?
A. There was.
Q. In what seat was the coat!
A. In the back seat.
No cross examination-
Witness stood aside.
CAPTAIN F. C. BEASLEY,
recalled by the Commonwealth:
DIRECT EXAMINATION.
By Mr. Pollard:Q. You are the same Captain Beasley, of the Petersburg
Police Department, who testified in this case earlier today.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Captain, has a coat been turned over to you and kept in
your possession, which was found in that wrecked car here
on July 18, 1943?
A. Yes, sir.
(Coat produced.)
Q. I hand you a coat and ask you to examine it and stafe
whether or not that is the coat which was found in the wrecked
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car on July 18, 1943, driven by the defendant and in which
there were two soldiers?
A. (Examining) Yes, sir.
page 122 Q. Has it been in your possession ever since?
A. Yes.
Mr. Pollard: I offer that, if the Court please, in evidence,
marking it Exhibit F. C. B. No. 1.
Coat referred to accordingly filed in evidence.
Q. Mr. Beasley, will you look at this map, Exhibit W. W.
C. No. 1, filed with Mr. Cotten's testimony, and state whether
or not East Washington Street, Madison Street, the Petero-
burg Hospital, and the territory lying south of the Peters-
burg Hospital down to Wythe Street and beyond Wythe
Street, and the territory running back here down to Lieuten-
ant Run all the way to East Bank Street, is within the Cor-
porate Limits of the City of Petersburg, Virginia?
A. (Examining) Yes, it is.
By the Court:
Q. In other words, the eastern Corporate Limits of ti
City of Petersburg are as far to the east as Lieutenant Run"
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And the western Corporate Limits are as far to the west
as Sycamore Street?
A. That is right.
Q. And the northern Corporate Limits are considerably
north of the Petersburg Hospital?
A. That is right.
Q. And the southern Corporate Limits are considerably
south of the Petersburg Hospital?
page 123 } A. That is right.
0. In other words, the propertv around the ho--
pital is Drobablv a mile or more within the Corporate Limits
of the City of Petersburg?
A. Yes, sir.
Witness stood aside.
Mr. Pollard: That is the Commonwealth's case.
Mr. Cooley: I want to make a motion, if your Honor please.
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The Court: Gentlemen of the jury, you will retire.
(Jury retired.)
Mr. Cooley: May it please the Court, the defendant now
makes a motion to strike all of the evidence that at this stage
has been produced by the Commonwealth, and assigns as
grounds in support of said motion the following:
1. That the evidence produced by the Commonwealth is
legally insufficient to sustain a conviction for the crime
charged in the indictment.
2. That the burden rests upon the Commonwealth to prove,
beyond a reasonable doubt, the guilt of the accused; that the
Commonwealth has not produced a shred of evidence suffi-
cient to establish that the accused accomplished the murder
.of Officer Hatchell,-for, even if the jury should return a
verdict of guilty upon this evidence, without the introduction
of any evidence on behalf of the defendant, the Court would
be forced to set it aside.
The Court: In other words, your motion is io
page 124 strike the evidence.
Mr. Cooley: Yes, sir.
The Court: The motion is overruled.
Mr. Cooley: We would like to have the privilege of arguing
the motion, your Honor.
The Court: It is in the record now.
Mr. Cooley: May we take an exception?
The Court: Yes. The record is your motion, and the excep-
tion is on the ruling. That is all in the record.
Recall the jury.
(Jury recalled.)
page 125 TESTIMONY FOR THE DEFENDANT.
SILAS ROGERS (colored),
the accused, sworn on his own behalf:
DIRECT EXAMINATION.
By Mr. Cooley:
Q. State your name?
A. Silas Rogers.
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Q. How old are you?
A. 21.
Q. Where do you live?
A. New York City.
Q. Where were you born?
A. I was born and raised in New York,
Q. Where does your family live?
A. In New York.
Q. On the 16th of July, 1943, which was a Friday, before
you were arrested in Petersburg on Sunday, where were you?
A. I was on the train, on my way up; I was coming up on
the train, coming through South Carolina, on to Hamlet,
North Carolina.
Q. Where were you coming from?
A. From Miami, Florida.
Q. How long had you been in Florida?
A. Five months.
Q. Had you been working in Florida?
A. Yes.
Q. Where?
page 126 A. At the Sheridan Barber Shop, 41st Street,
on Miami Beach.
Q. How long?
A. For about two months and one-half; and a little better
than that.
Q. For what pu'rpose were you going to New York?
A. I got a notice from the Local Board. I was supposed
to return back to go in the Army. I had been examined once
in Miami, Florida.
Q. Then, what is the status of yout position with the Draft
Board in New York?
A. I was supposed to report back and go into the Army.
Q. On what date, or what day were you supposed to report
to your Local Board in New York?
A. On the 22nd of July.
Q. Tell the gentlemen of the jury and his I-onor very
clearly about your leaving Miami, Florida, until you reached
Hamlet, North Carolina?
A. I first left Miami on the Florida East Coast Railroad,
and then I came into Jacksonville, Florida, and then I went
to Savannah, Georgia, and after I got to Savannah I had to
change, and, when I made the change, I came into Hamlet,
North Carolina. That was a Diesel engine, not the Silver
Meteor, pulling freight cars; and then I changed at Hamlet,
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North Carolina. That was in the afternoon, around 5:30 or
6:00 o'clock.
Q. Of what day?
A. The 17th.
page 127 . Q. What day of the week?
A. That was Saturday. So I was around there
for some time, and the fellows around the station told me how
to get out of town; and I asked what train was leaving, go-
ing north, and they said two; one around 10:45 and the freight
left at 10:20. And I left on the second train.
Q. What is the type of train you are talking about?
A. The Silver Meteor.
Q. Are both of them Silver Meteors?
A. Yes, the Silver Meteor comes all the way from Jackson-
ville.
Q. On what railroad?
A. That is the Seaboard.
Q. When you were in Hamlet, did you talk with anybody,,
A. Yes.
Q. How long were you in the City of Hamlet?
A. Maybe around three or four hours-from 6:00 o 'clo, 1i
until near 11:00 o'clock.
Q. Was it dark or light when you arrived at Hamlet?
A. It was good daylight.
Q. Where did you go in Hamlet?
A. I went to the movies, and was talking with the ticket-
taker at the theater; and then I came back down to the sta-
tion and was talking with a lot of the boys around the station,
and that is where I was when the train came up. And when
the train left I was on it.
Q. Did you know the schedule of the trais
page 128 leaving Hamlet, North Carolina, before some one
had told you about it?
A. No, sir. When I first got in the city, I asked a fellow,
and he did not know definitelv; and there was a guv that
traced railway express cars-checking the trains in and outz
and they gave me the right information when they were leav-
ing.
Q. Tell his Honor and the gentlemen of the iurv clearly
about your getting on the train at Hamlet, North Carolina T
A. When the second train came in, I was talkino2 with tiis
fellow that was putting fuel into the Silver Meteor; and he
told me to steD on up: and he said, "No one can see vou
there;" and I thought it was a safe place, and I stepped ulp
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there; and they did not make any stop between Hamlet and
Raleigh. He made one stop in Raleigh, North Carolina, and
I remained on that train.
Q. Now, explain to his Honor and the jury exactly what
happened. We do not want to get to Raleigh too quickly.
When you got on the train at Hamlet, did any one see you get
on that train?
A. Sure. It was a guy that was putting the fuel into it.
It was a colored fellow.
Q. Did you see the men working on that train?
A. That is right.
Q. What part of the train was being refueled?
A. The last part. They have two sections. The fuel is put
in the rear. Only the rear is connected with the baggage car:
and that is where I was: between the baggage car
page 129 and the engine.
Q. Was it a steam engine?
A. It was an oil burner. It was run by fuel oil.
Q. And then the train pulled away?
A. That is right.
Q. Did you ever get off of that train?
A. Not before ogetting to Petersburg.
Q. Did the train stop at Raleigh?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you get off at Raleigh?
A. No, sir.
Q. Did anybody see you at Raleigh?
A. No. sir.
Q. Did the train stop there?
A. Yes. sir.
0. Well. how do you account for the fact that the train
stopped at Raleioh and no one saw you and you did not get
off of the train there?
A. It was a lonog train, and, when the engine got into the
yard, he 1wassed all of the lights in the yard, and. at the on,
of the yard, no one can see.yon: and he was g.oing" thron-,i
the station. If vou Q'et in the light, some one can see von.
hut there was enou'h room for me to put myself away so*
that no ono eould see me. And I remained on that train.
Q. About how lono did the train remain at Raleigh?
A. About ten minutes, maybe.
page 130 0 . Then where was the next stop?
A. Petersburg-. But between here mnd PRaco 1,
fhore was a cracked rail that held us un. There wer? severa ,
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trains stopped there, and there were some men working there;
and then, after they got the rail fixed, the train came on into
Petersburg.
Q. Did anybody see you on that train after it left Hamlet,
North Carolina, and before it arrived in Petersburg-any-
where?
A. Yes, just before I got into Petersburg.
Q. Tell his Honor and the gentlemen of the jury about that.
Who saw you, and under what circumstances, and if anything
was said, what was said?
A. This guy was a mechanic. He came from the engineer's
compartment. When he first came to the door, he saw me
sitting there; and he said, "Watch your step. I am coming
over;" and I tried to get up, and he said, "No, stay where
you are;" and he said, "Are you getting a ride?" and I said,
"Yes;" and he said, "You be particular." And he went into
the baggage room. And then, before we entered Petersburg,
ten or fifteen miles out of town, the guy from the baggaEe
room came to the door and flashed a light on me and said,
"Listen, Bud! I do not know what you are doing on here.
You do not have any business on the train. It is dangerous.
We have a lot of cops and railroad detectives in Richmond.
I advise you to get off in Petersburg." And I did that.
Q. At the time those people saw you, was the
page 131 train standing still?
A. No, sir, the train was running.
Q. And had the train left Raleigh when they saw you?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did they see you before the train stopped for that rail
to be fixed?
A. No, sir.
Q. Was it in North Carolina or Virginia where the rail was
in bad order?
A. I do not know that, because it was at night and I re-
mained on the train while the track was being fixed. And
then, after that, they arrived in Petersburg. And then I knew
I was in Virginia.
Q. Was the rail broken before you got to Raleigh, or after
you got to Raleigh?
A. That was after we came through Raleigh.
Q. About how long had you been coming from Raleigh be-
fore the train was stopped on account of that split rail?
A. Maybe an hour or an hour and one-half; something like
that.
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Q. Did the train stop in Petersburg?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What did you do after the train stopped in Petersburg?
A. The fellow had told me before getting into Petersburg
to get off in Petersburg; and he told me that that would be
the next stop; and I got out on the left-hand side of the train,
and, as the train was pulling away, I walked back,
page 132 and at the end of the car I walked across the track
into the station, and there I remained until day.
Q. Do you remember seeing anybody there?
A. There was a colored soldier and a large light-skinned
lady; and she was sitting there also.
Q. Can you describe the station to the gentlemen of the
jury?
A. I think I can. As far as I know, it seemed to be a kind
of reddish brick building, if I am not mistaken.
Q. And you changed clothes where?
A. In that station.
Q. In what part of the station?
A. That was in the colored department; in the lavatory.
Q. Was it dark or was the sun shining?
A. That was at night.
Q. When you were on the train, what kind of clothes were
you wearing?
A. I had on a pair of greenish-looking trousers, with pin-
stripes in them, and a brown shirt.
Q. Where are those clothes?
A. I do not know. The detectives had them.
(Clothes produced.)
Q. Examine these clothes and see if they are the ones you
were wearing at the time you were riding on that train?
A. (Examining) Yes, sir.
The Court: Do you want to file them as exhibits?
Mr. Cooley: Yes, sir.
page 133 . The Court: It is so ordered.
Clothes referred to accordingly filed in evidence-cap,
shirt, and trousers, designated as Exhibits S. R. Nos. 1, 2,
and 3.
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By Mr. Cooley:
Q. When you changed clothes in the station here, what
clothes did you put on?
A. I did not have to pull off the others. I had the blue pin-
striped trousers on underneath those trousers, and I had the
brown shirt over the tan shirt. All I had to do, in the sta-
tion, was to pull those off; and I had the others on. And I
rolled them up and brought them out when I left there in the
daytime.
Q. When you left in the daytime, where did you leave from?
A. I left that station.
Q. From the time you went in the station, after you got off
the train, and until you left that station in the daytime, with
these clothes on, where were you in Petersburg?
A. I was in the station. I was from the lavatory back to
the waiting room. That is as far as I got until daylight.
Q. Do you know where the ticket office is at the station?
A. Yes, I passed the ticket office when going into the col-
ored department.
Q. Where was the ticket office in reference to the waitig
room?
A. First I got to the ticket office, and then I
page 134 passed into the colored department. That is in
the center, and the lavatory is back in the corner.
Q. Have you been to the station since you left there then'
A. No, sir.
Q. Do you recall where the white waiting room is?
A. I could not say for sure. The colored department is
what I was interested in, to clean myself up. And I was a
little sleepy too from riding at night.
Q. Do you know what time it was when you left the sta-
tion?
A. It was something to 9:00 o'clock.
Q. When you left the station, which way did you go?
A. When I first left the station, I came down one block,
and then turned to my left and went down, and then I went
over to Washington Street. There were two service stations
there, and there I met a colored fellow. He was sitting there;
and he gave me information.
Q. What informati on did you get, and what was said?
A. This colored fellow was sitting there, and I spoke io
him, and asked him-
Mr. Pollard: I object to that.
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The Court: I will not let him detail the conversation, but,
if he says he went to a man to inquire about something, I will
let him say that, and what information was given him.
By Mr. Cooley:
Q. What did you ask the man about when you saw him near
the service station ?
page 135 The Court: What did you go there to ask him
about?
A. How to get out of town, and about some food also; and
he told me how to get out of town; he said, "Go down three
traffic lights and make a left turn ;" and he said that would
be Sycamore Street, and then to go down two blocks and turn
to the right, and to go along to your right and you will see a
bridge. And that is what I did.
By Mr. Cooley:
Q. Where was the man at the service station?
A. He was not exactly in the yard. There was a buildinff
on this side (indicating). He was sitting on the runway. it
is built up something like a fence, but it was not high. He
was sitting there waiting for the service station to open.
0. Do you know what time that was?
A. I think it was pretty close around a quarter to nine; or
ten minutes to nine.
Q. And then you went where?
A. He told me the way to go, and I went straight down
West Washington Street; and he said there was a church
thre on the left; and he said on the rig-ht-hand side is a school
oaled the Petersburg High School. That was on the rigidt-
hand side. And I looked and on the rivht-hand side thero
was a building named Petersburg High School; and I went
dohwn three traftc lights, which was Sycamore Street. ann]
thOn von go down a block and then you turn to your right;
and he said you will see a bridge: and I did; and. a- I was
goilo' qcross that bridge, the cop arrested rhe.
page 136 0 . What did you have with you?
A. I had this shirt and those trousers, under-
!loath my arm. The shirt was wrapped around the greei-
frousors. I did not have any paper to wrap) them up in.
0. T-Tad von ever been in Petersburg before?
A. No, sir, I never had in my life.
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Q. When you were stopped by the officer, what did he say
to you?
A. He said, "Stick them up;" and I did not say anything;
and he said, "Get in the car;" and I got in the car, and he put
the handcuffs on me, and I went to the foot of the bridge
and turned around like something had happened; and I did
not know anything about it; and then he carried me to Head-
quarters.
Q. Did you say anything to the officer about a gun?
A. Not at all.Q. Did he say anything to you about a gun?
A. No, sir, he did not.
Q. Did you have a gun?
A. No, sir.
Q. The clothes that have been introduced in evidence here,
are those your clothes?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. The shirt and pants are yours?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And the hat is yours?
A. Yes, sir.
page 137 . Q. How many people were with the officer wheni
he picked you up on the bridge?
A. He was alone.
Q. Where did he take you?
A. Back to Headquarters.
Q. When you got there, what happened? Now, take youir
time and tell these gentlemen what happened?
A. When I first entered the Headquarters-he told me to
get out of the car and go ahead in there, and shoved me; and
when I got on the inside, the time I entered the door, one of
the white men said, "That is that Negro. Let me get to that
sucker first." And I did not know what it was all about.
And as soon as they got the handcuffs off of me-I hate to
say so, but I was hit by several fists and was struck on the
head with a black-jack. And that is how I got the blood on
my head, and got this scar here (indicating).
Q. Where was that scar?
A. Right behind here (indicating back of head to the left
side).
Mr. Cooley: Your Honor, I would like for the gentlemen of
the jury to see that scar.
The Court: Yes.
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(Witness exhibited scar to jury.)
By Mr. Cooley:Q. Take this shirt and tell the gentlemen of the jury if that
shirt was torn after you left the station?
page 138 . A. Yes, sir, this shirt was torn after I left the
station. When I was going across the bridge the
shirt was only cut off at the sleeves, and I notice here where
it has been torn. And, when I got there, they were piling on
me, and tore the shirt across the sleeve. And before they
washed the shirt, it was just like some one had killed a bog,
or something like that. They have washed the shirt, and you
can not see it so much; and also my cap. And my head was
sore. And it hurt. And after that, they took me upstairs,
and there were two detectives. One took my picture-one of
them first took my hand and bent it back, and asked me about
some gun that I killed the officer with; and I did not know
anything about it; and the other detective took a gun and
put it in my face and said, "If you don't tell me where the
gun is, I am going to kill you;" and I said, "You can kill me.
I do not know anything about it;" and he said, "You are one
of those hard fellows, and don't want to talk," and grabbed
me by the hair and slapped me down on the floor, and told
the other one to go and get the water; and he went and got
the water and poured three glasses of water in my nose to
make me tell something; and I did not know anything about
it; and then he made my nose bleed more, trying to make me
tell something about that gun; and I did not know anything
about it. And, finally, they saw that I was not going to tell
them anything about it, and they quit beating me.
Q. Was there any blood on that shirt?
page. 139 [ A. There was no blood on that shirt before I
entered the Headquarters.
Q. Was it ever on there after you entered the Headquar-
ters?
A. Certainly there was.
Q. Where is it now?
A. It has been washed away. You can see the stains.
Q. (Indicating hat) Is that your hat?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Is there blood on that hat? Examine it?
A. (Examining) Yes, sir, there is some of the blood on it.
That (indicating) is vhere they pulled the hat down on the
back of my head and tried to get people to identify me. But
no one seemed to know me around Petersburg.
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Q. Were fingerprints ever made of your fingers?
A. Yes, sir. I have had them made three times. At Miami
Beach you have to have fingerprints before you can work on
the beach.
Q. I mean in Petersburg, did the police take your finger-
prints?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. State the number of fingers that the prints were made
of, and when?
A. They made -them on July 18th; both hands; right and
left.
Q. Was there anything else done to your fingers by way of
a test, other than fingerprints?
A. No, sir.
Q. Do you know what officer made the finger-
page 140 . prints?
A. I do not know him by name, but I know him
when I see him.
Q. Has he been on the stand here today?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Is he the same one that took your picture?
A. No, sir, there were two of them. The one that made the
picture was here, but the one that made the fingerprints was
not here. That was a kind of short, handsome-looking fel-
low.
Q. Were you in a group of people to be identified?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Where did they take you?
A. They took me to Raleigh, North Carolina.
Q. Did anybody identify you there?
A. No, sir.
0. Did they ask them in your presence to identify you?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What did they say?
A. They went over in the colored section, in Raleigh, and
askred, Did they ever see me there before? and they said, No:
and they asked two or three white fellows, Did they know me,
and they did not know me.
0. A Mr. Cook testifed here that an automobile belongin-
to him was stolen. Did they take you to him?
A. No. sir.
Q. Between Petersburg and Ralei'h, did the detpctive stop
anywhere to ask anybody if they had seen you before?
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A. They stopped at some service stations.
page 141 Q. And what did they say?
A. They said they had never seen me before.
Q. After the detectives took you out of Petersburg, did they
find anybody who said they had seen you before?
A. No, sir, no more than the soldiers here in Petersburg,
and a fellow in the hospital. That is all I know of.
Q. When you were arrested on that Sunday morning, wece
you confronted or faced by two soldiers?
A. Yes.
Q. What did they say?
A. When the soldiers first came in, at first one of them said,
"No, that is not him;" and the other one said, "That don't
look like him either. I don't think that is the fellow." And
they took them on back; and then, upstairs, in Captain Beas-
ley's room, they said I still was not the guy; and later on,
about a week later, when I was supposed to go to the lower
court, then I was carried down there and those soldiers were
sure that I was the guy.
Q. They testified in the Police Court that you were the
one?
A. That is right.
Q. When did they first say definitely that you were the
one?
A. That was in the Police Court-they did not say definitely,
but they said that I was the man. That was the day before
court-day.
0. They were identifying you as the man who did what?
A. They were trying to identify me as the man who killed
Robert Hatchell, but I was the wrong fellow.
page 142 Q. Did they say you killed Officer Hatchell, or
that you had stolen an automobile?
A. They did not exactly say. I do not exactly know whnt
to say about that. They did not say I killed a man, thoug].
They paid I was driving a car.
0. Did you drive the automobile?
A. No, sir, I did not. I do not even know how to drive
o1.
0. Have you ever seen it?
A. No, sir, I haven't seen it.
Q. Have von ever driven an automobile?
A. I never have in my life.
0. Can yoni drive an automobile now?
A No, sir, I can not.
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Q. Did you ever have a driving permit from any particular
State?
A. No, sir, I never have.
Q. Did the police take you anywhere else other than to
Raleigh, North Carolina?
A. The detectives took me over here in the colored section,
somewhere, I do not know where, but the people over there did
not know me either.
Q. Did they ever take you to the Petersburg Hospital?
A. Yes, sir, they took me there on that same day. They
carried me to the window; and at first they said there was a
lady there, or a patient there, that remembered seeing me.
And I never did see any one there. They carried me around
there and told me to stand up; and I stood up
page 143 - there; and then they said, "Come on back".Q. Did they take anybody else to the hospital
then?
A. No, sir.
Q. They only took you?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Were you ever in Raleigh, North Carolina?
A. No, sir.
Q. I mean, on the 18th of July, 1943?
A. Yes, sir, in passing through there that night on the
train. But that was on the 17th. The 18th, on a Sunday, 1
got here-yes, it was the 18th, because it was after 12:00
o 'clock.
Q. Were you in Raleigh that Saturday night?
A. Yes, sir, on that train.
Q. Were you on the ground?
A. No, sir, I was on that train.
Q. Did you take an automobile there?
A. No, sir, I did not.
Q. Did you see these two soldiers?
A. I never have in my life, before down here at the Head-
quarters.
Q. Did you pick up two soldiers in an automobile and drive
away towards Petersburg?
A. No, sir, I did. not.
0. Did you drive down the highway to come to Petersburg
with two soldiers?
A. No, sir, I did not.
page 144 Q. Were you driving an automobile when two
officers were going up West Washington Street,
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and did they turn around and ask you to pull over to the
curb?
A. No, sir, I was not driving a car, and I could not have
seen them.
Q. Did you speed away from the officers ?
A. No, sir, I did not have anything to speed with.
Q. Did you turn swiftly from East Washington Street into
Madison Street in an automobile?
A. No, sir, I did not.
Q. Did you jump out of the automobile, up by the side of
the Petersburg Hospital, into some bushes?
A. No, sir, I did not.
Q. Did you get out of an automobile and run, leaving those
two soldiers in there?
A. No, sir, I did not.
Q. Before the police officers took you to the Petersburg'
Hospital, had you ever been there before?
A. No, sir, I did not know that there was a Petersburg
Hospital.
Q. Did a slim, thin policeman arrest you-I judge he would
be kind of slim-at the Petersburg Hospital?
A. No, sir, that was on the bridge.
Q. Did you snatch a gun from the police officer ?
A. No, sir, I did not.
Q. Did you draw a gun on him?
A. No, sir.
page 145 Q. Did you shoot one?
A. No, sir.
Q. Did you run away, at the Petersburg Hospital, from an
officer?
A. No, sir.
Q. Did you ever walk in the woods behind the hedge at the
Petersburg Hospital?
A. I never have been in the bushes at all in Petersburg.
Q. Do you know where Lieutenant Run is in Petersburg?
A. No, sir.
Q. Were you ever on East Bank Street, by the Gas House
near Lieutenant Run in Petersburg, Virginia?
A. No, sir.
Q. How did you get up on the bridge when you were ar-
rested?
A. When I was walking across the bridge.I had to come
down West Washington Street and turn to my right, and
that was the third traffic light on West Washington Street
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to Sycamore Street, and then I turned, and a fellow had told
me that I would see the bridge. And I went across it.
Q. Before the time you were arrested on the bridge by a
police officer, had you seen Corporal Jolly, the police officer
who testified here on the stand?
A. No, sir, I never had seen him before.
Q. Are you married?
A. No, sir.
page 146 CROSS EXAMINATION.
By Mr. Pollard:
Q. What kind of dressing do you have on your hair?
A. Black and White hair dressing.
Q. Did you have it on your hair when you were arrested?
A. No, sir, I had Lucky Wave dressing.
Q. Your hair was wavy?
A. It was before they pulled it. Before that it was not,
loose.
Q. It was not like that on the bridge when Officer Masoni
arrested you, was it?
A. No, sir, it was not loose. It was together.
Q. What kind of hat did you have on that Sunday morninc,
July 18, 1943?
A. I had on a white sailor hat.Q. You had that hat on when you came to Petersburg, re
gardless of how you got here, didn't you?
A. That is right. But I got here on the Silver Meteor; thi-
Seaboard train that runs north.Q. You had on that tight-fittino sailor hat?
A. It does not fit me so tight, I do not think.
Q. Put it on?
(Witness did as requested.)
Q. Now, draw it back over your head?
(Witness did as requested.)
Q. Is that as tizht as you can get it on?
A. That is tight enough.
page 147 Q. Now, you came from Savannah, or into Sa-
vannah on the Silver Meteor?
A. Yes, sir, a Diesel.
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Q. Were you beating your way on the train?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you came from Savannah to Hamlet on the Silver
Meteor?
A. No, sir.
Q. What kind of a train was it?
A. That was an engine pulling a freight train. It was a
Diesel freight.
Q. Were you beating your way on that train?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now, you took the second section of the Silver MNeteor
from Hamlet, North Carolina?
A. That is right.
Q. And before you took that train you saw all of the mem-
bers of the train crew?
A. No, sir, I did not.
Q. I understood you to say that you saw the men who
worked on the train?
A. That was just before I entered Petersburg. That was
the guy from the baggage car and the guy from the en-
gine.
Q. Well, in Hamlet, before getting on the Silver Meteor,
didn't you talk with a man that worked on the train?
A. No, sir, no more than the fellows working around in
the yard.
0. You had to get on the platform to get on the
page 148 train?
A. No, sir, there is no platform there on that
side. I was not on the right-hand side. The platform was on
that side, and I got on the train on the other side.
Q. And you hid between the engine and the baggage car.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you rode the Silver Meteor from Hamlet to Raleio'i,
North Carolina?
A. Yes, sir.
0. And you did not get off at Raleigh, North Carolina?
A. No, sir.
(. You are suire of that?
A. T am positive.
Q. Youi are vight much accustomed to riding trains, and
kncw ri 'ht much about them?
A. I know a little about them.
0. You have been all over the country on trains, haven't
VnP ?
A. No, sir.
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Q. Well, over a good portion of the country?
A. Well, from Miami, Florida.
Q. Is that the first time you ever bummed your way on a
train?
A. No, sir, that is not the first time I ever was on a train.
Q. Now, when you got to Petersburg you were put off the
train. Who told you that you had to get off the train?
A. That was the guy from the baggage car.Q. And he told you there was a lot of police of-
page 149 ficers and detectives in Petersburg? Is that right ?
A. No, sir, he said those fellows were in Rich-
mond, and that it would be a good idea to get off in Peters-
burg. They were railroad detectives.
Q. So the Baggage Master was being nice to you?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. He was a white man?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. He was one of the officials on the train?
A. He was working in the baggage car.
Q. Now, you say when you got to Petersburg you got off
the train and went around into the colored waiting room at
the station?
A. That is right.
Q. And you stayed around there in the station until you
went to the Gulf Service Station at the corner of Washing-
ton and South Streets?
A. I was in the station until good daylight.
Q. How many hours would you say you were in the colored
waiting room?
A. I do not know what time we got here.
Q. You spent the time from the time you 'ot here until you
talked with that man at the Gulf Service Station-you were
in the colored waiting room the most of the time?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Were you sleeping there?
A. No, sir, I would not feel right to go to sleep
page 150 . there. I would sit there a while.
Q. What do you mean by you would not "feel
right"?
A. Well, I did not want to go to sleep in there.
Q. You were pretty tired and sleepy?
A. Yes, sir, and anybody else would be.
Q. You say you talked with this man at the service station
about a quarter to nine o'clock?
A. Yes, sir.
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Q. And when you were arrested on the bridge you say you
said nothing about a gun?
A. That is right.
Q. The officer is mistaken about that?
A. He must be. Yes, sir.
Q. Now, you say that the officer took you to Raleigh, North
Carolina?
A. The detectives did.
Q. How many days was that after you were arrested?
A. I do not know exactly.
Q. About how many days?
A. Around two or three days.
Q. And you stopped at service stations on the way?
A. We stopped at some.
Q. Now, tell the jury why they took you to Raleigh, North
Carolina, that day?
A. I do not know.
Q. You do not know?
A. No, sir.
Q. Now, let me see if I can not refresh your
page 151 memory: Hadn't you told the police officers on
July 18th, Sunday, that you came into Petersburg
on an International truck, with a red body-a red-top cab,
with green stripes around it-and got here about 8:00 o'clock
that morning and got off the truck at South Street and talked
with this boy at the service station?
A. I did not tell the police that.
Q. You did not?
A. No, sir.
Q. Did you tell me that?
A. No, sir, I did not.
Q. You did not make that statement on Sunday, July 18th?
A. No, sir, but I have seen it in the paper. But I did not
make that statement.
Q. And you never have said you came to Petersburg on a
truck, with a red-top cab, with green stripes around it?
A. No, sir.
Q. And they did not take you down to Carolina to try to
check up on your story?
A. After they said about the stolen car they were asking
the fellows did I buy any gasoline.
Q. Did you tell the officers that you came here on a train
at 3:00 or 4:00 o'clock in the morning?
A. Yes, sir, sure I did.
Q. You did?
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A. Yes, sir.
page 152 } Q. Now, you say you were arrested that moruo
ing around 10:00 o'clock and carried to the Police
Headquarters, and that the soldiers who testified here today
first said that you were not the man?
A. That is exactly what they said: that they were not sure
that I was the guy.
Q. And that the first time they ever identified you as the
man was about a week later, before you were tried in court.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How many times did those soldiers look at you on July
18th?
A. Twice downstairs. When I entered the Headquarters,
and after I was carried upstairs to Captain Beasley's room.
Q. Didn't they look at you again in the Police Court room
when I was there on that day about 1:30 o'clock?
A. No, sir.
Q. When the Captain of the police was there?
A. When I was in Captain Beasley's room that was the only
time I remember them coming, back. That was the second
time that day.
Q. Now, what time were you beaten when you were takei-
into the Police Station-when you were hit with the fists and
with the blackjack?
A. That was shortly after I was in the Police Station.
Q. About 10:00 o'clock in the morning?
A. I do not know the time.
Q. And I came down there Iater on in the day?
A. I do not remember.
page 153 Q. Did you see me?
A. I really do not know. Late that afternoon
I saw you, but I do not know whether you were there in the(
morninog or not.
. -ow did I treat you? Did I beat you too?
A. You did not beat me.
Q. Did I treat voh all rigzht?
A. Yes, sir. You offered me a Coca-Cola; and I accepteO
it.
Q. I bought you a Coca-Cola, didn't I?
A. Yes, sir.
0. Didn't yon make the statement to me, in the presence
of two noliee officers, about how you oot to Petersburcr?
A. No, sir, not before I was telling them about the shirt.
Mr. Pollard: I warn 'you that I expect to prove that at
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the Police Court room on Sunday, July 18, 1943, in the pres-
ence of Captain Beasley, Detective Kirkland, Sergeant Wil-
kinson, and State Police Officer Hubbard, you made the state-
ment that you left Hamlet, North Carolina, on the train and
came to Raleigh, North Carolina, and that you left the train
at Raleigh, North Carolina, and that you left Raleigh, North
Carolina, on the night of July 17th on an International truck
with a red cab, with green stripes around it, and that the
driver of that truck brought you all the way from Raleigh
to Petersburg and put you out at the corner of
page 154 South and Washington Streets, at that service
station there.
Now, I warn you that I expect to prove that you made that
statement.
The Court: Do you deny it?
Witness: I did not make it.
The Court: The Commonwealth's Attorney is putting you
on notice that he expects to prove that you did make that
statement.
Mr. Pollard: And I further expect to prove that you were
asked what was the name of the man driving the truck, and
that you said you did not know his name, but that he was
driving an International truck with a red cab with green
stripes around it.
Do you deny that?
Witness: Yes, sir.
Mr. Pollard: And I further expect to prove that you made
the statement at that time that when you arrived in Peter,-
bur. and came to a filling station at the intersection of South.
and Washin-ton Streets, the truck turned away from Wash-
ington Street, mnd that the driver told you to walk down to
the second traffic ligaht and turn down Sycamore Street and
then turn to the right and go over the bridoge to Richmond;
and that you told me that you saw a school that was the Pe-
tersburg High School.
Do you deny making that statement?
pa'e 155 Witness: Yes. sir, I deny making that state-
ment. But I did talk about the Petersburg High
Zohool.
The Court: Do vou mean to tell him that you are nuttinrg
him on notice that you expect to prove that he made that
statement?
Mr. Pollard: Yes, sir: that the driver of the truck told
1;i that: and that he said he got off the truck at 8:00 o'clock
that morning.




Q. Did you tell the police that you came from Hamlet, North
Carolina, on that Silver Meteor?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And did the police take you to Hamlet to be identified
by anybody that saw you down there?
A. No, sir.
By Juror:
Q. Are you familiar with the stations on the Seaboard Air
Line Railroad?
A. No, sir.
Q. How did you know you were in Hamlet, North Carolina?
A. Before I got on the train the fellows that were at Ham-
let, North Carolina, told me how many stops there would be
between there and Richmond.
Q. I think you said that when you got off the train here
you removed these clothes in the station?
A. Yes, sir, that is right.
page 156 . Q. Then what did you do?
A. I rolled the clothes up. They were in the
lavatory until I got ready to go, and then I put them under
my arm, and then I went to the bridge.
Q. And when you were arrested on the bridge, did you have
those clothes under your arm?
A. Yes, sir.
By the Court:




sworn for the defendant:
DIRECT EXAMINATION.
By Mr. Cooley:
Q. What is your name?
A. Lester Evans.
Q. Where do you live?
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A. Hamlet, North Carolina.
Q. Where do you work?
A. At the Roundhouse in Hamlet, North Carolina.
Q. For what company do you work?
A. The Seaboard Air Line Railway Company.
Q. What type or kind of work do you do now?
A. I fill Diesels at the passenger station at night.Q. Tell the gentlemen of the jury in general terms, in your
own words, just what kind of work that is. Ex-
page 157 plain it to them?
A. It is fueling the Diesels that run up and
down the road. I fill them at the Roundhouse and down at
the station at night; and also I water them.
Q. How do you put the water or fuel in the Diesel engine?
A. You put it in the tank; and on the end you put the water
in.
Q. On Saturday night, the 17th day of July, 1943, do you
remember seeing Silas Rogers get on one of those trains?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you know Silas Rogers before that time?
A. No, sir, I never had heard that name called before.
Q. Had you seen him before that time?
A. No, sir, I had not.
Q. Did you talk with Silas Rogers when he got on that
train?
A. No, sir, he did not say a word to me.
Q. Did you see him when he got on that train?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Well, tell these gentlemen all about what happened when
you saw Silas Rogers get on that train, and until the train
left?
A. Well, a boy that works the water line is a worker at the
passenger station at night. Two or three crews work at the
passenger station: a mail crew and the water line crew. And
this boy was talking to that fellow there (indicating the ac-
cused). At that time I was working the P. and D. car, next
to the Diesel, and I did not pay the boy any at-
page 158 . tention then. I thought he was a boy there in
that town. And I saw the boy climbing up to o
across the train. I thought he was going across. And I took
the hose down there and spied the fellow between the P. and
D. car and the Diesel, and I asked one of the boys. "Who told
that boy to get up in there?" and he said. "I told him to get
up in there. Go ahead;" and I said, "Then, I haven't got
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anything to do with it;" and I walked away; and in fact I
never paid any hobo any attention; in fact, I am scared of
them, to tell you the truth. And I went on up there, after the
train pulled off, and went to this boy and said, "That looks
like-
The Court: Don't tell that.
By Mr. Cooley:
Q. Now, tell these gentlemen exactly what part of that trabi
you saw Silas Rogers on?
A. He was standing on the P. and D. car, the car that joins
the Diesel.
Q. What is a P. and D. car!
A. That is what they call it down there.
Q. He was right at the end, in the door?
A. Yes, sir, at the end of the P. and D. car and the Diesel:
between those two cars.
Q. Can a man ride there very well?
A. I do not know, but it looks like there is standing room
in there. I have never tried it myself.
Q. You said you saw him get on that train?
A. Yes, sir.
page 159 Q. Was he there when the train pulled away?
A. Yes, sir, he was on there.
Q. About what time was it?
A. As nearly as I can tell, it was about 10:55 that Satur-
day night when that train left there. We came down to the
roundhouse at 9:00 o'clock and worked the train until 9:30:
and that crew had gone back to the roundhouse, and the main
machinist had come there.
Q. How many Silver Meteors left Hamlet, North Carolina.
that ni'ght?
A. The one that had gone was No. 43, and this one is No. 44
that I saw this fellow get up on.
Q. How long behind the first Silver Meteor did the second
Silver Meteor leave?
A. The first Silver Meteor was on time. That left at 9:45
or 9:50. And this other Silver Meteor left at 10:55.
Q. How do you know the man that got on that train was
Silas Rogers, the man here now?
A. I did not know his name, but I looked at him in the face,
and he had long. hair, and it looked to me like it was the man.
I did not hold any conversation with him. I just walked away-
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and went back to the boss man to take down the fuel hose;
and when I took that fuel hose down, the man hollered,
"Aboard"; and the train left.
Q. Did the man that you saw on that train have a beard?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you see the kind of clothes he had oil?
page 160 A. No, sir. I saw him from here up (indicat-
ing head and shoulders).Q. Did you see him in his face?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you look at him good?
A. Yes, sir, I am sure I did. When I took down the water
hose, he was standing up there; and when I looked up at him,
I asked the boy that was watering the P. and D. car what
was the fellow doing up there; and he said he told him to go
up there; and to go ahead and don't say nothing about it.Q. What was the name of that other fellow?
A. James Arthur Ashton.
Q. Look at Silas Rogers and see if he is the man. Stand
up, Rogers (the accused stood up). And see if he is the one
you saw on that train?
A. It looks like the one to me.
Q. But the one you saw had a beard?
A. Yes, sir. I do not know how long the beard was. It
just looked like he needed a shave.
Q. You say Rogers was on that train when it pulled away?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. When did you see him again?
A. That was the only time I saw him.
CROSS EXAMINATION.
By Mr. Pollard:
Q. You stayed in Hamlet, North Carolina?
A. Yes, sir.
page 161 0 . You do not know whether this man left the
train at Raleigh, North Carolina, or not?
A. No. sir. I was not at Raleigh, North Carolina. I was fl
Hamlet, North Carolina.
Q. You saw him get on the second section of the Silvr
Meteor at Hamlet?
A. Yes. sir.
Q. And you think this is the man that you saw?
A. Yes, sir, it looks like the same one to me.
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Q. If you ever saw him once you would not forget him?
A. That is right.
Q. He is different-looking from the average man?
Mr. Hopkins: I object to that question.
The Court: He can answer it.
A. Yes, sir.
By Mr. Pollard:
Q. And you think he is the man that got on at Hamlet?
A. Yes, sir.
Mr. Hopkins: Your Honor, he can not make a comparison
unless there is something in the evidence to justify it; and we
object.
Mr. Pollard: I will withdraw the question.
The Court: Go ahead.
By Mr. Pollard:
Q. You are familiar with Diesel and Silver Meteor trains?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Is there anywhere else to ride, on a Silver
page 162 . Meteor train, except where this man got on at
Hamlet?
A. I never paid any attention to that so much, about ally
one hoboing. But where he was there is space enough to ride.
Q. I say, is there anywhere else on that Silver Meteor for
any one to bum a ride?
A. No, sir.




Q. You are a member of the Negro race, are you not?
A. Yes, sir.
Witness stood aside.
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sworn for the defendant:
DIRECT EXAMINATION.
By Mr. Cooley:
Q. Please state your name?
A. W. E. Bright.
Q. Where do you live,,Captain Bright?
A. Richmond, Virginia.
Q. Are you employed anywhere?
A. I am employed by the Seaboard Air Line Railroad.
Q. In what capacity?
A. Train Conductor.
Q. How long have you been a conductor?
page 163 . A. Pretty nearly forty years.
Q. What train do you run?
A. I am on the train known as the Silver Meteor just now.
The numbers of it are 43 and 44.
Q. I should like to direct your attention to Saturday night
and Sunday morning, a continuation past midnight of July
17th and 18th, after your train left Hamlet, North Carolina.
What time did the train leave?
By the Court:
Q. First, were you the Conductor on that train that night?
A. Yes, sir, I was.
By Mr. Cooley:
Q. Did your train leave Hamlet, North Carolina, on Satur-
day night the 17th day of July?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What was the destination of your train?
A. Well, it is New York. That is the final destination.
Q. After your train left Hamlet, where was the first stop?
A. Raleigh, North Carolina.
Q. And did it stop at Raleigh, North Carolina, that night?
A. Yes, sir, that is a regular stop.
Q. About how long?
A. Five minutes is the regular time to stop there.
Q. And then, when you left Raleigh, North Carolina, where
was the next stop?
A. I do not know, because we headed in at inter-
page 164 mediate stations to meet trains; and I do not re-
member about that night.
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Q. Do you recall whether or not your train stopped because
of a rail defect?
A. Yes, sir, at McKenney, Virginia.
Q. About how long was your train stopped there for re-
pairs?
A. Twenty or thirty minutes. I do not know the exact
time. And then we came out of the side-track and came on at
slow speed to Petersburg.
Q. From the time that your train left Hamlet, North Caro-
lina, or when your train left Hamlet, North Carolina, in com-
ing to Petersburg, did you see any one riding that train who
was not paying a fare?
A. Yes.
Q. Where was he riding?
A. He was riding between the baggage car and the motor
engine. We have those Diesel motors. He was in the door
at the back end of the rear motor that was coupled to the
baogag-e car.
Q. Where was the train on the track when you saw this
person?
A. I can not say. It was somewhere before we arrived in
Petersburg. I do not know exactly where it was. It was be-
tween Norlina and Petersburg. I would say at McKenney,
Virginia. But we were not going to stop before getting to
Petersburg.
Q. Was that after your train had left Raleigh, North Caro-
lina?
page 165 A. Yes, sir.Q. Was that after your train had left where
they were repairing the rail at McKenney.
A. Well, we were delayed at McKennev. but the rail was
repaired somewhere in the neighborhood of Burgess Station.
Q. When your train started off, after it was delayed be-
cause of the defect in the rail, did you see the person before
or after that?
A. It was after that.
0. What did you say to him?
A. I said. "WVht are you doing there!" and I do not know
exactly what he said, except, "Just catching a ride," or some-
thing like that.
0. Was it dark or light?
A. It was dark, except for the lioghts in the motor and the
Tioxhts in the baggage car. Of course, when I open the door,
they shine.
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Q. Did you have any other light?
A. No, sir.
Q. And then what was said?
A. I said, "When we stop at Petersburg, you get down."
That was all.
Q. And what did he say?
A. I do not remember that he said anything, except, "All
right," or something like that. He may have said, "All
right," but I do not remember that.
Q. Did you leave him there?
page 166 t A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you shut the door?A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you see him again?
A. No, sir.
Q. What is the distance from Hamlet to Petersburg?
A. 230 miles.
Q. Could you describe the person to the jury?
A. No, sir.
Q. Was he white or colored?
A. Colored.
Q. Was he a light-colored person or a dark-colored person?
A. I do not know. He was sitting down with his head
down, leaned against his breast, and I did not pay any par-
ticular attention to him.
Q. Did he have a hat on?
A. I can not say.
CROSS EXAMINATION.
By Mr. Pollard:
Q. Anybody at the Dunlop Street Station in Petersburg
would have known that morning, between 8:00 and 9:00
o'clock, that that Silver Meteor had been delayed twenty min-
utes because of derailment, wouldn't he?
Mr. Hopkins: Objection.
Mr. Pollard: I will withdraw the question.
pao-e 167 By Mr. Pollard:
Q. The officials there at the Dunlop Street Sta-
tion would have known that there was a derailment which de-
laved the Silver Meteor on the morning of July 18th, wouldn't
they?
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Mr. Hopkins: May I object to that?
A. Not necessarily.
Mr. Hopkins: There is no way that this witness can tell
what somebody else knows.
The Court: I can not tell whether this witness knows it or
not.
Mr. Pollard: Strike out that question and answer. I will
withdraw the question.
By Mr. Pollard:
Q. Captain, as I understand it, you did not get a good view
of the man?
A. No, sir, I did not.
Q. And you can not identify him in any way?
A. No, sir.Q. By his clothing or face or hair or anything?
A. No, sir. I did not pay any attention to him. I went on
about my business in getting to Petersburg and unloading
my passengers. And he got off the train here.
Witness stood aside.
page 168 E. PORTER,
sworn for the defendant:
DIRECT EXAMINATION.
By Mr. Cooley:
Q. Please state your name?
A. E. Porter.
Q. Where do you live?
A. Richmond, Virginia; 2817 Edgeworth Avenue.
Q. Where do you work?
A. For the Seaboard Air Line Railway Company.
Q. And what type of work do you do for the Seaboard Air
Line Railway Company?
A. A trainman.
Q. Specifically what kind of work do you do?
A. I have to watch the signals and receive and put off bag-
gage; and whatever there is to do in getting the train over
the road.
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Q. And in which car is your principal headquarters?
A. The head car.
Q. Which car, in reference to the engine is the head car?
A. My car is next to the engine.
Q. What popular name is your train known by?
A. The Silver Meteor.
Q. Was it the first or the second section?
A. The first section out and the last section coming in.
Q. When you say "coming in", do you mean going north
or south?
A. From the south.
page 169 The Court:
Q. You are on the first section going south
from Richmond, Virginia?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And on the second section coming north into Richmond,
Virginia?
A. That is right.
By Mr. Cooley:
Q. We would like to direct your attention to Saturday night,
July 17th, and continuing over into early Sunday morning,
July 18th. We would like to know if you were riding the sec-
ond section of the Silver Meteor?
A. I was.
Q. Where did that train leave from?
A. Miami, Florida.
Q. Where did you get on it?
A. At Columbia, South Carolina.
Q. Did you pass through Hamlet, North Carolina?
A. I did.
Q. Did you pass through Raleigh, North Carolina?
A. I did.
Q. Do you recall whether or not the train on which you
were riding was delayed because of some rail trouble?
A. I do not remember what date it was. But we were de-
layed.
Q. Do you recall whether or not you saw somebody riding
on your train who was not a paid passenger?
A. I did not.
page 170 Q 9. Did you see a hobo on that train?
A. I did not.
Q. Did you see any one get off at Petersburg?
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A. I saw some one standing beside the train, but he did not
get off. When I opened the door and got out, there was some
one on the ground beside the train. I did not see him get off
the train.
Q. The side that you saw the person walk away from, was
that the regular side for passengers to get on or off the
train?
A. It was the opposite side.
Q. Passengers get off and baggage is put off on what side
at Petersburg?
A. On the side the station is on; on the right-hand side go-
ing north.
Q. And the person you saw was on what side of the train?
A. The left-hand side going north. The opposite side from
the station.
Q. Where did you see him go?
A. He walked across the yard, down the fill. I was unload-
ing some stuff, and I opened the door. The conductor was
talking to some one, and told them to get off at Petersburg,
and I opened the door; and then I saw some one go across
there, down in that fill, from the railroad.
Q. When you heard the conductor talking with some one,
did you hear the person answer the conductor?
A. No, sir, I was busy working.
Q. Where was the person situated on the train
page 171 then?
A. I did not see the fellow he was talkinog with.
I was back behind the door in the car. I did not see any one,
and was not near enough to hear it.
Q. In what part of that car was the door located where
you heard the conductor talking with some one?
A. The north end of the car; the front end.
Q. The person you saw, was he a white or a colored man?
A. It was dark and some distance from me. I could see the
bulk of the man, but I could not say whether he was white or
colored. There was no light on that side, and I did not pay
much attention to it. I just saw somebody there. And that
is all T noticed.
0. How was he dressed?
A. I do not know.
0. Don't you recall any of the clothes that he was wear-
ing.?
A. No, sir.




Q. The engine on that No. 2 Silver Meteor and the first
coach, when it pulled into Petersburg, pulled in some dis-
tance east of the Dunlop Street Station, didn't it?
A. The trestle is north of the station, and we pulled up
near the trestle.
Q. And where you saw this man on the left side of the train,
headed north, was up near the trestle?
A. Yes, sir. It was way up past the station.
Q. In what direction did that man go that got
page 172 t off or was put off of that train?
A. He went down through those people's yards
there, and was going down that way, and I was unloading my
stuff, and I thought it was somebody going by that coal yard
under our track. It was light there, down in that bottom
where the street and road is.
Q. Did you see him any better there ?
A. I was not noticing. I just saw the fellow, and it looked
like to me, the best I could see, that it was the same one that
I had seen there.
Q. How tall was the man that you saw leaving that side
of the train?
A. Not carefully observing him, I would say he was around
six feet tall. A tall fellow.
Q. It was a tall fellow?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And the last you saw of him he was walking down by
the trestle, going through the coal yard?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Before your train left Petersburg that morning, Sun-
day, July 18th, you told a porter at the Dunlop Street Station
that you put a man off there, didn't you?
A. I told him that the conductor told a man to get off. And,
going through people's yards, I thought it was a wonder
people did not shoot them .oinh trough their yards.
Q. And you told that porter that at that time?
A. I do not know. It was while I was standing
puae 173 there.
Q. What time did the train leave here that
ii oruin'?
A. I do not vemember.
Q. Did you tell just one porter, or how marTy other people?
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Mr. Cooley: We object to that.
The Court: The objection is sustained.
Mr. Pollard: I will withdraw that question.
By Mr. Pollard:
Q. Did you tell anybody but the porter about that man be-
ing put off the train?
A. No, sir. There was nobody there but the porter.
Q. And you left that man in Petersburg and you went on
to Richmond-you left that man at the station?
Witness: The man that I saw standing by the side of the
train?
Attorney: I am talking about the porter.
A. Yes, sir, we left him at Petersburg. He receives what-
ever stuff they have to put off there.
By the Court:
Q. You are a member of the white race, are you not?
A. Yes, sir.
Witness stood aside.
The Court: I reckon it may be stipulated that Captain W.
E. Bright is a member of the white race. Is that all right?
Mr. Pollard: Yes, sir.
Mr. Cooley: Yes, sir.
Recess until 8:30 P. M.
page 174 M. HALEY DAVIS (colored),
sworn for the defendant:
DIRECT EXAMINATION.
By Mr. Cooley:
Q. Please state your name?
A. M. Haley Davis.
Q. Where do you live?
A. 311 St. Matthews Street, Petersburg, Virginia.
Q. Are you working anywhere?
A. Yes, sir, for the Petersburg Gas Company.
Q. How long have you been working for the Petersburg Gas
Company?
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A. From September 1, 1911.
Q. Do you work at the Plant?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Where is that plant located?
A. On the corner of East Bank and Madison Streets, Pe-
tersburg, Virginia.
Q. What place is at the rear of the plant?
A. We have a little lot at the rear end.
Q. And after you pass that lot, going east, what do you
strike then?
A. You strike a bridge down in the bottom.
Q. What is that called?
A. It is called Lieutenant Run.
Q. Were you working on Sunday morning, July 18th, when
an officer of the Petersburg police force was killed some-
where in Petersburg?
page 175 A. Yes, sir.
Q. Were you at any time in the yard at the
re-ar of the plant of the Petersburg Gas Company?
A. I am all over the yard at different times of the day. I
do not have a certain time, because my job calls me all over
the whole place in the house, in the boiler-room, and where
the pump is.
Q. Were you at work?
A. Yes, sir, I was at work.
Q. Were you at work about 7:00 to 8:00 o'clock that morn-
ing?
A. Yes, sir, I went on at 6:00 o'clock in the morning.
Q. Did you see the police searching around Lieutenant Run?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And around East Bank Street?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Before the police arrived to search around there, did
you see any men come out of the bushes at Lieutenant Run?
A. I saw two men come right along down by the gate, and
they went in the bushes there-they ran back into the bushes
there. And I was standing out there by the pump. And then
one came back and looked up the street; and then they took
out and went back down Lieutenant Run.
Q. Where were you then?
A. At the gate.
Q. How close is the gate to the thick bushes where you saw
the men?A. At the gate.
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Q. How close is the gate to the thick bushes where you saw
the men?
A. I reckon it was about half way as far as to
page 176 the outside gate here.
The Court: Indicating half way betweeil two points about
two hundred feet distant;
By Mr. Cooley-:
Q. Could you see the men clearly-very well?
A. Fairly well.
Q. Have you been asked by the police to identify Rogers as
one of those men?
A, Yes, sir, they summoned me from the Plant, and told me,
to be here today.
Q. Where did the men come from when you first saw them?
A. They came down East Bank Street.
Q. From what direction did they come?
A. When I saw them, they were at the gate-they were
coming down Eagt Bank Street by the gate at the Gas Com-
pany's Plant; by that lot.
Q, You say they were coming down East Bank Street. Do,
you know where Crater Road is?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Were they going towards Cvater Road and Lieutenant
Run or 1iot?
A. They came down the street and ran in that little path
or road which goes down to WVythe Street, in that bottom,
By the Court:
Q. Were they coming tftom or towards Crater Road?
A. They came down East Bank Street, goin- to Lieutenant
Rn, bit they Went down in that swamp just below the gate.
page 177 By Mr: Cooley:
Q. Were those meni white or colored men?
A. They were 0-6Iored men; they looked like colored men-
0ite wns a 1jrrwnqskinned marn.
0. Look at the defendant bere, Wat he one of them?
A. It don't look like it. The flrn was Iighter than the
(e9.nant is. And he had on a brown cap and a brown shirt.
Q. On that Stilday motning we0r you taketi to the Police
Station and asked to identify this boy (indicating accused).'
A. They came to my house; I do not know the police; btit
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two of them came to my home. I think one was named Mr.
Jackson, and that one was Mr. Wilkinson. They came to my
house one evening after I got home.
Q. And did they take you to the Police Headquarters?
A. Yes, sir.
,Q. Did they ask you to identify somebody?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. They asked you to identify whom?
A. That man there (indicating the accused).
Q. Was Rogers alone or in a group of some other men?
A. They brought him in by himself at the Police Head-
quarters.
Q. And what did the police officers ask you?
A. Mr. Pollard was there, and he asked me could I identify
him; and I told him the man that I saw had on a brown cap
and a brown shirt.
Q. You mean the Commonwealth's Attorney asked you
that ?
A. Yes, sir, that is Mr. Pollard right over there
page 178 (indicating Commonwealth's Attorney).
Q. And then you said this man was not one of
those men that you saw going to Lieutenant Run?
A. It did not look like it.
Q. And did a group of policemen come and search around
Lieutenant Run?
A. I could not tell you how many there were. But there
was a plenty of them.
Q. About what time was it?
A. It was after 7:00 o'clock.
CROSS EXAMINATION.
By Mr. Pollard:
Q. The first you saw of these two men, that you saw there,
they were walking- down East Bank Street in an easterly di-
rection towards Crater Road?
A. Yes, sir.
9. And they were passing the gas plant? Is that right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And one had on a brown hat? What kind of hat did the
other one have on?
A. One had on a straw hat, with a black band on it; and
tim other one had on a brown cap and a brown shirt.
Q. What time did you see them?
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A. I could not tell you exactly the time, but soon after 7:00
or 8:00 o'clock; something like that.
Q. Before or after you saw the police officers down there?
A. I saw them just ahead of the police.
page 179 Q. And where did they go down Lieutenant
Run?
A. I do not know, but they went that way. There is a little
piece of corn there. Somebody has a garden down there.
And the last I saw of them, they were going through that
piece of corn.
Q. That was a piece of corn on the east or west side of
Lieutenant Run?
A. On the west side.
Q. Between the gas house lot and Lieutenant Run?
A. Just a little bit below the gas house lot.
Q. And on the west side of Lieutenant Run?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And that little corn patch is just a little south of the
gas house?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Could they get from that place to Madison Street?
A. They tell me you can go to Wythe Street.
Q. I say, can you get from there to Madison Street?
A. I do not know, sir.
Q. Neither of those men came from the direction of the
hospital before the police got there, did they?
A. I did not see them.
Q. You saw them on East Bank Street?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you came to the Police Headquarters about 1:30
P. M. on Sunday, July 18th?
A. Yes, sir.
page 180 . Q. And I asked you to look at this man and seeif you had ever seen him before, and you said you
did not think you had; and I told you to go on home?
A. Yes, sir, that is right.
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION.
By Mr. Cooley:
Q. On which street is the Petersburg Hospital located?
A. It is on Madison Street.
Q. On what street is the front entrance of the Plant at
which you work?
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A. You can come in at the upperside on Madison Street.
And then you can go down East Bank Street to the boiler
room.
Q. The two men you saw would be coming from Madison
Street, or coming from Lieutenant Run?
A. Coming down East Bank Street.
Q. From the direction of Madison Street or from the di-
rection of Lieutenant Run?
A. Going to Lieutenant Run, but they cut off into the bushes
there.
Q. Were they coming from the direction of Madison Street?
A. I did not see them from that direction; they came down
East Bank Street by the gas house.
Q. Madison Street crosses East Bank Street?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Were they coming from that direction?
A. When I saw them, they were coming down
page 181 by the gas house, just below the gate on East Bank
Street.
Q. Were the men walking or running?
A. They were running when I saw them.
By the Court:
Q. You are a member of the Negro race, are you not?
A. Yes, sir.
Witness stood aside.
Mr. Cooley: Your Honor, Thomas Epps is the last witness,
and he does not answer at the present time.
Now, we would like to recall some of the Commonwealth
witnesses. I would like to recall Captain Beasley for further
cross examination.
The Court: Yes.
CAPTAIN F. C. BEASLEY,
recalled by the defendant for further cross examination:
By Mr. Cooley:
Q. Captain Beasley, you had charge of the Rogers case, did
you not?
A. I did.
Q. Were fingerprints taken of him?
A. Yes.
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Q. Did you take the fingerprints on the automobile that
you found-on the outside?
A. I could not tell you that.
Q. Did you take fingerprints on the steering
page 182 t wheel of the automobile?
A. I could not tell you that.
Q. Do you know of anybody on the police force who did?
A. We have a fingerprint man down there.
By the Court:
Q. Do you know whether anybody tried to take those finger-
prints?
A. Mr. Jackson went up there, I think. I do not know
whether Mr. Kirkland went up there or not.
By Mr. Cooley:
Q. From the result of the findings of those fingerprints, if
any were taken other than of Rogers's own hands, did you
find fingerprints somewhere on the car in Petersburg, as well
as those of Rogers?
A. You would have to ask the fingerprint man about that.
I do not know.
Q. Who is that man?
A. Mr. Jackson is our fingerprint man.
Q. Who authorized the taking of these fingerprints?
A. I could not tell you who authorized it. Mr. Jackson
sometimes goes out about that by himself. Sometimes, in
cases of robbery, he goes out and gets them without orders.
Q. You are familiar with the paraffine test, aren't you?
A. I do not know whether I am or not.
Q. Do you know anything about it at all?
A. I do not know anything- about fingerprints:
Q. I mean, paraffine tests?
page 183 A. I do not know much about that.
Q. Have you ever heard of it?
A. Oh, yes.
Q. Was there a paraffine test taken of Rogers's finger-
prints?
A. Not that I know of.
Q. Tell the iury as much as you know abont the paraf-
fine tpst. how it is done, and for what purpose it is taken?
A. I do not know much about it.
Q. Please tell the jury the little you do know about it?
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Mr. Pollard: I do not know whether that is relevant to the
issue.
The Court: Are you objecting to it?
Mr. Pollard: Yes, sir.
The Court: The objection is sustained. The witness says
he does not know anything about it.
By Mr. Cooley:
Q. Were the bloodhounds ever placed on the trail of Rogers?
A. I could not tell you. I did not handle the bloodhounds.
Q. Who handled the bloodhounds?
A. I reckon, if they got them from the State Farm, the State
man handled them. If they got them from the penitentiary,
the man from the penitentiary handled them. Where they got
them I do not know.
Q. Did a report come to you as to whether or not the blood-
hounds trailed Rogers along Lieutenant Run to the bridge
where he was finally arrested?
A. No, sir.
page 184 } Q. Bloodhounds were on the trail of somebody
out in Lee Park, weren't they?
A. I do not know. I was out at the park, but I did not go
out there until late that night. And then the bloodhounds
were resting; they were not trailing anybody. And late that
night was the only time I went to Lee Park. I was at the
Station House all day.
Q. Why did you go out there?
A. I went out there to see what was going on.
Q. Was the rest of the police force out at Lee Park?
A. Some of them.
Q. For whom were they looking?
A. They were looking on every road; all around.
C. What were they looking on every road for?
A. I could not tell you. They were looking for anybody
tliov could see, I reckon.
0. And half of the police force, excluding yourself, was out
nt Lee Park, weren't they?
A. I do not know whether half of the police force were out
there or not. I said I did not o'o out there until late. It was
around dark when I went there.
Q. Please state again why you went there?
A. Because I knew that men were out there; and I went out
lh're to see what was g'oinoz on.
Q. Did they ever find what they were looking for?
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A. Not that I know of.Q. Who were they looking for?
page 185 A. I do not know. Anybody they could have
picked up out there.
Q. Were there a lot of people out there?
A. I do not know. They were scattered around in different
places, and I did not go around in the. different places to see
bow many men were out there.
Q. Why didn't they pick up one another?
A. You can ask them that.
Q. Were they out there on Monday?
A. I do not know. I was not out there on Monday.
Q, Monday, the 19th of July?
A. I do not know.
Q. Well, when the rest of the police officers were out at
Lee Park late that night, and you were out there that same
Sunday night, where was Silas Rogers?
A. I reckon he was locked up. I do not know. He is sup-
posed to have been locked up.
Q. Captain Beasley, it is a fact that the police officers
were out there looking for some one who was reputed to have
killed a police officer, isn't it?
A. To be frank with you, I was not out there looking for
anybody particularly. The man we had arrested satisfied my
mind, if you want to know the truth about it.
Q. Who detailed the police officers out there?
A. I could not tell you.
Q. Didn't anybody send them out there?
A. I did not send anybody out there.
page 186 . Q. You took Rogers to North Carolina, didn't
you?
A. I certainly did.
Q. Which way did you take him?
A. The No. 1 Highway.
Q. When?
A. On July 21st, and brought him back on July 22nd.
Q. Did you ask people to identify him?
A. I certainly did.
Q. Who identified him?
A. Nobody.




Q. You said you were at the Police Station all day on Sun-
day, July 18th?
A. Yes, sir, until nearly dark that night.
Q. What angle of the case were you working on all day?
A. I was working on Rogers.
Q. What time did you leave the Police Station to go out
there to Lee Park?
A. When I went out there, I went out to the City Farm.
Q. What time was that?
A. Late in the evening. I could not tell you exactly what
time it was.
Q. What did you do?
A. I stayed around the City Farm, and finally I came back
to town.
Witness stood aside.
page 187 M r. Cooley: I would like to recall Officer Jack-
son.
The Court: Yes.
OFFICER R. L. JACKSON,
recalled by the defendant for further cross examination:
By Mr. Cooley:
Q. Mr. Jackson, you took the fingerprints of Rogers, did you
not?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you also take fingerprints on the car, on the out-
side?
A. I went up there to look at it.
Q. Did you take fingerprints off the steering wheel of the
car?
A. No.
Q. Did you try to get any fingerprints off the steering
wheel of the car?
A. No.
Q. Did you try to get any fingerprints from the inside of
the car, other than the steering wheel?
A. Yes, sir, off the dashboard, the rear-view mirror, and the
side wings of the front door.
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Q. Did you find any fingerprints on that car to match those
of Rogers?
A. No, I did not.
Q. Did you find any fingerprints on the car ?
A. Yes.
page 188 Q. You are familiar with the paraffine test,
aren't you?
A. Yes.
Q. Tell the gentlemen of the jury what the paraffine test
is, and why it is used, and how it is made?
Witness: What has that got to do with this casel
The Court: You answer the question.
A. I have read a little about it, but I have never practiced it.
I never have had any occasion to practice it.
By Mr. Cooley:
Q. Please answer the question?
A. I have answered it.
By the Court:
Q. Do you know anything about it?
A. I know very little about it.
By Mr. Cooley:
Q. Do you want to say now that you do not know anything
about it?
A. Yes, sir. I have read a little about it, but I have never
practiced it; and I do not know anything about it.
Q. Whose fingerprints were on the automobile, that proved
not to be those of Rogers?
A. I do not know whose they were.
Q. Did you accompany Rogers to Raleigh, North Carolina,
when he was taken there?
A. No, sir.Q. In taking a man's fingerprints, do you have to bend his
fingers back to the extent that it is painful?
page 189 A. I never have that I know of.
Q. Then, why did you bend this man's fingers
back?
A. I did not bend his fingers back.
Q. Did you bend his hand back?
A. No, sir. You do not have to bend his hand back to take
his fingerprints.
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Q. Did you bend his hand back in order to make him tell
something that was not so ?
A. No.
Q. You did not do it?
A. Sure I did not.
Q. Do you deny it?
A. I do.
Q. Why did you pour water up this boy's nose ?
A. I did not pour water up his nose.
Q. Who did?
A. Nobody that I saw.
Q. Were bloodhounds ever placed on the trail of Rogers to
attempt to follow his path?
A. I do not know.
Q. Were bloodhounds used in the trail out there at Lee
Park ?
A. There were some out at Lee Park; yes.
Q. Were you there with the bloodhounds?
A. No.
Q. When were you there?
A. I went there that afternoon.
page 190} Q. Was the most of the police force there?
A. No, there were only two of us together.Q. Who are those two?
A. Detective Curtis and myself.
Q. Other police officers were there at Lee Park when you
got there? Isn't that so?
A. They were out there somewhere. I do not know where.
At different places. I know that some were out there.
Q. Why were you and other police officers at Lee Park?
A. Captain Beaslev told us to go out there and render any
assistance wherever they needed it.
0. Captain Beasley told you to go out there?
A. He told us to render assistance wherever they needed
it.
0. What assistance did they need?
A. I do not know. Thev never called on us.
C. What were they doing at Lee Park that Sunday after-
noon?
A. They had gone beyond Lee Park that Sunday afternoon.
Tl~v wore out on the Governnent Highway.
0. What were they doin!g out there?
:k. They had bloodhounds out there.
() Bloodhounds on whose trail?
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A. I do not know.
Q. What was the objective of that search out there?
A. I do not know.
Q. For whom were you looking?
A. I was looking for the man that they jumped in the
woods-on the railroad.
page 191 Q. Who jumped the man in the woods?
A. Officer Parrish and some railroad detective.
Q. When they jumped a man on the railroad, for whom
were they looking?
Mr. Pollard: I object, unless the witness knows it of his
own knowledge.
A. I do not know who they were looking for.
By Mr. Cooley:
Q. Who were you looking for?
A. I was helping them out.
Q. You were looking for somebody that killed Officer
Hatchell?
A. I suppose so.Q. Where was Silas Rogers then?
A. I do not know.
Q. What time of day was that?
A. It was Sunday afternoon; and Silas Rogers was locked
up at the time.
Q. Was that on July 18th?
A. The 18th or 28th.
Q. It was on the Sunday that Officer Hatchell was killed,
wasn't it?
A. Yes.
Q. Was blood on Rogers' shirt at the Police Headquarters?
A. I did not notice it.
Q. Was blood on the back of his head?
A. I did not notice it.
Q. Did you see a knot on his head?
page 192 A. No.
Q. Did you ever see anybody hit him in the
Police Headquarters?
A. No, sir.
Q. Did you see blood on Rogers at any time?
A. No. ,
Q. If it had been there, you would have seen it when you
took that picture, would you not?
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A. I do not know.
Q. Do you mean that, if you took a picture of a man and
blood was on him, you would not see it?
A. I did not pay any attention to it.
Q. And if his head was bleeding, you would not have seen
it?
A. I did not see it. I will tell the jury that.
FURTHER EXAMINATION RE-DIRECT.
By Mr. Pollard:
Q. At the time you took the fingerprints, or attempted to
get fingerprints, off of the car, where was the car?
A. At Vinson's Garage.
Q. Do you know how many people had been around that
car or put their hands on it from the time it was moved from
the Petersburg Hospital?
A. Several of them.
Q. Have you had some experience in fingerprinting?
A. Since 1932.
Q. If my fingerprints were on a desk, and another man were
to put his fingers on top of that, would it erase my
page 193 . fingerprints?
A. It may make them no good.
Witness stood aside.
PRIVATE JAMES JORDAN,
recalled by the defendant for further cross examination-
By Mr. Cooley:
Q. What is your rank?
A. A Private.
Q. You testified before that you told the police officers at
the Police Headquarters that you were from Rhode Island?
A. That is right.
Q. Did you also tell them that you had been stationed at
Camp Pickett?
A. That is right.
Q. And when the officers released you, they released you
to go back to Camp Pickett, didn't they?
A. That is right.
Q. You did not tell the truth when you said that you were
going to Camp Pickett?
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A. No, sir.
Q. You did not tell them the truth?
A. No, sir, I did not.
Q. Isn't it a fact that the police arrested you and picked you
up at your home?
A. They did not arrest me.
page 194 Q. And you also said that the police did not ar-
rest Private Stephens?
A. That is right.
Q. If Private Stephens said he was arrested, which one
of you would be wrong?
A. He was not arrested. When they picked him up, it was
by private police. They said he was wanted in Virginia as a
material witness. And thev did not say he was under arrest.
They asked him if he wanted to come back to Virginia.
Q. Why did you tell the Petersburg police that you were
from Camp Pickett?
A. Because I had continued all the way from New Orleans
up here, and if I told them I was from Jackson Barracks, I
could not go home and come back here.
Q. Therefore you told them that because you knew they
would hold you here?
A. The first time I went to the Police Station-
Mr. Pollard: I object.
Mr. Cooley: That is all.
Witness stood aside.
THOM\AS EPPS (colored),
sworn for the defendant:
DIRECT EXAMINATION.
By Mr. Cooley-
(. What is your name?
A. Tbomars Epps.
Q. Where do you work?
A. At the Gulf Oil Station.
pafge 195 0 . Where is that?
A. At the corner of Washington and South
Streets, this City.
0. On Rlunday morning, July 18, 1943, what time did voIT
go to work?
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A. I was down there at 8:30 o'clock, but I did not go to
work until 9:00 o'clock. BPt I got there at 8:30 o'clock.Q. While you were waiting to go to work, did you see Silas
Rogers, here (indicating accused)?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Where were you when you saw Silas Rogers?
A. I was sitting between the Safeway Store and the King-
dom Hall-that church there.
Q. Why were you sitting there?
A. I was just sitting there between the Safeway Store and
the Kingdom Hall.
Q. I say, why were you sitting there instead of being at
work?
A. It was not my time to go to work. I go to work at 9 :00
o'clock, but I have to catch my bus and go there ahead of
time; if not, I will be behind time.
Q. Did you see Rogers before he stopped to talk with you?
A. No, sir, that was the first time I saw him.
Q. Where did he come from?
A. From the north end of South Street. He was out into
West Washington Street when I saw him.
Q. Was he running or walking?
page 196 A. He was walking.
Q. Was he excited or calm.
A. He looked to me like he was calm, like any other man
would be.Q. (Indicating photograph) I show you a picture of Silas
Rozers, that has been introduced in evidence by the Common-
wealth, and ask you was Rogers looking like that when you
saw him?
A. (Examining) He had on a sailor cap, and he was not
bareheaded like that when I saw him (indicating photo-
graph).
0. Was his hair bushed up all over his head when you saw
him?
A. It did not look bushed up like that. But he had on a cap
wbon I saw him.
0. Was bis shirt torn like that (indicating photograph)?
P. Yes, sir, it was- torn on both sleeves.
Q. Was blood on Rogers when you saw him?
A. No. sir. I did not see qnv blood on him when I saw him.
0. If blood had been on him when you talked with him then.
would vou have seen it?
A. I do not know, sir. I did not nay such close attention.
But, anyway, I did not see any blood on him.
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Q. Are you certain that Rogers did not come from towards
Sycamore Street?
A. When I saw him he came from the north end of South
Street, and came across to the Gulf Station, around into West
Washington Street.
page 197 Q. What did he say to you, if anything?
Mr. Pollard: Objection.
The Court: The objection is sustained.
By Mr. Cooley:Q. Was there any conversation between you and Rogers?
Mr. Pollard: Objection to any conversation.
The Court: He can ask was there a conversation, and the
witness has a right to say whether or not there was a con-
versation. But he can not tell what the conversation was.
The question is whether or not he had a conversation with the
accused.
Did you have any conversation with Silas Rogers, the ac-
cused?
Witness: Yes, sir.
-The Court: Don't say what the conversation was.
By Mr. Cooley:
Q. The conversation was concerning what?
Objection.
The Court: The objection is sustained. You can not do in-
directly what you can not do directly.
By Mr. Cooley:
Q. As a result of the conversation, what did Rogers do after
you and he finished talking?
A. He came on down West Washington Street.
Q. Did you or not direct Rogers how to get out of town?
A. Yes, sir, I directed him how to get to Rich-
page 198 mond.
Q. Did Rogers or not tell you where he had
come from?
Mr. Pollard: Objection.
The Court: I will let him say whether he did or did not tell
him where he came from. But I will not let this witness say
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where Rogers did tell him he came from. That would be a
self-serving declaration and not admissible. I will let him
make the statement, if he can, whether or not Rogers told him
the place he came from.




Q. What did Rogers have about him, other than in his
hands, when you saw him?
A. As far as I saw, he had some clothes under his left arm.
That is all I saw then.
Q. When did you see Rogers again after he left you?
A. I did not see him any more until 1:30 that day.
Q. On what day?
A. That same day.
Q. Was that on Sunday, the 18th day of July, 1943T.
A. Yes, sir, it was that Sunday.
Q. Where did you see him?
A. At the Police Headquarters.
Q. How did you get down to the Police Headquarters?
A. They came and got me and carried me down
page 199 there.
Q. Who was that?
A. The police officers came and got me.
Q. For what purpose?
A. To identify the man.
Q. And did you identify him?
A. Yes, sir, I told them that that was the same man that I
saw.
Q. Was there blood on Rogers when you saw him at the
Police Headquarters?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Where was the blood?
A. I noticed it on his shirt when I saw him.
Q. (Indicating exhibit) This is a shirt that has been in-
troduced by the Commonwealth, and it has been stated by
Rogers that it was the shirt that he wore. Is that the shirt
that Rogers had on at the Police Headquarters?
A. As far as I know he did. It was something like that.
It looked sort of like that.
Q. Has this shirt been washed from the time you saw it?
A. It must have been.
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Q. Look at it and see if blood is on the shirt now like you
saw it at the Police Headquarters?
A. (Examining) No, sir, I do not see any blood on it now.Q. (Indicating photograph) At the Police Headquarters
was Rogers looking like that when you saw him?
A. I could not say that he looked like that. I was not pay-
ing close attention. And I could not identify that
page 200 he looked like that (indicating photograph).
Q. The police did not ask you to come here to
testify, did they?
Mr. Pollard: Objection.
The Court: That has nothing to do with it. The police
have nothing to do with whether he comes here to testify or
not. The police do not conduct cases in this court.
Mr. Cooley: That is all.
No cross examination.
Witness stood aside.
Mr. Cooley: Now, your Honor, 1, want to call Officer Par-
rish.
Mr. Pollard: Mr. Parrish has been in the courtroom, your
Honor.
The Court: Mr. Parrish has been in the courtroom all of
the time. He was not a witness in this case, and, therefore,
he was allowed to be in the courtroom all of the time. You
may call him with that understanding.
OFFICER E. M. PARRISH,
sworn for the defendant:
DIRECT EXAMTNATIO.
.ly Mr. Cooley-
Q. Please state your name?
A. E. M. Parrish.
Q. You are a member of the Petersburg Police Deparfmenf,
aren't you?
pTae 201 A. Yes, sir.
Q. How long have you been a member of th
police force?
* A. Fifteen years.
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Q. Are you a police officer or a detective?
A. I work in civilian clothes. I am a police officer.
Q. On Sunday, July 18, 1943, were you a part of the in-
vestigating force that was searching for the person who killed
Officer Hatchell?
A. No, sir.
Q. Were you in Lee Park that Sunday afternoon?
A. Yes.
Q. State to the jury what was your purpose there?
A. I went to Headquarters after I heard that Officer
Hatchell had been shot, to render any assistance that I could
render at Headquarters or anywhere in the town. They had
this man upstairs. Captain Beasley and Officer Jolly and
some other officers were there. I do not know who was up
there, or what was said or done. I went over to the hospital
to see where Officer Hatchell had been shot, or to see if I
could render anv assistance in finding the man; and there
some one made the statement that the bloodhounds-
Mr. Pollard: Objection.
The Court: Don't say that.
A. (Continued) I found out that the bloodhounds were go-
ing through Blandford, trailing some man. Officer Hawks
and I went over in Blandford and found out that the blood-
hounds were trailing some trail; I do not know
page 202 who it was; but they were going through there be-
tween McKeever Street and the top of a hill,
through a vacant field, and they came out on St. Andrews
Street; and I received information about the description of a
man goin- through that field; and, as he was headed towards
Walnut Hill or the football grounds there, I thought maybe
he might come out on Route 301, or Lee Park; and Officer
Hawks and I went around through Lee Park and came down
the Johnson Road to the overhead bridge, and, in crossin"
the overhead bridge, we saw a tall colored man, about six
feet tall, dressed in brown trousers and a blue shirt and a
lioht hat or cap, a good distance away, about as far as from
here to Sycamore Street (indicating about 275 feet) - we could
not tell whether it was a hat or a cap that this colored fellow
had on. We called him to the car: and he would not come.
Hie asked who we were, and we told him. And we drew our
,,ins on the man. He then inut both hands in his hip pockets,
-nd, as I started off the bridge to go to where he waq, he ran,
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and we shot at him about twelve times, six shots each; and
he went in the woods. I did not know whether he was the
man that had anything to do with the shooting of Officer
Hatchell, or what he had done, but I knew he had done some-
thing right bad from the way he acted and ran. I knew the
bloodhounds were over on St. Andrews Street when we left,
and I called for help, and they sent the bloodhounds over
there; and the next thing I knew the whole woods was full of
officers looking for this man.
page 203 . By Mr. Cooley:
Q. Does Lieutenant Run meander up towards
St. Andrews Street?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What time of day was it that you conducted your inves-
tigation, with Officer Hawks, up to St. Andrews Street and
out to Lee Park to where you all fired twelve shots at the
man?
A. It was 11:00 or 12:00 o'clock when we started from the
hospital, and then we went over in Blandford.
Q. The sun was shining?
A. Yes.
Q. Where was Silas Rogers?
A. He was supposed to be in jail, locked up.
CROSS EXAMINATION.
By Mr. Pollard:
Q. The dogs were brought out to that bridge where you all
shot at this man, weren't they?
A. We called Headquarters for help, and the first man
that came there was Officer Lockett. He took the police car
and drove back to St. Andrews Street and brought the dogs
out there in the car and put them on the track of the man whom
we followed. We did not know who he was.
Q. The dogs did not trail anybody from St. Andrews Street
to where you all shot at this man?
A. That is right.
Q. And the man was six feet tall, with a blue shirt and
brown trousers?
page 204 A. Yes, sir.




Q. And he wore a white hat?
A. I do not know what kind of hat he had on. It was as
far as from here to Sycamore Street (indicating about 275
feet). And that is the reason we did not hit the man; he was
too far away.
Q. Were the bloodhounds put on the trail of Rogers, or any-
body from down towards the Appomattox Bridge and back
towards the hospital?
A. I do not know that.
Witness stood aside.
Mr. Cooley: That is the case for the defense,
page 205 TESTIMONY IN REBUTTAL.
The Court: Is there any rebuttal?
Mr. Pollard: I have some rebuttal.
OFFICER W. A. GOODWYN,
sworn, in rebuttal, for the Commonwealth:
DIRECT EXAMINATION.
By Mr. Pollard:
Q. Please state your name, residence, and occupation?
A. W. A. Goodwyn; 107 Chappell Street, Petersburg, Vir-
ginia; police officer of the City of Petersburg, Virginia.
.Q. Were you on duty at the Petersburg Police Station on
the morning of July 18, 1943, Sunday morning?
A. Yes.
Q. The morning that Officer Hatchell was shot?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Were you on duty at the Police Station when Officer
Mason brought Silas Rogers, the defendant here, into the
Police Station?
A. Yes, sir.
0. Did you see James Jordan and Charles Stephens at the
Police Station at that time?
A. Yes, sir, I brought them in there.
Q. Will you please state whether or not they identified
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the defendant, Silas Rogers, just after Officer Mason brought
him into the Police Station?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did they identify him?
A. When Officer Mason brought Silas Rogers
page 206 in, he took a seat on the bench. I went back in
there and unlocked the two soldiers, and I told
them to go in and take a look at the man and not to do any
talking and to come back and talk with me. And they walked
in and turned right around and came back and said he was
the man. Both of them said that.
CROSS EXAMINATION.
By Mr. Cooley:
Q. When the soldiers said he was the man, was Rogers
present?
A. They said he was the man that rode into Petersburg
with them.
Q. Did Rogers hear that?
A. No, sir.
Mr. Cooley: Your Honor, we move to strike that testimony
out. It is a statement made out of the presence of the ac-
cused-when he was not present.
The Court: The objection is sustained. Gentlemen of the
jury, you will pay no attention to that.
Mr. Pollard: That is as to the identification.-
The Court: I will let you interrogate him further as to the
identification, but any statement made by the two soldiers out-
side of the presence of the defendant is not evidence.
Witness stood aside.
page 207 CAPTAIN G. M. WILLIAMS,
sworn, in rebuttal, for the Commonwealth:
DIRECT EXAMINATION.
By Mr. Pollard:
Q. Please state your name, residence, and occup)ation?
A. G. M. Williams; member of Virginia State Police; Rich-
mond. Virginia.
0. Captain, were voi in Petersbunx at the Police Station
on Sunday, July 18, 1943, at about 1:30 P. M.?
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A. Yes, sir.
Q. Were you present in the courtroom there on that day at
approximately that time when two soldiers, James Jordan
and Charles btephens, were asked in the presence of this man
(indicating accused) to identify him?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did they or not identify him at that time in your pres-
ence?
A. They did.
Q. Did you not, in the presence of this man (indicating ac-
cused) ask them whether or not there was any doubt in the
world that he was the man?
A. I did.
Q. And what did they say?
A. They said there was no doubt in their minds.
Q. And that was in his presence?
A. Yes, sir.
page 208 CROSS EXAMINATION.
By Mr. Cooley:
Q. Captain Williams, when the soldiers identified Rogers in
your presence on that Sunday, was Rogers selected from a
line-up of men, or was he there alone?
A. Rogers was there alone.
Witness stood aside.
CAPTAIN F. C. BEASLEY,
recalled, in rebuttal, by the Commonwealth:
DIRECT EXAMINATION.
By Mr. Pollard:
0. Cantain. are you the same F. C. Beasley of the Peters-
1nr" Police Department, who has testified several times in
tllhz~ casqe?
A. Yes, sir.
(). Whalt time dd von oet to the Police Station on Sindav
,,n' inQ, ,Tnlv I P., 1943, the day on which Officer Hatchell was
shot?
A. T got a call while I was at home that Offceer Hatebell
w.; shot; and I got in my car and rode to the Police Station.
A:!d I got in the police car and went right straight out. And
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I got back a little after 10:00 o'clock, I think.
Q. Had Silas Rogers then been arrested?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Was he brought to your office?
page 2G9 A. He was brought to my office. And when I
went in the room there he was sitting on the bench
with Officers Kirkland and Curtis; and I told them to bring
him up to my office. And that was a little after 10:00 o'clock.
Q. And were the two soldiers, James Jordan and Charles
Stephens, brought there at that time when Silas Rogers was
in there?
A. They were.
Q. Were they asked to identify him in his presence?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did they or not identify him at that time?
A. Both of them identified him.
Q. Did he have on any shoes at that time?
A. James Jordan identified him, and said, "If you find his
shoes, they will be black, high-top shoes;" and I sent for
them, and they were high-top black shoes.
Q. Were you present, Captain Beasley, at around 1:30
o'clock at the Police Station on July 18, 1943, when I asked
Silas Rogers some questions?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did he or not at that time make the statement that he
had left the City of Hamlet, North Carolina, on the night of
July 17, 1943, on a train, and had gotten off the train in the
City of Raleigh, in the State of North Carolina, and that he
had left the City of Raleigh, in the State of North Carolina,
at 10:00 P. M. on the night of July 17, 1943, in an Interna-
tional truck, with a red cab that had green stripes
page 210 around it?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How many times, in answer to the questions, did he in-
sist that he left Raleigh, North Carolina, on that International
truck with the driver of the truck?
A. I questioned him once, and you questioned him once, and
I think that was about all of the questioning. It was two
different times.
Q. Did he not say at that time that the man driving the
truck put him out in Petersburg that morning at 8:00 o'clock
and told him to walk down the street until he came to the sec-
ond traffic light and to turn to the left, and that he would
then make a right turn and come to a bridge that he had to
cross to go to Richmond to get to New York?
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A. Yes, sir.





Q. Captain Beasley, when the two soldiers identified Rog-
ers, as you say, that identification took place in your office,
did it?
A. It did.
Q. How many suspects were in your office, other than
Rogers, for those soldiers to identify?
A. Nobody but him.
Q. Which soldier said, "If you get his shoes,
page 211 they will be black, high-top shoes"?
A. James Jordan.
Q. What did Silas Rogers have on at that time?
A. He did not have on any shoes.
Q. What did he have on?
A. I reckon it was his naked feet.
Q. I say, what did he have on?
A. I say, he did not have on any shoes. He did not have
anything on his feet.
Q. Did he have on socks?
A. I am pretty sure he did not. I am confident that he did
not have on socks.
Q. Where were his shoes?
A. Downstairs somewhere. I do not know where. I sent
for them and had them brought to my office.
Q. Why did you have him walk around the Police Head-
quarters barefooted?
A. I did not have him walk around the Police Headquarters
barefooted.
Q. But, when the soldiers identified Rogers in your office,
you are very positive that he did not have any shoes on?
A. I know he did not have any shoes on.
Q. Did you ask Rogers about a telegram from his boss?
A. I did.
Q. Did you, as a matter of fact, receive a telegram for him?
A. I did.
Q. Did you order Officer Jackson to Lee Park
page 212 to conduct an investigation there?A. I did not.
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Sergeant H. S. Hubbard.
Q. If Officer Jackson stated that you ordered him to Lee
Park to aid in whatever manner he could, is he wrong?
A. He is mistaken.
Witness stood aside.
SERGEANT H. S. HUBBARD,
sworn, in rebuttal, for the Commonwealth:
DIRECT EXAML\NATION.
By 2\r. Pollard:
Q. Please state your name, residence, and occupation?
A. H. S. Hubbard; member of Virginia State Police; Pe-
tersburg, Virginia.
Q. Sergeant, were you at the Police Station on Sunday, July
18, 1943, at about 1:30 o'clock that afternoon?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Were you present when I asked the defendant, Silas
Ro.gers, some questions?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did he or not make the statement that he left Hamlet,
North Carolina, on the night of July 17, 1943. on a train and
got off of that train in the City of Raleigh, North Carolina,
and got a ride from the City of Raleigh, North Carolina, to
Petersburg, Virginia, on an International truck with a red
cab that had green stripes around it?
page 213 A. That is right.
Q. How many times do you suppose he was
asked and answered the question that be came to Petersburg
that morning at 8:00 o'clock on an International truck?
A. At least five or six times.
Q. Were you present at the Police courtroom in the Citv
of Petersbur' a little after those onestions were osked To -
ers-when the defendant was brouofht into the Police Court-
room to be identified by two soldiers, James Jordan and
Charlq Stenhens?
A. Yes, sir.
0. Was C.aptain Williams present at that time?
A. Yes, sir.
0. Were fiev qkocl. in the presence of the defendant, Silas
?ooerq. to identify him?
A. Yes. qir.
Q. Did they identify him or not ?
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A. They did.
Q. At that time did Captain Williams ask them whether
there was any doubt in the world in their minds that he was
the man?
A. Yes, sir, he asked them that several times.
Q. What did they say?
A. They said there was not any doubt; that they would
swear to it.
page 214 t CROSS EXAMINATION.
By Mr. Cooley:
Q. Sergeant, when the soldiers identified Rogers, was
Rogers the only accused facing the soldiers?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Was there blood on Rogers's shirt at that time, or about
his head?
A. I think there was.
Q. On what part of that shirt was the blood, if you can
say exactly?
A. There was some on the back, or it looked to be.
Q. Were you a member of the police crowd that was search-
ing" in Lee Park that afternoon?
A. I went out there.
Q. Did you find the man for whom you were looking?
A. I went out there because the crowd was out there.
). What crowd?
A. The police officers.
Q. For what purpose?
A. They bad bloodhounds out there. I went out there with
C,hntain Williams.
0. Did the bloodhounds find the person for whom you were
loo!0in'?
A. No. sir.
C. Did you shoot at anybody?
A. No, sir.
Q. How lono did you stay out there?
pq-'e 215 A. About three hours, I reckon.
0. Looking for whom?
A. I was niot lookinof for anybod-r rarticularlv. We went
down the road and ate, and came back to where the dogs were
•and saw them.
C. Did vou go back out there Monday with the police?
A No, sir.
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Q. When you left were the police still in Lee Park?
A. I think the most of them had gone away.
Q. But the police were there and the bloodhounds were
there, and they were looking for somebody?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Weren't they looking for the person that killed Officer
Hatchell?
A. I do not know.
Q. (Indicating exhibit) This is the shirt that Rogers had
on. What part of that shirt had blood on it?
A. The back of it.
Q. Has the blood been washed out of that shirt?
A. (Examining) I do not see any now.
Witness stood aside.
page 216 ANANIAS LAWRENCE (colored),
sworn, in rebuttal, for the Commonwealth:
DIRECT EXAMINATION.
By Mr. Pollard:
Q. Please state your name, residence, and occupation?
A. Ananias Lawrence is my name. Trucker, Seaboard Air
Line. 307 Lawrence Street, Petersburg, Virginia.
Q. How long have you been working for the Seaboard Air
Line?
A. Since 1905.
Q. Do you work at the Dunlop Street Station or not?
A. At the Market Street Station. I handle freight.
Q. On the night of July 17, 1943, what time did you go to
.work?
A. At 11:00 o'clock.
Q. And what station of the Seaboard Air Line did you go
to work at?
A. The Dunlop Street Station.
By the Court:
Q. Do you mean 11:00 o'clock at night?
A. Yes, sir.
By Mr. Pollard:
Q. How long did you work that night and the morning of
July 18, 1943?
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A. I came off at 7:00 o'clock.
Q. You worked from 11:00 o'clock Saturday night, July 17,
1943, to 7:00 o'clock A. M. on the morning of July 18, 1943?
A. That is right.
page 217 Q. At the Dunlop Street Station?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What was your duty up there?
A. Handling mail.
Q. Do you know where the colored waiting room is up
there?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Where is that?
A. That is on the north side.
Q. On the north side of the station?
A. Yes, sir,-wait a minute, the colored waiting room is on
the south side.
Q. The south side?
A. That is right. The white waiting room is on the north
side.
Q. Did your duties up there on the night of July 17, 1943,
from 11:00 o'clock to the morning of July 18, 1943, at 7:00
o'clock, take you through the colored waiting room at inter-
vals ?
A. Yes, sir, through the colored waiting room and the bag-
gage room.
Q. How many times were you in the colored waiting room
from 3:00 A. M. on July 18, 1943, until the time you stopped
work at 7:00 o'clock that morning?
A. Off and on about every train that ran.
Q. How many times would you say you were in there?
A. At least five or six.
Q.Did you see this man (indicating accused) sitting in
there?
page 218 A. No, sir, I did not see him.
The Court: Referring to the defendant, Silas Rogers?
Mr. Pollard: Yes, sir, the defendant, Silas Rogers.
A. (Continued) No, sir, I did not see him.
By Mr. Pollard:
Q. Did you see any man in there, dressed in a white sailor
bat, with bushy hair, and a tan shirt?
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Mr. Hopkins: Objection.
The Court: The objection is overruled.
Mr. Hopkins: Exception.
A. No, sir, I did not.
By Mr. Pollard:
Q. Can you say positively that there was no man, with a
white sailor hat on and a tan shirt, in there?
Mr. Hopkins: Objection.
The Court: It is overruled.
Mr. Hopkins: Exception.
A. I did not see any.
By Mr. Pollard:
Q. rom 3:00 o'clock A. '\. on the morning of July IS,
1943, to 7:00 o'clock A. M. of the same morning, did you see
the defendant here, Silas Rogers, in that colored waiting
room ?
A. No, sir, I did not.
Q. Did you see any man, between those hours, in there, with
a white sailor hat and a tan shirt on-
page 219 M r. Hopkins: Same objection; and, if your
Honor please, we object to this line of question-
ing by the Commonwealth, because it calls for a conclusion
based on facts not in the evidence, namely, because it calls for
this witness to testify that Silas Rogers was not in the colored
waiting room at the Dunlop Street Station when the said wit-
ness testified that he was in that station on the night in ques-
tion only five or six times.




Q. You say your name is Ananias Lawrence T
A. That is right.
Q. On Wednesday night of this week, did vou work at the
Dunlon Street Station of the Seaboard Air Line?
A. I haven 't worked anywhere of this week. I am off on a
vacation.
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Q. On Wednesday night of last week were you then on a
vacation?
A. No, sir, I was working at the Market Street Freight
Station then.
Q. When did you work at the Dunlop Street Station at any
time after the night of July 17th?
A. All week before last.
Q. Well, on Wednesday of that week how many
page 220 people came to that station?
A. I could not tell you.
Q. On Tuesday of that week how many people came to that
station?
A. I could not tell you that.
Q. On Thursday of that week how many people came to
that station ?
A. I could not tell you that.
Q. On the night of the 19th of July did you work at that
station ?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How many people came to that station that night?
A. I could not tell you.
Q. How many times did you see this man here?
A. I have told you that I did not see that man up there.
Q. You did not see him?
A. Not that I know of.
Q. Did you see anybody else?
A . I have seen a plenty of them.
0. How many people did you see?
A. I did not count them.
The Court: Make your nuestion a little more definite as to
the time you are talking about.
T3- Mr. Coolev:
. I am talkino about that same night. On the 18th of July.
1943, how many neople went into the colored side of that sta-
tion?
r,aqe 221 A. I bad -nmcthin!" else to do. I have to work
the mail. Of course I saw them, but I did not
count them or take notiee of them.
0. How many times did you go into the rest room?
A. Off and on all night; several times.
0. About how many times?
:\. About three or four or five or six.
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Q. You did not stay in there continuously, did you?
A. No, indeed.
Q. And if this man was in that station or in that rest room,
the chances are that you would not have seen him, aren't
they?
A. No, sir, not at all.
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION.
By Mr. Pollard:
Q. If this man (indicating accused) had stayed in that col-
ored waiting room on the morning of July 18, 1943, from
3:00 o'clock in the morning until 7:00 o'clock of that morn-
ing, when you went off duty, would you have seen him or
not?
Mr.*Hopkins: We object to the question. He has been over
that.
The Court: The objection is overruled.
Mr. Hopkins: Exception.
A. If he had been in there that long,.in going in and out.
I would have noticed him, or in going in and out when I got
ready to leave there.
page 222 Mr. Pollard: That is all.
Witness stood aside.
Mr. Pollard: That is the case.
page 223 TESTIMONY IN SURREBUTTAL.
Mr. Cooley: May we put the defendant back on the stand?
The Court: Yes.
SILAS ROGERS,
the defendant, recalled, in surrebuttal, on his own behalf:
DIRECT EXAMINATION.
By Mr. Cooley:
Q. Rogers, you have heard the testimony about some state-
ment that you are reputed to have made concerning a truck,
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which you denied on the first cross examination. Tell his
Honor and these gentlemen of the jury what, if anything, was
said concerning a truck, or anything else, in addition to your
riding on the Silver Meteor from Hamlet, North Carolina, to
Petersburg, Virginia.
Mr. Pollard: Objection.
The Court: The objection is sustained.
Mr. Cooley: The question is in rebuttal to the statements
that were made and that have been denied by the witness.
And, since that time the Commonwealth has presented re-
buttal testimony showing that those statements were made;
and it is fair to ask this witness about those circumstances.
The Court: The situation is this: This man was asked
whether he made certain statements; and he said
page 224 he did not make those statements. The Common-
wealth's Attorney put him on notice that he ex-
pected to prove that he did make those statements. The Com-
monwealth's Attorney has put people on the stand who testi-
fied as to those statements. This man can not now go back
on the stand and say something else.
Air. Cooley: Not even if he can make explanations about
any statements that were made, if any?
The Court: All the Commonwealth's Attorney has asked
him was if he made certain statements; and he denied mak-
ing them; and he was put on notice that the Commonwealth's
Attorney expected to prove that he did make them; and the
Commonwealth's Attorney did introduce evidence to the ef-
fect that those statements were made by the accused. That
is all rebuttal of the Commonwealth's Attorney.
Mr. Cooley: We should like to explain how those statements
were made.
The Court: You should have done that when he was on the
stand, and you did not see fit to do so.
Mr. Cooley: Then, your Honor's ruling is that you deny
this witness the opportunity to show the circumstances?
The Court: My ruling is that you can not ask the wit-
ness that question; and that he can not answer the ques-
tion just propounded. That is all I have ruled so
page 225 . far.
Mr. Cooley: We note an exception to that rul-
ing, your Honor.
Witness stood aside.
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Mr. Pollard: That is the case.
The Court: Is that the case?
M[r. Cooley: That is the case for the defense.
Note: At this point the Court adjourned until tomorrow
morning at 10:00 o'clock.
August 27, 1943, 10:00 A. M., Court reconvened.
The Court: On yesterday, when the accused was on the
stand as a witness in his own behalf on cross examination, he
was asked by the Attorney for the Commonwealth whether he
made certain statements relative to coming to Petersburg on
a truck. The accused flatly denied making any such state-
ments. The Commonwealth's Attorney then laid the proper
foundation, and told the accused that he expected to intro-
duce evidence to show that he did make those statements at
the time specified. If the accused had at that time desired to
make some statement about his coming into Petersburg on a
truck, that was the time for him to say whatever he wanted to
say, although he had denied making those specific statements.
The Commonwealth's Attorney did introduce evi-
p)age 226 dence to the effect that the statements were made
by the accused.
Last night the accused was again put back on the stand,
and the accused was asked to state what he did say in regard
to coming into Petersburg on a truck. At that time I ruled
that the accused had no right to make any such statement.
I am still of the opinion tlat I was absolutely correct in that
ruling. The accused has no right to take what is ordinarily
called "two bites at a cherry." He had the right, if he de-
nied, as he did, making those statements, to say what, if any-
thing, he did say. But the accused has no right to sit idly b,.
so to speak, and to take the chance that the Commonwealth
will not introduce evidence which he says he will introduce,
and, after the Commonwealth does introduce that evidence,
then to come on the stand and say I want to say what I want
to say.
So I say that I think my ruling last night is absolutely cor-
reet accordinq: to the law of the State of Virginia.
However. this is a serious case, and I am g.oing to reverse
mv ruIn!2, in that regard because it is a serious case. and I
will let the accused go on the stand and make any statement
which he says he made in reQoard to eomino into Petersbur-
on a truck. I am not going to permit him to reiterate any-
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thing which he has said about coming into Petersburg on the
Silver Meteor, because he has testified to that.
So, you may put him back on the stand, if you
page 227 . want to, for him to make any statement which he
wants to make, which he claims he made with re-
gard to coming into Petersburg on a truck.
Mr. Pollard: If your Honor please, I ask whether or not
he may be restricted in testifying as to what statement he
made in answer to my question at the time referred to when
I laid the foundation for the impeachment.
The Court: That is absolutely correct. He is confined to
that, and to no other time whatsoever.
Mr. Cooley: I ask that the jury retire.
The Court: Gentlemen of the jury, retire.
(Jury retired.)
Mr. Cooley: If it please the Court, those remarks being
made so long-overnight--after the ruling of the Court last
night, we think that, in the opinion of counsel for the defense,
't would have been more proper if those statements had been
made in the absence of the jury, because the jury will take
into consideration that your Honor had not given full and
c1ne consideration to the matter; and now, overnight, your
Honor has changed those statements.
Your Honor has reviewed at length what the defendant
shopld have done at that time, and it puts the defendant in a
most serious and prejudicial position in the minds of the jury.
And the subse-uent remarks thereto and the further claims
by The Commonwealth's Attornev were likewise within the
bearing of the Jury: that constituted more preju-
pagR e 228 dice in the minds of the jury against this defend-
ant.
And. since the defendant and his counsel are of the opinion
flV + tbo-e Qtatements are not in any wise proper to be made
;, the hearino of the jurv. we make the motion at this time
that this case be stopped at this particular instant.
The Coi rf: The motion is overruled.
Mrr. Coolev: We note an exception to that ruling, vo'ir
or.
The Court: Recall the jury.
(J i ry recalled.)
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SILAS ROGERS,
the defendant, recalled on his own behalf:
DIRECT EXAMINATION.
By Mr. Cooley:
Q. Rogers, in regard to certain statements that were proven
or presented in evidence on yesterday concerning your com-
ing into Petersburg on a truck, was anything ever said to
you, or by you, or in your presence concerning your coming
into Petersburg on a truck, or in any other way than on the
Silver Meteor?
A. Yes, sir.Q. Please state to his Honor and the gentlemen of the jury
what was said, and how it was said. Take your time and ex-
plain it fully?
Mr. Pollard: Objection.
The Court: The objection is sustained.
Mr. Pollard: The man does not dispute the fact.
The Court: You must designate the time. This
page 229 witness has testified as to the alleged statement
made by him, which referred to a designated and
specified time. If he made any statement to anybody else
at any other time, that is not evidence in this case.
Mr. Cooley: The statement about which we are now ask-
ing is one that was supposed to have been made by the ac-
cused on the 18th day of July, 1943, at the Police Headquar-
ters in the presence of Captain Beasley, Frank J. Kirkland,
and Sergeant Hubbard.
The Court: At what time? Give the hour.
Mr. Pollard: The record shows the hour.
Mr. Cooley: I will say around 1:00 or 1:30 P. M.
The Court: The question is, Did you make any statement
in the presence of those particular officers at that particular
time in the Police Courtroom here about coming into Peters-
burg on a truck.
Mr. Cooley: Before the witness answers your Honor's
question, I will say that we want to give the witness an op-
portunity now to do what your Honor refused to let him do
last night. What he wanted to do last night was to explain
the situation. And now your Honor, excluding everything
else, lets him make a particular statement.
The Court: I do not know that he will make a
page 230 statement. I will let him make any statement
which he claims was made to those people at that
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particular time; that is, what it is claimed he denies was made.
If he claims he made one at that time, I will let him say what
statement he then made.
Mr. Cooley: We want him to explain the background of
the statement.
The Court: That is what he has no right to do at this
time.
Mr. Cooley: Then, we will withdraw the witness from the
stand.
Witness stood aside.
Mr. Pollard: I would like to have the jury excluded.
The Court: Gentlemen of the jury, retire.
(Jury retired)
Mr. Pollard: For the purpose of the record, if your Honor
please, I will say this: The statement referred to was made
at 1:30 P. M. on Sunday, July 18, 1943.
Mr. Cooley: What is the purpose of this?
The Court: I do not know. The Commonwealth's Attor-
ney is going to make a motion, I reckon. The jury is out.
Mr. Pollard: Strike it out.
If your Honor please, for the purpose of the record, in
connection with the statement or statements made by the de-
fendant, Silas Rogers, in answer to questions pro-
page 231 pounded to him by me at the Petersburg Police
Station on Sunday, July 18, 1943, at about 1:30
P. M. in the afternoon, I desire to say that I have a statement
in my hand consisting of four and one-half pages, which is
the complete statement made at that time by the defendant;
that this statement is signed by the defendant and witnessed
by Captain Beasley, Officer Frank Kirkland, and Sergeant
Hubbard, each page of the statement being signed by the de-
fendant, Silas Rogers, as well as the last page.
I want to state for the purpose of the record that I am of-
fering this statement to counsel for the defense to introduce
in its entirety if he wishes to do so.
(Paper handed to counsel)
The Court: Let the record show that the Commonwealth's
Attorney gave the statement to counsel for the defendant;
and I am going to give counsel for the defendant the oppor-
tunity to look at the statement to see what it says.
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Mr. Cooley: For what purpose is it offered. It is preju-
dicial to the defendant.
The Court: He is offering it to you. The jury does not
know anything about it.
Mr. Cooley: Then, let the record show that we refuse to
take it.
The Court: If you want to do so I will give you time to
consider the statement now.
Mr. Cooley: This is in the nature of a confession, your
Honor. Did they have a stenographer to take it down?
The Court: I do not know anything about it.
page 232 I was not there. You have a statement there,
which the Commonwealth's Attorney asserts was
signed by the accused. He has turned it over to you for such
purposes, if any, as you and the other counsel for the accused
want to use it.
Mr. Cooley: Then, let the record also show that counsel
for the defendant do not accept this statement, which was
made about 1:30 P. M. on Sunday, July 18, 1943, because this
statement was made shortly after this defendant was beaten
up by the police.
Mr. Hopkins: We want to put the defendant back on the
stand. According to the uncontroverted evidence, the defend-
ant was beaten up. Some of the officers admitted something,
and the State's star witnesses, the two soldiers, admitted
something. That is in the evidence here. It is most unrea-
sonable evidence. The defendant wanted to explain that
those statements were read to him; that he never made them;
that he never compiled them; that the words were put in his
mouth, and that he did sign them but under duress. And that
is what he wanted to explain.
The Court: I understood that he wanted to make a state-
ment as to what he did say at the time referred to by the
Commonwealth's Attorney. I had the Reporter read to me
the question before I came into court this morning. Last
night the question was propounded to the defendant, What
did he say about coming into town on a truck? and I will let
him answer that. I will not let him go any fur-
page 233 ther than that. The conditions may vary it. But
he said on yesterday that he did not make that
statement.
Mr. Hopkins: If he made it under duress, then it is the
same as if he did not make it.
Mr. Pollard: I asked him whether I mistreated him, and
whether he was hurt at all at that time; and if I had not
bought him a Coca-Cola.
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The Court: He denies that he made those one or two state-
ments in the record. These other statements that you refer
to, which you say he made and which have not gone to the
jury, you say were made under duress. Now, it is peculiar
for counsel for the defendant to want to put a man on the
stand and let that man say, "I made a certain statement,"
which the Commonwealth's Attorney does not agree that he
made, and then say it was under duress.
Mr. Cooley: But those statements were made; and he was
asked to sign them.
We will let the evidence stand like it was last night. Let
the case be closed as of last night.
The Court: Let the evidence be closed as of this time.
Testimony closed.
page 234 - Mr. Cooley: And we renew our motion for a
mistrial because of statements made before the
jury.
The Court: It is overruled.
Mr. Cooley: Exception.
The Court: Recall the jury.
(Jury recalled)
The Court: Gentlemen of the jury, I am going to take you
up to the alleged scene of the crime. We are all going to-
gether: the jurors, the two alternate jurors., the defendant,
counsel for the defendant, the Commonwealth's Attorney, the
Sergeant, the Clerk, and the presiding Judge. We are going
in the same body, and we are all going to stay together.
Your gentlemen of the jury go up to the alleged scene of
the crime and look. Each man can look. I do not want any
man on the jury to be asking any questions of anybody about
anything. Don't even talk to each other up there about this
case. But you can look.
The alleged scene of the crime being outside of the Peters-
burg Hospital, I feel that it is my duty to take into consid-
eration the fact that that is a hospital, and that there are sick
people in that hospital, and that, although it is necessary to
conduct the case properly, the Court has no right to do any-
thing which might jeopardize the health of any person in
that hospital.
Consequently, we are not going inside of that hospital.
You can walk around on the outside of the hos-
p,,ag-e 235 pital, in the front of it, and to the south side of it,
and look, and stay together; and nothing else.
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And I hope that is very plain. Don't talk to anybody up
there.
I do not want any confusion which might militate against
the recovery of any person who happens to be in that hos-
pital. I want you to go there and see the surroundings of
the place where Officer Hatchell is alleged to have been shot.
Note: At this point the jury and others above mentioned
left the courtroom to view the scene of the alleged crime; and
subseqeuntly returned to the courtroom, and the case pro-
ceeded.
The Court: Gentlemen of the jury, at the request of the
defendant, I make this statement to you: That it is obvious
from what you saw at the alleged scene of the crime that the
hillside has been cut over, and you have a right to take that
into consideration. What you saw there this morning on
that hillside shows that the grass has been cut and some of
the bushes have been recently cut down. You saw it. And
you have a right to take that into consideration.
Mr. Robinson: If your Honor please, I desire to make a
motion.
The Court: Gentlemen of the jury, retire.
(Jury retired)
page 236 } Mr. Robinson: May it please your Honor, at
this time the defendant renews his motion to
strike all of the evidence of the Commonwealth; and we will
state in the record the grounds for that motion.
The Court: Counsel for the defendant indicated to me just
now that they wanted to make this motion; and, in order to
save time, I am not requiring counsel at this time to state
the grounds of his motion. I do not know of any ground
which would make me feel that this motion should be granted,
and, consequently,, I am overruling the motion and permitting
counsel to dictate to the Reporter their grounds for the mo-
tion when the jury retires to consider the case. I assume
that counsel for the defendant except to the ruling of the
Court.
Mr. Robinson: Yes, your Honor.
Counsel for the defendant assign the following as grounds
for said motion to strike:
1. That the evidence produced by the Commonwealth is
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legally insufficient to sustain a conviction for the crime charged
in the indictment.
2. That the burden rests upon the Commonwealth to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused; that the
Commonwealth has not produced a shred of evidence suffi-
cient to establish that the accused accomplished the murder of
Officer Hatchell-for even if the jury should return a verdict
of guilty upon the evidence, without the introduction of any
evidence on behalf of the defendant, the Court
page 237 would be forced to set it aside.
The Court: Recall the jury.
(Jury recalled)
page 238 . And the defendant tendered this his bill of Ex-
ception No. 1 and prayed that the same may be
signed, sealed and made a part of the record in this case,
which is accordingly done this 10th day of January, 1944,
within sixty days of the final judgment in this case.
R. T. WILSON (Seal)
Judge of the Hustings Court of the City
of Petersburg.
This bill of exception before it was changed by me was ten-
dered to me on December 29, 1943.
R. T. WILSON
Judge.
page 239 BILL OF EXCEPTION NO. 2.
Be It Remembered that on August 26, 1943, after the Court
bad adjourned for lunch, and after the accused had been taken
from the courtroom by the Sergeant to be returned to the jail,
and while the spectators were moving out of the courtroom,
and while counsel for the defendant and the Attorney for the
Commonwealth were moving around their tables, and while
a part of the jury was also moving around, the judge said to
the jury that if any of them wanted pajamas, night clothes, or
anything like that they should get the Sergeant to 'phone for
them but that they should not 'phone themselves; and the
judge told the stenographer not to take down that statement as
the court was adjourned and as it was not a part of the trial
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of the case; which statement of the judge to the jury was
made in the absence of the defendant.
Whereupon, immediately after the Court reconvened, at the
expiration of the period of said adjournment, at 2:00 o'clock
P. M. on the same day, and in the presence of the defendant,
the defendant, by his counsel moved the court to withdraw the
case from the consideration of the jury and to declare a mis-
trial, on the ground that the remark of the judge to the jury
made in the absence of the defendant while the Court was not
in session constituted reversible error. This motion the Court
overruled. To which action of the Court the defendant,, by
counsel, excepted, and tendered this his bill of exception, No.
2, which he prayed may be signed, sealed and made a part of
the record in this case, which is hereby accordingly done this
10th day of January, 1944, within sixty days of the final judg-
ment in this case.
page 240 R. T. WILSON (Seal)
Judge of the Hustings Court of the City
of Petersburg.
The bill of exception before it was changed by me was ten-
dered to me on December 29, 1943.
R. T. WILSON
Judge.
page 241 BILL OF EXCEPTION NO. 3.
Be It Remembered that on the trial of this case after the
completion of all the evidence the Court took up the matter
of the instructions to be given to the jury, and the following
instructions offered by the Commonwealth and by the defend-
ant are all of the instructions which were given in the case.
There were no objections to any instruction which was finally
offered, and no instruction was refused that was offered.
page 242 1.
The Court instructs the jury that murder is the unlawful
killing of any person with malice aforethought.
2.
The Court further instructs the jury that murder is dis-
tinguished by the law of Virginia as murder in the first de-
gree, and as murder in the second degree.
Silas Rogers v. Commonwealth of Virginia.
3.
The Court further instructs the jury that every homicide
in Virginia is presumed to be murder in the second degree.
In order to elevate the homicide to murder in the first degree,
the burden of proof is upon the Commonwealth. It is, how-
ever, the duty of the jury to consider all of the testimony, no
matter by whom introduced, and ascertain therefrom if the
accused is guilty, and if so, of what offense.
4.
The Court instructs the jury that murder is the unlawful
killing of another with malice, without malice there can be
no murder, but malice may either be express or implied. It is
express where a person kills another with a deliberate mind
and formed design. It is implied from any deliberate, cruel
act, committed by one person against another, suddenly, with-
out any, or upon slight provocation. It is pre-
page 243 sumed or implied from the act of killing, unac-
companied with circumstances of extenuation, and
the burden of disproving malice is thrown upon the accused.
5.
The Court further instructs the jury that murder in the
first degree is any willful, deliberate and premeditated kill-ing.
6.
The Court further instructs the jury that whenever the
killing is willful, deliberate and premeditated, the law infers
malice from this fact.
7.
The Court further instructs the jury that the rule of law
is that a man shall be taken to intend that which he does, or
which is the necessary consequences of his act.
8.
The Court further instructs the jury that to constitute a
willful, deliberate and premeditated killing, it is not neces-1vy that the intention to kill should exist any particular
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length of time prior to the actual killing-it is only necessary
that such intention should come into existence for the first
time at the time of the killing, or any time previously.
page 244 9.
The Court instructs the jury that a reasonable doubt is
what the word implies; a doubt founded on reason; a doubt
for which you can give a reason; a doubt growing out of the
testimony in the case, or the lack of testimony; a doubt which
would cause you to hesitate in the ordinary affairs of life; it
means a reasonable doubt, and not a fanciful doubt. The
jury is not to go beyond the evidence to hunt up doubts, nor
must they entertain such doubts as are merely chimerical or
conjectural. It must be a reasonable doubt, and must arise
from a candid and impartial investigation of all of the evi-
dcnce in the case. Unless it is such that were the same kind
of doubt interposed in the graver transactions of life, it would
cause a reasonable and prudent man to hesitate and pause, it
is not sufficient to authorize a verdict of not guilty. If, after
considering all of the evidence, the jury can say that they
have an abiding conviction of the truth of the charge, to a
moral certainty, they are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt.
J.
The Court instructs the jury that every man in the eyes of
the law is presumed to be innocent until he is proved to be
guilty, and the burden is upon the Commonwealth to establish
his guilt by evidence so strong, so clear and so conclusive,
that there is left in the minds of the jury no rea-
page 245 sonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt. This
presumption is an abiding presumption and goes
with the defendant through the entire case and applies at
every stage thereof until repelled by proof.
The Court further instructs the jury that a reasonable
doubt is that state of the case which, after a full consideration
of all the evidence leaves the minds of the jury in the con-
dition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction,
amounting to a moral certainty from the evidence in the case,
that the defendant is guilty of the charge alleged in the in-
dictment. And if the jury has such a doubt, or if the con-
viction of the jury of the guilt of the defendant, as alleged
in the indictment, does not amount to a moral certainty from
all of the evidence in the case then the court instructs you
that you should acquit the defendant.
Silas Rogers v. Commonwealth of Virginia.
B.
The Court instructs the jury that evidence that the defend-
ant may have committed one crime is not admissible for the
purpose of establishing the fact that he committed another
separate crime except as the evidence of the commission of a
crime may, or may not, tend to show a motive on the part of
the accused to commit the crime with which he is charged.
The jury may not assume that, merely because a defendant
may have been guilty of a misdoing upon one oc-
page 246 } casion, he is actually guilty of a misdoing upon
another. Therefore, even if the jury should find
that the defendant Silas Rogers was driving a stolen car, or
had actually stolen such car, this fact alone cannot justify a
verdict of his guilt in connection with the murder of Officer
Ilatchell, nor can such fact be considered as relevant evidence
thereof except as it may, or may not, tend to show a motive
on the part of the accused to commit the crime with which he
is charged.
F.
The Court instructs the jury that it is not sufficient that
the evidence in this case creates a suspicion or probability
of guilt on the part of the Silas Rogers; nor can the guilt of
Silas Rogers be inferred because the facts proved are con-
sistent with his guilt. To justify a verdict of guilt in this
case the evidence must not only be inconsistent with Silas
Rogers' innocence, but it must be of such character as to ex-
clude every reasonable hypothesis save that of guilt.
H.
The Court instructs the jury that if you find that there is a
conflict in the evidence in this case or any fact or circum-
stance tending to establish the guilt or innocence of the de-
fendant, a part of which is in favor of the theory of the Com-
monwealth and a part is in favor of the theory of Silas Rogers,
and the jury should entertain a reasonable doubt
page 247 - as to which is true, then it is the duty of the jury
in arriving at your verdict to adopt the evidence,
theory, and conclusion most favorable to Silas Rogers.
A.
If the jury have any reasonable doubt whether the defend-
ant is guilty of murder in the first degree, or murder in the
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second degree, they must find him guilty of murder in the sec-
ond degree. If the jury have any reasonable doubt whether
the defendant is guilty or not guilty, they must find him not
guilty.
L.
The Court instructs the jury that the question of identity
as to the person who committed the crime as charged in the
indictment is one of grave consideration for them in forming
their verdict; and that although upon this trial for murder
the defendant relies upon the defense of "Mistaken Identity"
as his defense to the said crime, the Commonwealth must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt, and to the exclusion of
every reasonable hypothesis, that the said prisoner on trial
is in fact the person who committed the crime charged in the
indictment.
And the Court further instructs the jury that if the Com-
monwealth does not prove beyond a reasonable doubt and to
the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis, that the said
prisoner is in fact the murderer then they should find the
defendant not guilty.
page 248 E.
The Court instructs the jury that under the indictment in
this case the burden is upon the Commonwealth to prove to
the satisfaction of the jury beyond all reasonable doubt, the
presence of the defendant at the time and place of the alleged
shooting, and if the jury, after considering all of the evidence
in the case, entertain a reasonable doubt as to the presence of
the defendant at the time and place of the alleged shooting,
the jury cannot find the defendant guilty.
The Court further instructs the jury that if they believe
from the evidence that the defendant has proven an alibi in
this case, they should find him not guilty.
And the court further instructs the jury that if the evi-
dence of his alibi, together with aIl the facts and circum-
stances, creates in their minds a reasonable doubt of the
presence of the accused at the place of the commission of the
crime alleged, they should give him the benefit of that doubt
and acquit him.
K.
The Court instructs the jury that the defendant is presumed
to be innocent until his guilt is established beyond a reason-
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able doubt, and he is not to be prejudiced by the inability of
the Commonwealth to point out any other guilty agent; nor is
he called upon to vindicate his own innocence by naming the
guilty party. He rests secure in that presumption of innu-
cence until proof is adduced by the Commonwealth which
establishes his guilt beyond all reasonable doubt; and whether
that proof be direct or circumstantial, it must be such as ex-
cludes any rational hypothesis of the innocence
page 249 t of the defendant.
I.
The Court instructs the jury that the indictment in this case
is not to be considered by the jury in the slightest degree as in-
dicative of the guilt of the defendant, and while the jury has
the right to take the indictment in their jury room, yet they
shall not consider the indictment as being any evidence what-
ever of the guilt of the defendant, and it is not to be con-
sidered by them as having any weight whatever as evidence
against the defendant in this case.
C.
The Court instructs the jury that the credibility of the wit-
nesses is a question exclusively for the jury, and that where
a number of witnesses testify directly opposite to each other,
the jury is not bound to find the defendant guilty solely be-
cause the Commonwealth has the greater number of witnesses.
The jury have the right to determine from the appearance of
the witnesses on the stand, their manner of testifying, and
their apparent candor or fairness, their apparent intelligence
or lack of intelligence, and from all other surrounding cir-
cumstances appearing on the trial, which witnesses are more
worthy of credit, and to give credit accordingly.
G.
The Court instructs the jury that in determining the weight
to be given to the testimony of the different witnesses in this
case, the jury are authorized to consider the witnesses' temper,
feelings, bias, prejudice and interest, if any has been shown;
their demeanor whilst testifying; their apparent intelligence;
their means of information, and to give such
page 250 . credit to the testimony of such witnesses as under
all the circumstances such witnesses seem to be
entitled to.
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The jury are instructed that circumstantial evidence must
always be scanned with great caution, and can never justify a
verdict of guilty, especially of an offense, the penalty of
which may be death, unless the circumstances proved are of
such a character and tendency as to produce in a fair and un-
prejudiced mind a moral conviction of the guilt of the accused
beyond all reasonable doubt, and unless the jury believe from
the evidence that each and every circumstance essential to the
conviction of the accused has been made out and established
beyond a reasonable doubt, then the accused should be ac-
quitted.
The Court further instructs the jury that certain evidence
in this case is circumstantial and not positive evidence, and
that in the application of circumstantial evidence to the de-
termination of this case, caution and vigilance should be used
by the jury. Such evidence is always insufficient where, as-
suming all to be true which the evidence tends to prove, some
other reasonable hypothesis may still be true, for it is the
actual exclusion of every other reasonable hypothesis which
invests mere circumstances with the force of truth. Where
the evidence leaves it indifferent which of several hypotheses
is true, or establishes only some finite probability
page 251 in favor of one hypothesis, such evidence cannot
amount to proof, no matter how great the prob-
ability may be. Therefore, even if the jury should believe
from the evidence in this case that theie is a strong prob-
ability that the defendant Silas Rogers is guilty of the offense
charged in the indictment, still if, upon the whole evidence,
there is any other reasonable hypothesis consistent with his
innocence, they cannot find him guilty.
D.
The Court instructs the jury that upon the trial of a crimi-
nal case by a jury the law contemplates the concurrence of
twelve minds in the conclusion of guilt before conviction can
be had. Each individual juror must be satisfied beyond a
reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt before he can, under
his oath, consent to a verdict of guilt. Each juror should feel
the responsibility resting upon him as a member of the jury,
and should realize that his own mind must be convinced be-
yond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt before he
can consent to a verdict of guilt.
The Court further instructs the jury that the jury room is
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no place for pride of opinion or obstinacy, and that it is the
duty of the jurors to discuss the evidence in a spirit of fair-
ness and candor with each other, and with open minds to
give careful consideration to the views of their fellows, and
if it can be done without a sacrifice of conscientious convic-
tions, agree upon a verdict.
page 252 The Court further instructs the jury, however,
if any individual member of the jury, after hav-
ing considered all of the evidence in this case, and after con-
sultation with his fellow jurors, should entertain such reason-
able doubt of the defendant's guilt, it is his duty not to sur-
render his own conviction simply because the balance of the
jury entertains different convictions.
11.
The Court instructs the jury that these are all the instruc-
tions of the Court, and are to be read and considered to-
gether.
page 253 } Incidents in connection with the discussion of
the instructions.
The Court: Gentlemen of the jury, at this time I will con-
sider the instructions. I will adjourn court, and the jury
will be brought back at 1:00 o'clock. In the meantime, I will
take up the matter of the instructions.
(Jury retired)
The Court: I suggest to counsel for the defense and the
Commonwealth's Attorney that they give me at this time a
copy of the instructions which they expect later to ask for;
and that they give to opposing counsel copies of the instruc-
tions which they later expect to ask for.
I will read those instructions over, and then I will get the
Commonwealth's Attorney and counsel together, with the ac-
cused being present, and ask counsel at that time what in-
structions they actually request, and pass on them at that
time.
In the courtroom at 11:42 A. M., during the recess of the
Court, the Judge took up with the Commonwealth's Attorney
and counsel for the accused the question of the instructions,
the accused being present and the jury being absent.
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Two of counsel for the accused were present and the third
counsel, Robert H. Cooley, Jr., had stated to the Court that
he did not wish to be present when the instructions were
given to the Court for consideration or during the discussion
of the same.
page 254 The Court: Mr. Commonwealth's Attorney,
give me such instructions now as you want to ask
for.
(Instructions handed to the Court)
The Court: And counsel for the accused, please give rme
such instructions as you desire to ask for.
(Instructions handed to the Court)
The Court: I have found it more expeditious to take up the
instructions of the Commonwealth first, and then of the de-
fendant afterwards; and I will proceed in that way.
The Court: Has counsel for the defendant any objection
to Instruction No. 1, as offered by the Commonwealth?
Mr. Hopkins: No, sir.
The Court: Has counsel for the defendant any objection
to Instruction No. 2, as offered by the Commonwealth?
Mr. Hopkins: No, sir.
The Court: Has counsel for the defendant any objection
to Instruction No. 3, as offered by the Commonwealth?
Mr. Robinson: Yes, sir.
The Court: What is your objection?
Mr. Robinson: There is no evidence in this case which will
sustain a conviction on the charge of manslaughter under any
circumstances; and we feel that it is incorrect to say that
"in order to reduce the offense to manslaughter, the burden
of proof is on the accused;" and further that it has no bear-
ing upon this case.
The Court: In other words, you desire deleted
page 255 from this instruction the following words: "and
in order to reduce the offense to manslaughter, the
burden of proof is upon the accused"?
Mr. Robinson: Yes, sir.
The Court: I grant that request and will give the instruc-
tion with those words left out.
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The Court: Has counsel for the defendant any objection
to Instruction No. 4, as offered by the Commonwealth?
Mr. Robinson: No, sir.
The Court: Has counsel for the defendant any objection
to Instruction No. 5, as offered by the Commonwealth?
Mr. Robinson: No objection.
The Court: Has counsel for the defendant any objection
to Instruction No. 6, as offered by the Commonwealth?
Mr. Robinson: No objection.
The Court: Has counsel for the defendant any objection
to Instruction No. 7, as offered by the Commonwealth?
Mr. Robinson: No objection.
The Court: Has counsel for the defendant any objection
to Instruction No. 8, as offered by the Commonwealth?
Mr. Robinson: No objection.
The Court: Has counsel for the defendant any objection
to Instruction No. 9, as offered by the Commonwealth ?
Mr. Robinson: No, sir.
The Court: Has counsel for the defendant any objection
to Instruction No. 10, as offered by the Commonwealth?
Mr. Robinson: No, sir.
page 256 The Court: Has counsel for the defendant any
objection to Instruction No. 11, as offered by the
Commonwealth?
Mr. Robinson: No, sir.
page 257 - The Court: Has the Commonwealth's Attorney
any objection to Instruction A, as offered by the
accused?
Mr. Pollard: No, sir.
The Court: Has the Commonwealth's Attorney any objec-
tion to Instruction B, as offered by the accused?
Mr. Pollard: Yes, sir.
The Court: After having heard what counsel for the de-
fendant has stated in connection with this instruction., and the
objections of the Commonwealth's Attorney to the same, the
Court is of the opinion that the instruction as offered should
not be given, but that it should be amended.
I shall amend the instruction bv inserting after the word
"crime' on the fourth line the following words, "except as
the evidence of the commission of a crime may, or may not,
tend to show a motive on the part of the accused to commit
the crime with which he is charged;" and I shall add those
same words to the end of the instruction following the word
''thereof' '.
I understand that counsel for the accused have no objection
to the giving of the instruction as amended by me.
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Mr. Robinson: No objection.
The Court: Has the Commonwealth's Attorney any objec-
tion to Instruction C, as offered by the accused?
Mr. Pollard: No objection.
The Court: Has the Commonwealth's Attorney any objec-
tion to Instruction D, as offered by the accused?
page 258 M r. Pollard: No objection.
The Court: Has the Commonwealth's Attor-
ney any objection to Instruction E, as offered by the accused?
Mir. Pollard: No objection.
The Court: Has the Commonwealth's Attorney any objec-
tion to Instruction F, as offered by the accused?
M[r. Pollard: No objection.
The Court: Has the Commonwealth's Attorney any objec-
tion to Instruction G, as offered by the accused?
Mr. Pollard: No objection.
The Court: Has the Commonwealth's Attorney any objec-
tion to Instruction H, as offered by the accused?
Mr. Pollard: No objection.
The Court: Has the Commonwealth's Attorney any objec-
tion to Instruction I, as offered by the accused?
Mr. Pollard: No, sir.
The Court: Has the Commonwealth's Attorney any objec-
tion to Instruction J, as offered by the accused?
Mr. Pollard: No, sir. In view of the fact that the defend-
ant has offered this Instruction J, to which I have no objec-
tion, I desire to withdraw Instruction No. 10, as offered by me,
as it covers the same facts of the case.
The Court: The Court then permits the Commonwealth's
Attorney to withdraw Instruction No. 10, and it will not be
given.
The Court: Has the Commonwealth's Attorney any objec-
tion to Instruction K, as offered by the accused?
Mr. Pollard: No, sir.
page 259 The Court: Has the Commonwealth's Attor-
ney any objection to Instruction L, as offered by
the accused?
Mr. Pollard: No objection.
The Court: Has the Commonwealth's Attorney any objec-
tion to Instruction M, as offered by the accused?
Mr. Pollard: No, sir.
The Court: I shall give the instructions, of course, when
the jury comes back.
However, I want to state two things:
First, while the instructions are a large number, yet they
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are not too many, and I want to compliment the Common-
wealth's Attorney and the defense counsel upon not asking
for instructions which have no bearing on the case, as counsel
frequently do; and,
Second, I also want to compliment the Commonwealth's
Attorney and the counsel for the accused upon not making
frivolous objections in regard to instructions offered by the
other side.
Let the record show that the Court completed the consid-
eration of the instructions at 12:36 P. M., and that the de-
fendant was present at all times, and that the defendant at
that time was taken back to jail.
page 260 [ The above instructions and incidents to the dis-
cussion of the instructions are incorporated in
this bill of exception, No. 3, which the defendant tendered,
and which he prayed may be signed, sealed and made a part
of the record in this case, which is hereby accordingly done
this 10th day of January, 1944, within sixty days of the final
judgment in this case.
R. T. WILSON (Seal)
Judge of the Hustings Court of the City
of Petersburg.
This bill of exception before it was changed by me was ten-
dered to me on December 29, 1943.
R. T. WILSON
Judge.
page 261 . BILL OF EXCEPTION NO. 4.
Be It Remembered that on the trial of this case the Court
in reversing a prior ruling made with regard to defendant's
offer to testify concerning the making of certain statements
made the following statement in the presence, view and hear-
ing of the jury:
"On yesterday, when the accused was on the stand as a
witness in his own behalf on cross examination, he was asked
by the Attorney for the Commonwealth whether he made cer-
tain statements relative to coming to Petersburg on a truck.
The accused flatly denied making any such statements. The
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Commonwealth's Attorney then laid the proper foundation,
told the accused that he expected to introduce evidence to
show that he did make those statements at the time specified.
If the accused had at that time desired to make some state-
ment about his coming into Petersburg on a truck, that was
the time for him to say whatever he wanted to say, although
he had denied making those specific statements. The Com-
monwealth's Attorney did introduce evidence to the effect that
the statements were made by the accused.
Last night the accused was again put back on the stand,
and the accused was asked to state what he did say in regard
to coming into Petersburg on a truck. At that time I ruled
that the accused had no right to make any such statement. I
am still of the opinion that I was absolutely correct in that
ruling. The accused has no right to take what is ordinarily
called "two bites at a cherry." He had the right, if he denied,
as he did, making those statements, to say what, if anything,
he did say. But the accused has no right to sit idly by, so to
speak, and to take the chance that the Commonwealth will not
introduce evidence which it says it will introduce..
page 262 and, after the Commonwealth does introduce that
evidence, then to come on the stand and say I want
to say what I want to say.
So I say that I think my ruling last night is absolutely cor-
rect according to the law of the State of Virginia.
However, this is a serious case, and I am going to reverse
my ruling in that regard because it is a serious case, and I
will let the accused go on the stand and make any statement
which he says he made in regard to coming into Petersburg
on a truck. I am not going to permit him to reiterate any-
thing which he has said about coming into Petersburg on the
Silver Meteor, because he has testified to that.
So, you may put him back on the stand, if you want to, for
him to make any statement which he wants to make, which he
claims he made with regard to coming. into Petersburg on a
truck. "
Whereupon the Commonwealth's Attorney interposed the
following question:
Mr. Pollard: If your Honor please, I ask whether or not'
he may be restricted in testifying as to what statement he
made in answer to my question at the time referred to when
I laid the foundation for the impeachment.
And the Court thereupon made the following answer:
Silas Rogers v. Commonwealth of Virginia.
The Court: That is absolutely correct. He is confined to
that, and to no other time whatsoever.
Whereupon the defendant, by counsel, moved the Court that
the case be stopped at that particular instant upon grounds
then and there stated, which grounds are stated in the record
incorporated in Bill of Exception No. 1, which motion the
Court overruled. To which action of the Court the defend-
ant, by counsel excepted, and tendered this his bill of excep-
tion No. 4, which he prayed may be signed, sealed, and made
a part of the record in this case, which is hereby accordingly
done this 10th day of January, 1944, within siNty days of the
final judgment in this case.
R. T. WILSON (Seal)
Judge of the Hustings Court of the City
of Petersburg.
page 263 This bill of exception before it was changed by
me was tendered to me on December 29, 1943.
R. T. WILSON
Judge.
page 264 BILL OF EXCEPTION NO. 5.
Be It Remembered that on the trial of this case when the
Commonwealth had completed the presentation of its case-in-
chief and had rested, the defendant moved to strike all of the
evidence of the Commonwealth on the ground that the evi-
dence produced by the Commonwealth was legally insufficient
to sustain a conviction of the crime charged in the indictment,
in that it failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant committed the crime charged. The Court over-
ruled this motion. To which action of the Court the defend-
ant, by counsel, excepted, and tendered this his bill of excep-
tion, No. 5, which he prayed may be signed, sealed, and made
a part of the record in this case, which is hereby accordingly
done this 10th day of January, 1944, within sixty days of the
final judgment in this case.
R. T. WILSON (Seal)
Judge of the Hustings Court of the City
of Petersburg.
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This bill of exception before it was changed by me was ten-
dered to me on December 29, 1943.
R. T. WILSON
Judge.
page 265 BILL OF EXCEPTION NO. 6.
Be It Remembered that on the trial of this case the Com-
monwealth, and the defendant, to sustain their several issues,
introduced various witnesses who testified as fully set forth
in the transcript of testimony certified by the Honorable R.
T. Wilson, Judge of the Hustings Court of the City of Peters-
burg, Virginia, who presided at the trial (said certificate and
transcript being set forth at length in defendant's Bill of Ex-
ceptions No. 1), and which evidence was presented to the jury,
and after hearing the same and at the conclusion thereof, and
after receiving instructions, the jury returned a verdict in
words as follows:
"We the jury find the defendant Silas Rogers guilty of
murder in the First Degree as charged in the Indictment and
fix the punishment Death.
W. J. BARTON, Foreman."
AlThereupon the defendant moved the Court to set aside the
verdict as contrary to the law and the evidence, which motion
the Court overruled. To which action of the Court the defend-
ant, by counsel, excepted, and tendered this his bill of excep-
tion, No. 6, which he prayed may be signed, sealed, and made
a part of the record in this case, which is hereby accordingly
done this 10th day of January, 1944, within sixty days of the
final judgment in this case.
R. T. WILSON ('Seal)
Judge of the Hustings Court of the City
of Petersburg.
This bill of exception before it was changed by me was ten-
dered to me on December 29, 1943.
R. T. WILSON
Judge.
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page 266 BILL OF EXCEPTION NO. 7.
Be It Remembered that on the trial of this case the Com-
monwealth, and the defendant, to sustain their several issues,
introduced various witnesses who testified as fully set forth
in the transcript of testimony certified by the Honorable R.
T. Wilson, Judge of the Hustings Court of the City of Peters-
burg, Virginia, who presided at the trial (said certificate and
transcript being set forth at length in defendant's Bill of
Exceptions No. 1), and which evidence was presented to the
jury, and after hearing the same and at the conclusion thereof,
and after receiving instructions, the jury returned a verdict
in words as follows:
"We the jury find the defendant Silas Rogers guilty of
murder in the First Degree as charged in the Indictment and
fix his punishment Death.
W. J. BARTON, Foreman."
Whereupon, after the Court had overruled the defendant's
motion to set aside the verdict as contrary to the law and the
evidence, as set forth in defendant's Bill of Exception No. 6,
the defendant moved the Court to grant him a new trial upon
the same grounds assigned in support of his pre-
page 267 } vious motion to set aside the verdict, which mo-
tion the Court overruled. To which action of the
Court the defendant, by counsel, excepted, and tendered this
his bill of exception, No. 7, which he prayed may be signed,
sealed, and made a part of the record in this case, which is
hereby accordingly done this 10th day of January, 1944,
within sixty days of the final judgment in this case.
R. T. WILSON, (Seal)
Judge of the Hustings Court of the
City of Petersburg.
This bill of exception before it was changed by me was
tendered to me on December 29, 1943.
R. T. WILSON, Judge.
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia
page 268 BILL OF EXCEPTION NO. 8.
Be It Remembered that on the trial of this case at the con-
clusion of the case when both the Commonwealth and the de-
fendant had rested, the defendant renewed his motion to
strike all of the evidence of the Commonwealth, upon the
ground that the evidence produced by the Commonwealth was
legally insufficient to sustain a conviction of the crime charged
in the indictment, in that it failed to establish beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime
charged. The Court overruled this motion. To which action
of the Court the defendant, by counsel, excepted, and tendered
this his bill of exception, No. 8, which he prayed may be
signed, sealed, and made a part of the record in this case,,
which is hereby accordingly done this 10th day of January,
1944, within sixty days of the final judgment in this case.
R. T. WILSON, (Seal)
Judge of the Hustings Court of the
City of Petersburg.
This bill of exception before it was changed by me waq
tendered to me on December 29, 1943.
R. T. WILSON, Judge.
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City of Petersburg, to-wit:
I, Robert G. Bass, Clerk of the Hustings Court of the City
of Petersburg, in the State of Virginia, do hereby certify that
the foregoing" is a true and correct transcript of the record
and proceedings in the case of the Commonwealth of Virginia,
Prosecuting. against Silas Rovers, for a felony, for Murder,
that I was directed to transcribe.
Given under my hand this 17th day of January, 1944.
ROBERT G. BASS, Clerk.
Fee for this Transcript $25.00, and paid by Defendant's
Attys.
A Copy-Teste:
M. B. WATTS, C. C.
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